• The Political Economy of ‘New Wars’: Fundraising and Global Markets in Contemporary Armed Conflicts
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• War Economies: Issues and Options for Transformation
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• Youth and Conflict in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities for Peacebuilding
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• At the Margin of the City: IDPs, Citizenship, and Urban Polarization in Sudan
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• State Fragility and Restoring Order in Zimbabwe
  Albert Makocekana and Marko Kwamba
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**Book reviews**—critical assessments of new books that integrate peace and conflict concerns (1,500 words maximum).

**Resources**—reports, upcoming conferences and workshops, notices of new books and videos, e-communications, and Web sites that link peace and conflict studies (150 words maximum); documents, declarations, communiqués, and other relevant nongovernmental or multilateral organizational statements (1,000 words maximum).

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AFRICA PEACE AND CONFLICT JOURNAL
Volume 3 Number 1 June 2010

PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT

CONTENTS

Editorial Note v
From the Managing Editor viii

Articles

The Political Economy of ‘New Wars’: Fundraising and Global Markets in
Contemporary Armed Conflicts 1
Gianfabrizio Ladini

War Economies: Issues and Options for Transformation 13
Tony Karbo and Catherine Nelson

Building and Sustaining Peace: The Development–Peacebuilding Nexus in
Post-conflict Reconstruction in Africa 25
Martha Matisi

Youth and Conflict in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities for Peacebuilding 35
Joseph Peter Ochogwu

At the Margin of the City: IDPs, Citizenship, and Urban Polarization in Sudan 49
Mahmoud El Zain

State Fragility and Restoring Order in Zimbabwe 64
Albert Makocekamwa and Marko Kwaramba
Briefing

Information Gathering after Trauma: Considerations for Human Rights Work, Peacebuilding, and Interviewing 80
Laurie Leitch

Bookshelf

Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles, by Richard Dowden 88
Reviewed by Maneshka Eliatamby

It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower, by Michela Wrong 90
Reviewed by Sandra Nyaira

Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women’s Lives through War and Peace in Sierra Leone, by Chris Coulter 94
Reviewed by Beth W. Stewart
Peacebuilding in post-conflict states must be multifaceted, actively engaging support at the local, national, and international levels by civilians, ex-combatants, government, as well as corporations. The recurrent theme of peacebuilding and development in this issue of the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal is in recognition that transforming a conflict society into a peaceable society involves the dual agency of economic structures to lay the foundation for growth and good governance to secure it.

Good governance is not created through elections and institution building alone. Peacebuilding is as much careful economic development as it is social change. Substantive economic transformation involves addressing the issues important to a multiplicity of stakeholders. Economic inclusion necessitates support for alternative livelihoods and opportunities for capital creation, employment at the local level, as well as making a place for ex-combatants in governance. Elements of a framework for economic transformation range from restoration of public services to better management of economic sectors, including regulation of natural resources trade.

The political economy of war is such that state and non-state actors, for example rebel militias, may benefit from violent conflict. Rebel groups exerting power in a nation-state through the exploitation of extractive industries may have a disincentive to work towards peace. In such an instance, peacebuilding requires international cooperation to prevent the financing of violent conflict by stemming demand for the rebel-controlled resource on global markets. For example, the sale of diamonds to finance war in Sierra Leone was mitigated by corporations and governments agreeing to abide by the Kimberley Process, illustrating that war economies can indeed be affected through collaboration among members of the international community. While some domestic parties may be uninterested in peace, other parties must exert power over them. National and international regulation must be cohesive and well coordinated for peacebuilding to have a chance to succeed.

In analysing the political economy of Africa’s so-called new wars, Gianfabrizio Ladini examines the funding imperative of groups involved in intrastate conflicts. He begins by assessing the cold war as a force that contained local conflicts, through the flow or restriction of superpower funding, sometimes preventing escalation. He contrasts this situation with Africa’s new wars, which are typified by internal and domestic violence and links to international markets. Globalization has provided an outlet for the sale of illicitly obtained local resources by state and non-state actors, who also procure materiel from the same global marketplace. Conflicts funded by lootable natural resources complicate the political economy of war and transitions to peace.

The central role of natural resources in financing and prolonging violent conflict in African countries—for example, Angola, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda—is explored by Tony Karbo and Catherine Nelson. Focusing on the role of extractive industries in war economies, the authors consider the transformation of war economies into peaceable economies. Their article explores proposed solutions for stemming war
economies, such as sanctions and corporate responsibility. The inherent challenges of the solutions that have been attempted thus far are also considered.

Martha Mutisi offers a comprehensive discourse on the nexus of good governance and effective economic institutions. She challenges the development-led paradigm of post-conflict reconstruction in questioning the assumption that economic development reduces conflict. Mutisi notes that instead of improving domestic conditions, development aid can sometimes exacerbate fractured societies. When development assistance reaches previously disadvantaged, newly empowered groups, it has the potential to fuel resentment among other groups. Peace is not sustainable by economic empowerment alone; its pursuit must also include community mediation, conflict resolution, and peace education.

Youths take center stage in Joseph Peter Ochogwu’s research on peacebuilding in Nigeria. Ochogwu evaluates the youth constituency as an important population that can either serve as stakeholders in peacebuilding or as volatile drivers of conflict. Although elders may provide the ideology behind a conflict, youths are often the ones engaging in it as a livelihood, and in the process, damaging and terrorizing societies. Poor socioeconomic conditions that create a ‘reserve army of unemployed’ can easily be mobilized militarily. In Nigeria, corporate and state exploitation of unemployed youths illustrates the vulnerability of this group and its tendency toward involvement in violent conflict. Ochogwu suggests that such youths could just as easily (and should be) engaged to participate in peacebuilding.

Mahmoud El Zain considers the challenge of population resettlement through an evaluation of Sudanese housing policy towards internally displaced persons (IDPs) over the last century. A review of the growth of shantytowns and attitudes towards them in Greater Khartoum illustrates how the government, while trying to maintain stability in the capital, has lacked any regard for large-scale population movements and sometimes the fate of its citizens. Hamid notes that although civil wars in Sudan have caused displacement, government policies have also actuated migration to Khartoum. Official efforts to counteract this migration have failed, as IDPs have organized to carve out a place for themselves in the capital area.

Albert Makochekanwa and Marko Kwaramba examine the causes and conditions of state fragility and economic deterioration in Zimbabwe. Their case study shows the fragile state to be comparable to a post-conflict state, particularly in regard to the inextricable link between good governance and economic policy. Identifying hyperinflation and questionable policy decisions as a cause of internal crisis, the authors analyse their negative reverberations, including out migration and brain drain, disintegration of the public health and education sectors, disincentives for investment, and decline in trade relations. Scholar and practitioner Laurie Leitch briefs readers on best practices for information gathering after trauma. She discusses a neuroscientific perspective of collecting people’s stories and the issues of re-traumatization of victims and secondary traumatization of interviewers.

Three recent publications in the field of peace and conflict studies are reviewed in this issue. Maneshka Eliatamby reveals that Richard Dowden’s Altered States, Ordinary Miracles is an autobiography as much as an endeavor to document the effect of the cold war on newly independent African states over the last century. Veteran journalist Michela Wrong in It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower, looks at entrenched corruption and how this malaise played out during the 2007 elections in

Catherine Nelson and Tony Karbo
From the Managing Editor

More than two years ago, the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal published its first issue with the agenda of contributing to the academic discourse in the developing field of peace and conflict studies. It has actively pursued and achieved the goal of specializing on Africa while engaging different fields, including, among others, international relations, law, anthropology, public policy, and political science.

The foundation thus lain, the journal comes to a juncture where it is capable of expanding its focus in specialized areas of peace and conflict research. In this issue, on the nexus of peacebuilding and development, we present alternative analyses on the value of stakeholders in peacebuilding and suggestions for transforming economies of war into peaceable economies.

Academic thought on peacebuilding and development needs the kind of critical analysis offered in this issue. Because efforts to develop post-conflict economies have not always been successful in the past, we must address the tough questions surrounding these failures, seek detailed analysis of them, and search for potential solutions. As is widely known, good governance is a prerequisite for any attempt to structure institutions involved in post-conflict development. Sound financial institutions cannot be effective without respect for property rights, equal opportunity for citizens, and assistance with employment, capital creation, and support of alternative livelihoods. Academic rigour must be applied to these areas as well. It is our aim with this expanded focus on peace, conflict, and development to contribute to a relevant, new, and constructive discourse on these topics. The research involved is an added value to the scholastic field as much as it is constructive in the areas of policy and practice.

I would like to thank the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development (JPD) for its support in the launch of the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal. JPD—one of the leading academic journals addressing issues of peacebuilding and development—has since 2004 been publishing on these issues at both the conceptual and practical levels. Anyone interested in these areas should consult past and current issues of JPD.

We would like to once again thank the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Canada for its support in this progressive endeavor to promote quality research by scholars offering new and concise approaches to peacebuilding and development. With the IDRC’s assistance, the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal continues to offer a platform for academics throughout Africa to make their voices heard and their ideas known. This issue includes contributions from scholars at the University of Jos in Nigeria, the Africa University of Zimbabwe, and the University of Pretoria in South Africa. At this time, we would also like to welcome Guy Martin, as the newest member to our Editorial Board. He is a professor of political science in the Department of Social Sciences at Winston-Salem State University, North Carolina, in the United States.

Tony Karbo
Economic factors have always been integral to conflict, because fighting wars requires resources. Whereas interstate conflicts are and have been typically financed by taxing populations under warring governments’ control, contemporary armed conflicts, or so-called new wars—featuring fighting within state boundaries between a state and non-state actors—operate under a different equation, necessitating new means of fundraising to finance warring parties’ objectives and political projects. The absence of functional institutions and good systems of governance with prospects for furthering development in conflict areas have allowed the formation of war economies marked by the violent appropriation of local resources. Armed groups today exploit opportunities made possible through globalization by marketing these local resources through worldwide commercial networks. These same global outlets in turn supply military groups with the weapons they need. This complex network has far-reaching policy implications for peacemaking and conflict resolution, but thus far remains difficult to control.

**WARFARE HAS ALWAYS BEEN SHAPED BY ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS.** To view it as being sustained always by economic drivers, however, would be to oversimplify a much more complex reality. Economics are obviously crucial to warfare in at least two ways: as a motive for fighting and as a feature of warfare’s execution, as wars must be funded. It can be argued that until recently the economic dimension of warfare has primarily received attention only insofar as state-related violence is concerned, be it in terms of interstate conflicts or colonial policies, while intrastate wars have attracted relatively little policy-making and academic interest. The character of some contemporary conflicts has now gained in attention, however, prompting many to speak of ‘new wars’. Decolonization, globalizing markets, and the end of the cold war, some

Theorists note, have led to a form of warfare in which collapsing states, territorial claims based on sub-state identities, criminal economies, and legal commercial networks intersect. Through this network, non-state actors self-finance their war efforts by exploiting local resources, which they sell on the global market in exchange for money and arms. The lucrative nature of this network can encourage the continuation of conflict and complicate peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts.

The cold war covered the world with a single blanket whose edges were in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union. For decades, world politics was indeed shaped by the superpowers’ nuclear rivalry, which had a global posture, as the outcome of nuclear strikes would have known no boundaries. Under this blanket, local issues could well develop global implications, inviting superpower engagement through military operations or funding of trade unions, political parties, or armed groups. At the same time, however, these local conflicts could be controlled through external patronage and flows of money from the United States and the Soviet Union, thus preventing them from escalating to a level that would have disrupted the balance of terror.

The end of the cold war did not lead to the disappearance or resolution of these more-or-less latent conflicts. Indeed, quite the opposite occurred. State structures faced increasing risk of collapse because of corrupt political elites acting without their former patrons’ political and financial backing or restraint; social policies could not be financed because of the economic structural adjustments needed to acquire loans from international financial institutions. Such crises of the state raised new opportunities for fighting, especially where governments could not assert a monopoly over violence and taxation. The end of the cold war created the imperative that warring parties self-finance their political projects and military operations, as funding would no longer be forthcoming from the two blocs. These conditions—at the root of the internal, domestic dimension of contemporary war economies—explain why local resources came to be looted or acquired through pillage, ‘protection’ taxes, monopolistic control over trade and natural resources, appropriation of humanitarian aid, forced depopulation of land, and exploitation of labor. The other characteristic of contemporary war is its connectivity with global markets and commercial networks, both legal and illegal, through which the marketing of local resources and arms procurement are carried out. Globalization,
and the economic opportunities it offers, plays a crucial role in understanding and dealing with the new wars.

ECONOMICS OF TRUST, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT

Globalization is a complex social phenomenon, comprising political, economic, and cultural exchanges on a large scale. It is not entirely new, but the exchange of various kinds of information and products has definitely taken unprecedented forms in the wake of technological and economic evolutions. The increasing ease with which capital and services now flow within the world economy requires that analysis of the political economy of the new wars focus on the economic and financial aspects of globalization. This process was initially encouraged by financial deregulation and advanced by technological innovations, which in turn encouraged the kind of internationalization of production reflected in the growth of foreign direct investment as well as the role of transnational corporations in the global economy.

The collapse of the command economy associated with communism left little doubt that the free market indeed provides space for economic growth and development. It is risky, however, to vest markets and economic forces with the political task of advancing social change that a sustainable development policy might seek. The relationship between developed and less-developed economies is marked by substantial disadvantages of the latter that must be taken into account in order for them to benefit from a free economy.

The more-developed economies—centered mainly in the core regions of the Americas, Europe, and East Asia—can rely on connections between finance and production to build wealth through a process involving research and development, production, distribution, use, and waste. In these economies, the service industry—for example, insurance, research, trading, and marketing companies in certain markets—constitutes the basis for agriculture, industry, and other services as well (that is, the traditional economic sectors) in every phase of the wealth-building process, which needs steadfast financial investment to be effectively carried out. Risk management and the growing role of finance have come to be staples in the more-developed and more-uncertain service economies.

Notwithstanding structural uncertainties, choosing to invest money today in hopes of a better tomorrow requires putting ones trust in the current and future environment to lessen the risk that the funds invested will be lost. The growing role of finance in the more-developed economies comes from institutional assurances concerning in-


6. I would like to thank Professor Orio Giarini for clarifying these points. See O. Giarini and R. Stahel, The Limits to Certainty (Norwell, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993).
vestor decisions relative to some kind of security based on individual property rights and the enforceability of contracts. Indeed, from medieval times to the contemporary age, the institutional environment in the West has provided sufficient security to encourage the economic dynamics of saving, investment, trade, specialization, and integration, thereby promoting virtuous circles of capital creation, trade, and economic development. This is not the situation, however, in other regions of today’s world.

Lagging development often points to the absence of functional institutions and systems of governance. In less-developed countries, the institutional framework is notably weak even where parliamentary government exists. Oftentimes, economic opportunities are monopolized by privileged elites, nepotism, and corruption. Coupled with western protectionism, above all in the agricultural and textile sectors, and poorly conceived economic policies, these (internal and external) institutional deficiencies put these societies at a strategic disadvantage in today’s global economy. Development, thus, relies on global and local structures, institutions, and policies that will close the gap in economic opportunity, providing access to resources to disadvantaged individuals and groups. If it is otherwise, the knowledge and resources of local individuals, groups, and communities cannot be used in the creation of capital; also, rather than participating in globalizing markets, they will be restricted to the informal economy. If their property rights are not recognized by legal structures, they cannot use them to obtain credit, even though their resources would help feed the hidden taxes of corruption. Thus, any development strategy should aim to open global markets to the people it is designed to assist, providing them with the power to effectively take advantage of their knowledge, resources, and property.

7. The philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) argued that mutual trust in human society derives from the security of possessions and their conveyance by consent as well as the respect of promises. See Hume, Trattato della natura umana (Treatise on human nature), 3 vols. (Milan, Bompiani 2001), book 3, pt. 2, secs. 2–4. A certain degree of security involving property rights allows people the possibility of making reliable plans for the future. See also F. A. von Hayek, 'Economics and knowledge', Economica, 13 (1937), 33–54. A. de Soto, The Mystery of Capital (New York, Basic Books, 2000), and D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), argue that western political and juridical institutions have promoted these conditions relatively well, enabling the West’s economy to create the capital at the center of its relative success.

8. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance; de Soto, The Mystery of Capital. These dynamics have been an unintended outcome of historical social interactions and the result of specific policies of sovereigns. The relative economic success of Europe and the West provided the financial resources that state elites could use in conflicts and pursuit of worldwide strategies and policies, among them colonialism and imperialism. The collapse of the Soviet Union, moreover, was due mostly to its own economic failure vis-à-vis the better-equipped western economy. In strategic terms, the relative wealth of western societies gave their state elites power and funding while the Soviet elite struggled with the ‘welfare-or-warfare dilemma’.


11. On the decisive relationship between economics and knowledge, see von Hayek, ‘Economics and knowledge’; for institutional failures in developing countries, see de Soto, The Mystery of Capital; and for the crucial role of internal trade as an engine of growth, see Bauer, ‘From subsistence to exchange’.
More than dealing with state balance of payments and international finance, the idea of development concerns strengthening entire societies in terms of securing individual freedom to choose.\textsuperscript{12} To the contrary, however, the policies pursued by the international financial institutions—namely, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—have typically applied a trickle-down approach, the so-called Washington consensus, or its successor after 1990. They focus primarily on financial deregulation, trade liberalization, and austerity in the interest of encouraging and safeguarding foreign investment more than promoting social stability. Foreign economic institutions, coming from highly functioning environments—that is, developed economies—thus hold a strategic advantage over those from developing contexts.\textsuperscript{13} It should also be noted that the West’s economic and institutional environment emerged gradually over time, and perhaps within less complex historical contexts, often with governments actively protecting their own economies and private operators. It seems reasonable that in today’s more complex economic environment, development policies should be sensitive to local problems and socioeconomic realities in a way that enhances the ability of communities and economic operators to compete successfully in globalizing markets.

Capitalism and economic globalization constitute powerful sources of wealth creation and economic growth. One cannot overlook how the relative wealth of the West provided the “start-up” capital for colonialism and its global projection of political and economic power going back centuries. Problems arise, however, when the free market is viewed as the means and ends of social development. Economic transactions no doubt require effective and accountable systems of governance, with institutions and policies supportive to the needs of local populations and flexible in given contexts. Since every country and community has its own unique history, problems, social norms, and institutions, there is no universal, ahistorical trickle-down recipe for development; rather, the circumstances of the target population in the development process should assume primacy. One should ask, Whose development? Whose interests and needs should determine the process? There should be local timelines for development strategies aimed at promoting self-sustainable societies able to find a means of capital creation and progressively integrate into globalizing markets to take advantage of the potential gains there.\textsuperscript{14}

Whereas protectionism has encouraged the survival of closed economic structures, failures in state and international governance have caused problems as well, perpetuating corrupt political elites and mediating structural adjustment policies with negative effects on social cohesion and economic performance. The enormous flows of international aid have long been diverted to governments and for state elites’ consumption instead of being used to invest in the future of those for whom it was intended.\textsuperscript{15} A basic issue in promoting development, then, involves the kind of institutions


\textsuperscript{13} Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.; Collier, The Bottom Billion; de Soto, The Mystery of Capital.

\textsuperscript{15} Erixon, Aid and Development: Will It Work This Time? (London, International Policy Network, 2005); P. Bauer, ‘Foreign aid: Abiding issues’, From Subsistence to Exchange and Other Essays, chap. 5.
and systems of governance able to advance it by fostering sustainable processes of social change. At the end of the day, given the primacy of local individuals, groups, and communities, the overall objective of development policies should include working with or creating institutions able to guarantee the security of individuals and groups in terms of property rights and expectations.

THE NEW WAR ECONOMIES

Conflicts and underdevelopment are intimately linked. Not every less-developed country will degenerate into civil war, but the new wars typically presuppose some institutional conditions of underdevelopment—that is, a general context of insecurity revolving around governance, individual property rights, and sufficient stability to allow for planning in pursuit of a better life. Development is unlikely without security, and security cannot exist without some institutional protection of property rights and expectations. The new wars constitute probably the worst case in which institutional and governance failures and globalization converge. Institutional chaos encourages the violent appropriation of resources that then find easy access to global markets and commercial networks. The need of warring parties to self-finance their political projects and military operations is easily fulfilled by underdevelopment and globalization. The lack of functional institutions and systems of governance makes it easy for armed groups constrained by the ‘fundraising imperative’ to use their military leverage for economic purposes.

In the arena of a typical new war, both domestic institutional failures—sometimes an outcome of colonial legacies—and structural adjustment policies have promoted the emergence of quasi-feudal economies. The wealth-building process is determined by elite controls over economic exchange, on the political ability to keep more or less informal forms of protectionism in place to avoid economic integration, and to make the best of every exploitable difference (at the expense of the powerless). In such situations, saving seems to be a hazardous risk management strategy because of the lack of security surrounding individual resources. In the wake of such institutional failures, military power to control and protect people, economies, and resources is used by warring parties that have the ability to take advantage of the opportunities provided by globalizing markets, where the profitable marketing of local resources and arms procurement takes place. Warfare thus becomes a worthy economic enterprise, often with violence providing the means to acquire the commodities the global market demands. Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord, made $400 million a year during the civil war that lasted from 1992 to 1996. In such contexts, war becomes not only the continuation of politics by other means, as Clausewitz theorized, but also of economics, providing a financial stake in the continuation of conflict rather than getting to the negotiation table, creating spaces of cooperation between supposed enemies at the expense of the powerless civilian population, and increasing the number of actors and interests involved in the conflict and sometimes in its prolongation.

Local Resources, Global Commercial Networks

Armed groups’ fundraising usually follows two integrated strategies. First, they try to redistribute existing resources by adopting such tactics as pillage, robbery, imposition of ‘protection’ taxes and economic sieges, exploitation of labor, and appropriation of humanitarian aid. Second, they acquire external aid from governments or remittances from a diaspora or they fight their military enemy and civilians for monopolistic control over local commodities, natural resources, trade routes, and external links and force them to leave valuable land. These strategies lead to the provision of salaries or wage supplements or replacement, while control over price fluctuation through taxes, sieges, and aggression produces ‘forced markets’ beneficial to those using violence.19

In a statistical analysis of civil conflicts from 1990 to 2000, Michael Ross found that among all the major types of natural resources associated with them, diamonds and drugs led the way.20 Other resources frequently linked to the new wars included various gemstones, oil and natural gas, drugs, copper, gold, and timber. The relevance of their role in conflict dynamics depends largely on the ease or difficulty of looting them, and to a lesser extent on whether they can be transported easily and safely, and their legality. Being able to easily loot resources helped prolong conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Peru, and Sierra Leone because of the benefits each party gained and the tendency of discipline problems to develop within the groups as chains of command weakened in light of individuals taking advantage of exploiting the available resources.

A useful distinction for understanding the role played by natural resources in conflict dynamics is that between lootable and unlootable resources.21 The former—such as diamonds, opium crops, timber, or coltan—are mostly associated with non-separatist conflicts, for instance in Sierra Leone, Colombia, and Afghanistan. Access to this kind of resource may prolong the conflict by financing hostilities and foster the above-mentioned discipline problems. Unlootable resources, such as oil and natural gas, are linked to separatist conflicts. Their exploitation can exacerbate local grievances because of environmental pollution without economic benefit. Exploiting these resources is technology and skill intensive, and thus the resulting benefits typically accrue to national governments and foreign companies, as occurred in Sudan.

Commodities have no economic value in conflict areas where people cannot buy them: often, there is no local market because there are no local consumers. Global markets, however, offer millions of potential consumers and create interest among trading networks to provide economic mediation between global demand and local supply. A few good examples of this include the Liberian diamonds trafficked by Charles Taylor or the de Beers’ ‘conflict diamonds’ in Angola and Sierra Leone. Coltan, a mineral used in producing mobiles and laptop computers, has become the main commodity in the war economy of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Oil features

prominently in Aceh (Indonesia), Sudan, and Nigeria, where the Shell company has played a role in fostering conflict in the Niger Delta basin, while opium is the focus in Afghanistan and Nepal. Coca was the commodity of choice in Colombia and Peru, and control of drug routes was a source of funds in Bosnia. Striving for control of the local economy and resources thus constitutes a viable fundraising strategy of warring parties with the ability to forge flexible links with the new opportunities opened by globalizing markets and commercial networks.

Whereas the global markets are full of consumers demanding what warring groups supply, they are also full of actors supplying what the groups demand. The parties to a conflict supplying commodities typically demand in return goods to help them continue waging war. The end of the cold war, which created the biggest weapons stockpile in history, has led to the dumping of an enormous amount of arms onto the market, especially by members of the former Warsaw Pact converting to NATO weaponry. In addition, typical pre-1990s trade and production continued as well, so prices of material decreased everywhere, which made small arms available in a quantity that made them virtual weapons of mass destruction.

No Rules: The Arms Trade and Policy Options

The arms trade operates outside the jurisdiction of international bodies, such as the World Trade Organization or UN parameters. Control is left to national governments, which have generally proved to be unable or unwilling to effectively regulate exchanges. The five largest producers of weapons—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—all sit on the UN Security Council. A report from the field operations of Oxfam and Amnesty International stresses that ‘the absence of controls, together with the presence of loopholes or poor enforcement of controls, means that the arms travel too easily around the world, reaching conflict zones and countries with poor human rights records or high levels of organised crime. The majority of weapons in such situations are not home produced.’

Current brokering ensures that arms will get into whatever hands can pay for them, including those with such resources as diamonds, oil, or drugs. Arms production is usually a legal activity, but brokers nonetheless have also demonstrated a high degree of skill in circumventing national laws in order to supply the world’s conflict areas, even when they are subject to UN embargoes, as in the case of Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Iraq, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, to name a few. Government forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo used attack helicopters provided legally

22. C. Cater, ‘The political economy of conflict and UN intervention: Rethinking the critical cases of Africa’ in Ballentine and Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict; Ross, ‘Oil, drugs and diamonds’; Kaldor, New and Old Wars.

23. The AK-47, also known as the Kalashnikov, is a symbol of this democratization of violence. It is cheap, durable, easily portable, and requires little maintenance. It is not highly precise, but can fire up to thirty bullets in less than three seconds, each with lethal potential for more than a kilometer. It is easy and comfortable to use and is well suited for poorly trained people, including child soldiers.


by German and Belgian brokers to slaughter thousands of civilians in the residential area of Brazzaville in 1997. The episode contributed to the decision of the European Union to launch a peacemaking mission in 2003. This case makes clear that effective measures of conflict prevention and management are not restricted to conflict areas, but also involve developments and decisions in other countries and regions whose governments are not directly involved in the conflict.

Even where codes of conduct apply to arms transfers and are observed, as in EU states, and despite nice political rhetoric, some governments remain nonetheless keen to support arms supplies and military training for security forces with tarnished reputations: Britain trained the military corps of Suharto, the Indonesian dictator responsible of human rights abuses on a mass scale; Italy supplied small arms to the police forces and armies in Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Turkey; the United States and Britain, among others, armed the Iraqi government in the 1980s and are the main arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia.26

The trade of local resources and weapons is encouraged by the lack of effective means of control over conflict goods. This lack of effective international regulation of the new wars’ economic transactions provides incentives for parasitic, predatory, rent-seeking, and criminal political economies linking state and non-state actors with international commercial networks and global markets. The regulation of their activities would constitute an important element of broader strategies of conflict management as well as a means of connecting peacebuilding and development efforts. Charles Cater, for instance, proposes enforceable regimes of market regulation for the extraction of natural resources in conflict zones.27 Paul Collier advocates for international standards and tracking of natural resources, good governance, and post-war reconstruction to be agreed upon and enforced by international organizations.28 These kinds of regulations would aim at reducing the accessibility, profitability, and fungibility of lucrative resources, for instance, through targeted sanctions, freezing of financial assets, or strategies of interdiction developed to deal with transnational organized crime.

At present, two policy initiatives are worth mentioning that aim to curtail resource flows of conflict goods in order to influence combatants’ willingness to make peace. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), an international voluntary effort that took effect on 1 January 2003, targets the ‘conflict diamonds’ used to finance wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Congo. The KPCS advanced because of the political, humanitarian, and public relations concerns of governments, non-governmental organizations, and the diamond industry. It works by requiring warranties that the certified diamonds are not related to conflicts and war economies. A few other initiatives also attempt to bring transparency to extractive industries. The Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), among others, have gained in popularity. PWYP is an NGO-led campaign launched in 2002 to make it mandatory for extractive companies to make pub-


lic their payments to host governments. It also advocates strong monitoring and control mechanisms. The EITI works similarly, except that participation is voluntary. EITI was promoted by the United Kingdom in 2002 and endorsed by the World Bank.29 Other mechanisms for controlling links between natural resources, global markets, and wars include UN Security Council targeted embargoes, provisions against money laundering, arms trafficking, and illicit finance related to the UN system as well as other intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The global nature of the war economies means that international action is needed in tackling this phenomenon. Such an approach needs to overcome problems of collective action wherein one political or economic entity hesitates to act because it lacks assurances that others will do the same: Why, for instance, should a company publish its financial records when its competitors do not (and may gain an economic advantage from secrecy)?

The new wars’ economic networks are fluid and adaptable to changing circumstances. The different interests involved and shifting network of actors make addressing this issue difficult.30 Any type of intervention or regulation, therefore, needs to take into account the risks and weaknesses of operating in a sometimes nebulous environment. It is obviously not an easy task to apply effective international controls in conflict-affected areas lacking adequate monitoring and agencies for intervention.31 What is perhaps most striking is that well-motivated international policies can have unintended outcomes that negatively affect conflict resolution processes and the civilians they aim to protect.32

As Karen Ballentine has argued, easily looted resources are inherently difficult to regulate, while sanctions have the effect of raising the value of their targets, thereby increasing the economic incentive in marketing them.32 Sanctions against specific territories, moreover, may well play into the hands of the warring party controlling that area, and far from being neutral, could be used by the parties to shift the military balance and create strategic advantage. Targeting natural resources may increase the role of the local population as resource provider: a reduction in revenues as a result of an international embargo is likely to increase competition between parties over what remains to exploit. In these circumstance the civilian population’s resources and workforce may well come to acquire economic value. Thus sanctions and regulations can intensify conflicts, criminal actions, and civilian suffering, at least in the short term.

Furthermore, besides increasing civilian predation, targeting war economies’ conflict goods often has direct consequences for the daily life of communities that rely on these goods for survival. The drug trade in Colombia and Afghanistan, for instance, help sustain not only military operations but families as well.33

In addition to the shortcomings in international policy noted above, Neil Cooper notes a tendency to focus on a specific type of actor who engages in conflict trade and

certain conflict goods deemed worthy of control.\textsuperscript{34} The type of actors deemed worthy of concern have been rebel forces, not state actors, despite evidence of involvement of the latter in conflict trade. The economic interests of developed countries have impeded control over certain conflict goods, such as Liberian timber, whose main importers are French and Chinese entities. This, of course, has had an effect on post-conflict economies, where the legacies of war economies continued to be operational in terms of actors, mechanisms, and networks untouched by international policy actions.

Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke highlight some of the concrete implications to be drawn from the complex nature of contemporary war economies.\textsuperscript{35} First, a sound stakeholder analysis is a prerequisite for any policy dealing with war economies. It entails identifying the key actors, their motives, incentives they need to seek peace, and who controls the means of violence. A stakeholder analysis must also distinguish between participants in the war economy who seek profit and power and those who seek mere survival.\textsuperscript{36}

Ballentine and Nitzschke recommend five areas where international policy making should direct its efforts. First, transparency and accountability should be promoted as ways to strengthen global and regional regulatory mechanisms and to loosen the linkages between conflict trade and money laundering, corruption, international crime, and illicit finance. Second, sanctions enforcement can be improved by, for instance, using UN secondary sanctions to compel member states’ compliance with resolutions. Third, powersharing must be addressed in peace processes and negotiations, and resource-sharing agreements must be included if a struggle for natural resources is a prominent feature of the conflict. Given the importance of funding post-conflict recovery programs to avoid renewed hostilities, international financial institutions should be involved early on in peacebuilding efforts to promote conflict-sensitive development and a peacebuilding-related conditionality for loans. Fourth, DDR—disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—should include immediate funding for fast-acting, income generation projects. Fifth, the shadow economy should be harnessed to ensure that the post-conflict economy will not be marked by the legacy of the former war economy. This calls for the effective rule of law sustained by appropriate police training and judicial reform.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Contemporary armed conflicts feature complex networks of actors, interests, and dynamics. Far from old statist paradigms, they often call state sovereignty into question and take place typically within state territories between state and non-state actors. The political economy of today’s conflicts are such that they are worthy of special consideration. In these so-called new wars, politics and economics are often so interconnected that it may be hard to separate business profits and political motives. Powerless civilian populations become not just unintended victims of military operations but also the targets of acts of violence intentionally carried out by armed groups for eco-

\textsuperscript{34} Cooper, ‘State collapse as business’, 935–55.
\textsuperscript{35} Ballentine and Nitzschke, ‘The political economy of civil war and conflict transformation’, 17–19.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 9.
nomic gain. In such circumstances, the connections between politics and economics need to be taken thoroughly into account for any kind of conflict analysis to form the basis of successful conflict resolution policies. The complex nature of contemporary armed conflicts makes war economies inherently difficult to tackle. Thus the economic systems of wartime tend to persist in post-conflict settings, further hindering peacebuilding efforts and mortgaging the free development of societies attempting to emerge from conflict.
From the late 1980s into the twenty-first century, Africa experienced incessant civil strife that systematically diverted scarce national resources from development and prevented the continent from benefiting from the fast-paced processes of globalization. Academics, practitioners, and policy makers have offered various explanations for incidences of protracted civil conflict in Africa. The differences in their opinions beg that a closer look be taken at violent conflict and its causes, civil war, the pervasiveness of war economies, and strategies for the transformation of war economies into peaceable economies.

WHY SHOULD SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS BE CONCERNED about war economies? Why is the issue topical? For starters, there continues to be a dire need to improve overall understanding of the economic motivations of civil war in order to increase strategic competence in addressing the economic agendas of belligerents in violent conflicts. Furthermore, focused analysis of the economic agendas of protracted civil conflict is useful in developing policy responses that can address the economic roots of conflict or paradigmatically shift the agendas of elites and various groups to the conflict. Understanding war economies would also encourage scholars to discern empirical data that will assist in laying the foundation for improving peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.

THE CURRENT DEBATE

The exploitation of natural resources to prosecute war aims is one of the most troubling trends in violent conflict in Africa. Many African nations are endowed with valuable natural resources, including some of world’s most precious metals and minerals (for example, gold, diamonds, coltan, and uranium). Since the end of the cold war, international and local actors have intensified efforts to gain access to these resources. Most often, civil conflict has been used as a vehicle to gain control over them. Beginning in the late 1980s, Angola, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),...
Liberia, Sudan, and Uganda experienced protracted civil war in which natural resources played a central role.1

The concept of a ‘war economy’ refers generally to the overall economic and political characteristics associated with a violent conflict. Some scholars speak of the ‘economic functions of war’, referring to the patterns of economic linkages during conflict.2 The term war economy refers to the contingencies undertaken by a state to mobilize its economy to support war, creating a ‘system of producing, mobilising and allocating resources to sustain violence’.3 The concept was adopted by academics to analyze the dynamics of western economies during World Wars I and II; its application to the study of civil wars in Africa is a recent undertaking.

In the early 2000s, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler introduced their ‘greed versus grievance’ theory of resource conflict. The hypothesis emphasizes the opportunistic greed of rebel groups as a cause of conflict, rather than grievances emanating from group marginalization, ethnicity, poverty, and other structural issues.4 The theory sparked intense discussion in academic and policy circles about the political and cultural causes of conflicts over natural resources.5

Collier and Hoeffler acknowledge that conflict can be explained either by greed or by feelings of ethnic or political marginalization, that is, grievances.6 They conclude, however—in large part based on the correlation between primary commodities and conflict—that to understand the causes of contemporary civil wars one should discard political and cultural arguments and focus primarily on the greed element, especially when trade in natural resources is involved.7 Others also locate the problem in the correlation between commodities and conflict, but not in the greed of rebels; rather, they see the driving force as the rebels’ need to finance their campaigns and the opportunity to do so through trade in natural resources.8 The correlation could arise, for example, if conflict or expectations of conflict cause other economic activities,


7. Ibid.

such as tourism or manufacturing, to cease, thereby leaving only extractive industries as a reliable source of money.

In recent years, the greed versus grievance thesis has gained much prominence in the war economy debate. The major thrust of the debate is whether the phenomena of greed and grievance, if examined systematically, explain the behaviours and motivations of belligerents in protracted violent civil conflicts. Greed, according to Collier, reflects actors’ competition over valuable natural resources.9 Central to the grievance theory is identity group formation. An individual’s satisfaction is related to his or her identity and the relative position he or she has in society. At the heart of this proposition are the conditions of relative deprivation, polarization, and horizontal inequalities. Ted Robert Gurr defines relative deprivation as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they believe they can get.10 In other words, the core of the grievance thesis lies in inter-group hatreds, political exclusion, unequal distribution of resources, and marginalization. Collier and Hoeffler posit that civil wars stem from the greed of rebel groups’ leaders, who then organize insurgencies against legitimate governments. Greed, according to Collier and Hoeffler, consists of the opportunities recognized by a rebel group.11

Kenneth Omeji acknowledges that many of today’s intra-state wars occur in the global south in countries where there is an abundance of resources and highlights the propensity of these conflicts to arise in the face of the development of rentier economies, which are pervasive in countries where the central state authority is weak or failing. Omeji defines a rentier economy as one in which ‘rent plays a major role, and in which that rent is external to the economy’.12 In rentier economies, taxes and other forms of revenue are deliberately circumvented from the formal economy with the result that the state is deprived of much-needed revenue. It contrasts with a production state, which relies on taxation of the domestic economy to raise revenue. In short, a rentier economy is one whose economic survival and growth is significantly dependent on rents generated from natural resources. Chad, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan, among other African states, would be considered to have rentier economies. Countries where rentier economies have thrived are characterized by dysfunctional development plans and weak institutions. The exploitative nature of the state perpetuates rentier economies through its development of political and economic structures to sustain it. Elites within the state exploit the weak political and economic structures to develop parallel economic structures that promote the agendas that support violence.

War economies are propagated by an array of actors: governments, rebel fighters, mercenary units, civil defense militias, paramilitary groups (usually sponsored by governments, for example, the Kamajor in Sierra Leone), peacekeeping forces from regional and international organizations, and criminal networks, among others. The multiplicity of actors adds to the complexity and escalatory aspects of war. Actors in

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violent conflicts are usually motivated in part 'by their economic conditions, the economic structures that shape their views and the economic alternatives available to them.' 13 The concentration of resource wealth offers an ideal inducement to rebels and other dissident groups to challenge the state to ultimately obtain rent. In the post–cold war violent conflicts in Angola, the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the abundance of natural resources and potential income from them created situations in which the level of risk to seek rent through state capture was less than enduring the economic inequalities experienced by aggrieved groups in these states. 14

Collier, Karen Ballentine, and Heiko Nitzschke have demonstrated a correlation between natural resource abundance and the risk of armed conflict. 15 ‘Lootable’ resources, such as diamonds and narcotics, provide incomes for local communities and combatants and can be extracted, transported, and concealed by individuals and groups with relative ease. Access to lootable natural resources has been shown to disproportionately benefit insurgents and rebel groups. Ballentine and Sherman have suggested three pathways connecting natural resources to conflict: First, natural resources can contribute to the outbreak of conflict when groups attempt to control or gain access to those that are scarce or extractive. Second, extractive resources can be exploited to finance arms and armies or become a strategic consideration in gaining territory. This was the case in Angola, where the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) took control of diamond-mining areas; Liberia, where the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) controlled timber and diamond-mining areas; and Sierra Leone, where the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) controlled large swathes of diamond-mining lands in the eastern part of the country. Third, prospects for peace might be undermined by individuals or factions that stand to lose access to revenues gained from resource exploitation in conflict areas. In such cases, rebel and insurgent groups may actively hinder peace processes because they benefit from the continuation of conflict. The RUF and the NPFL stalled peace talks as they continued to exploit diamonds and timber, respectively. 16

These factors suggest that resource wealth alone is not a predictor of violent conflict in Africa. Namibia and Botswana, for example, have diamond reserves, yet they have not devolved into civil war. What is present, or absent, in societies affects the conditions by which greed and grievance may or may not induce war. The type of diamond mining and the technology involved, as well as good governance, distinguish Namibia and Botswana from Sierra Leone and Angola. In Sierra Leone, diamond reserves are found in alluvial fields, making the stones easily extractable by hand. 17 Diamonds in Namibia and Botswana require the technology for Kimberlite mining, not to mention government infrastructure to regulate extraction. Botswana’s diamond

14. Ibid.
15. Collier, ‘Doing well out of war’; Ballentine and Nitzschke, Profiting from Peace.
industry also stands apart from others prone to resource wars because of its advanced management of the industry.  

Good governance can be an asset stabilizing a country with resource wealth, to the point of withstanding threats caused by outbreaks of violence by marginalized populations. The San bushmen of Botswana were removed from their land so the government could exploit the country’s diamond resources. The San, rather than taking up arms, are presently using the court system to challenge the government over the expropriation of the land.

Although the greed and grievance theory has gained considerable credence in the literature on war economies, challenges to it cannot be overlooked. The theory is silent on the role played by governments and their elites in resource-rich states. Governments control a variety of income- and resource-generating mechanisms. Tax revenues and funding from the international community often provide governments large sums of money, the allocation of which has sometimes led to endemic corruption, polarization, weak institutions, human rights abuses, and inequitable distribution of resources in many war-torn countries in Africa.

**TYPOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION**

Jonathan Goodhand identifies three distinct but overlapping categories of war economies, each with a range of actors with differing interests and activities. A ‘combat economy’ entails economic activities that sustain war or conflict and includes such actors as the security arms of the state (military, paramilitary police, intelligence) and rebel groups and domestic and foreign groups profiteering from conflict, so-called conflict entrepreneurs. The combat economy funds war through production, mobilization, and allocation of resources to sustain the conflict. Further, predatory taxation of legal and illicit economic activities, extortion, control over strategic natural resources (such as diamonds, coltan, timber, or oil), and capture of foreign aid, diaspora remittances, and piracy are some of the elements that feed the combat economy.

A ‘shadow economy’, also known as the black market or underground economy, encompasses a range of informal relationships involving actors who profit from war or conflict. These profiteers may not be involved in the actual combat, but weigh war and peace as options in the expansion of their profit margins. Shadow economies are captured by respective combatants, at which time they become extensions, and actually the basis, of combat economies.

‘Coping economies’ emerge almost spontaneously to enable populations in conflict zones to survive the adversities of war. They involve subsistence agriculture, petty trading, cross-border smuggling, and diaspora remittances that help civilian populations make ends meet. The coping economy usually becomes a target of extortion, predatory taxation, and control of natural resources by parties in the combat economy.

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War economies become integrated into regional conflict formations, assuming positions in regional and global linkages of criminal networks and contraband that reinforce combat economies. Restoration of peace and democratic governance are necessary conditions for dismantling war economies. As Mats Berdal and David Keen succinctly point out, however, the transition from war to peace in many African countries in recent years does not connote a clear path from violence to consent, from plunder to production, or from repression to democracy. Instead, it constitutes a realignment of political interests and readjustment of economic strategies. Even in countries where there is no war, and where smuggling, criminality, and trade in contraband have become part and parcel of the political economy, these vices tend to become systemic and ingrained in national, regional, and global criminal networks.

War leaves behind not only destroyed economies, but also decimated infrastructures, and more often than not, a dearth of the institutional, human, financial, and other capacities need for rebuilding. Transforming war economies into peaceable economies requires a number of strategies, including negotiating economic aspects of peace agreements, financing peacebuilding and economic policies, and transforming post-conflict economies through sustainable peacebuilding. Many post-conflict countries have poor economies with limited capacity for development initiatives, therefore, economic recovery should be at the core of achieving and sustaining peace in these societies. Small-to-medium-scale economic activities, income-generating schemes, infrastructural development, and debt reduction or rescheduling are examples of economic-oriented peacebuilding measures that can transform war economies. The DRC, Liberia, and Mozambique stand as post-conflict African countries that have benefitted from debt rescheduling or cancellation as efforts evolve to mainstream war economy transformation in peacebuilding. Failure to identify the transformation of a war economy as a fundamental sustainable peacebuilding approach can further political divisions and lead to renewed violence.

Transforming war economies is not the exclusive domain of the country experiencing the challenges of such an environment, but also involves regional organizations as well as the international community. The process is also not limited to stemming the flow of financial resources to conflict entrepreneurs and disrupting criminal networks. As important as these efforts are, and as important as it is to strengthen them, they cannot alone address the larger problem of war economies. An important aspect of war economies is governance. It is precisely the lack of functional governance structures and the inability of the state to provide public goods to citizens that is largely responsible for and the result of war economies. Some scholars, including Ballentine have identified governance deficit as one of the products of war economies and as
being manifest at different levels in post-conflict societies. She argues that this deficit is particularly prominent in those countries economically dependent upon natural resources, that is, suffering from a ‘resource curse’.25

Addressing a governance deficit should not be restricted to elections and institution building alone, but should also include economic recovery and reconstruction in peace agreements as a foundation for long-term strategies for structural transformation. Sustainable transformation of war economies must be carried out at all levels of society, including the group, by assisting and empowering former belligerents to build their governance capacities. It is vitally important to transform former warring factions into political parties with capacities to govern.

Susan Woodward notes that beyond including economic strategies in peace agreements, it is important in post-war restoration to attend to basic services, such as electricity, water, garbage collection, and so on.26 These and similar measures build confidence in government, increasing the state’s ‘social capital’, which is an essential ingredient in any successful transition. In short, Woodward calls for ‘financing the peace’ as a way to create a stable government.

Often times, belligerents and other conflict entrepreneurs find clever ways to evade sanctions and continue financing war efforts. Regulatory regimes must include strategies for implementation and be specific with regard to the exploitation of natural resources that feed into war economies and not just remain within general regulatory frameworks that might be appropriate when concerning typical matters but not targeted enough to affect war economy issues. In this regard, Ballentine suggests strengthening the monitoring and enforcement capacities of sanctions, promoting criminal prosecution of sanctions busters supported by national governments, and improving the modalities of technical assistance for national governments.

MACRO- AND MICROECONOMIC TOOLS FOR SUSTAINABLE RECOVERY

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program for Sierra Leone, following civil war from 1998 to 2002, was designed by multiple agencies and spanned four years.27 In 2006, J. D. Rogers, the governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, analyzed the socioeconomic variables that contribute to an environment that allows a war economy to be transformed to assist in the development of the post-war economic sector.28 In the years following the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, multiple international agencies provided assistance to improve state institutions and better

27. The organizations involved included the government of Sierra Leone, the Economic Community Military Observer Group, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the World Food Programme.
manage agriculture, mining, and other sectors. Sierra Leone’s gross domestic product grew 6.5 percent in 2003, 7.4 percent in 2004, and 7.5 percent in 2005.

While economies improve in post-war environments, a key difficulty in establishing sustainable peace is linking that growth to employment opportunities on the local level. DDR programs in Sierra Leone integrated tens of thousands of ex-combatants into civilian employment. The program also gave returning IDPs and refugees farm tools to support livelihoods.

Reintroducing, Strengthening, and Sustaining Alternative Livelihoods

In post-conflict societies, there is usually an urgent need to maintain and strengthen livelihoods affected by the violence. This task should be carried out by national governments, development and humanitarian agencies, as well as international agencies of the United Nations and others, such as the European Union (EU), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and other development partners, including international nongovernmental organizations and local practitioners. The urgency is more acute where criminal and other illegal economic activities have become ingrained in the state’s broader economy.

Helping people shift away from war-related economic activities is a huge task; finding socioeconomic opportunities and economic security systems in the formal economy is vitally important to sustainable peacebuilding. The focus at this stage should be on planning and resource allocation for integrating the general population, including ex-combatants, returnees, and refugees, into the formal economy. The long-term challenge is how to sustain reintegration processes for ex-combatants and develop alternative livelihoods. The key to implementing this approach is to employ a multidimensional strategy that takes into account social, political, cultural, and environmental factors, as well as a conflict-sensitive approach to economic transformation. In Africa, transforming war economies into peaceable economies might simply mean the development of household income generation. This is a cheap proposition when compared to the costs of war economies. Development agencies should include this in any post-conflict peacebuilding framework.

Natural Resource Governance and Management

Responsible natural resource management requires participatory processes that include local populations in a transparent manner. Participation should not only be a normative goal of building or restoring democracy, but should also be seen as a requirement for rational decision making on resource extraction, access, and distribution. Setting up accountability councils would be one way of ensuring that checks and balances are secured. As James Boyce asserts, ‘in places at high risk of an outbreak or renewal of violent conflict, a key task is to ensure that the benefits and costs of natural resource exploitation are distributed so they ease social tensions rather than exact-
Furthermore, a key requirement is to curtail the use of resource revenues to finance war. More important, however, is to dislodge the revenue sources from rebel groups and government paramilitary groups by imposing conditionality and integrate natural resource finances into the mainstream economy. This can be achieved by creating inclusive governments in which former rebel leaders genuinely feel they are active participants in the political sphere. This should be done on the condition that they continue to respect the terms of the peace agreement. The experience of Sierra Leone shows that without such conditions, rebel leaders can manipulate the situation in a bid to further their own political as well as economic advantage.

**Humanitarian and Development Aid**

Post-conflict countries usually receive a substantial amount of foreign direct aid and development assistance. To address the challenge of aid dependence in post-conflict societies, the international aid and development communities should make deliberate and conscious decisions not to create unrealistic expectations. Aid, particularly development assistance, should be channelled into such critical areas of the recipient nation's economy as budget support and rehabilitation of infrastructure. James Boyce and Madalene O’Donnell argue that too much aid can create unrealistic expectations and budgetary commitments, as well as weaken a government’s resource mobilization capacity, an effect they refer to as ‘crowding-out’. External resource caps can help with this. International aid can be better allocated if consideration is given to performance indicators. Boyce and O’Donnell also caution against the unwitting tendency for post-conflict aid to create a dual public sector in which the government funds and manages one sector and donors fund and manage another. Aid should have the ultimate goal of building institutions to effectively manage resources without donor assistance.

**Policy and Legal Frameworks**

The economic transformation of war economies requires in the first instance targeted frameworks that address the economies’ specificities. These include strategies that would, as noted earlier, advocate for inclusion of regulatory frameworks in negotiated peace agreements monitored and enforced at the national, regional, and international levels. National governments, whatever their nature, must make it a priority to establish micro- and macroeconomic policies that have at their core long-term objectives for developing public finance, growth, and ultimately policies that address war economies at their core.

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31. For example, Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), was given the position of vice president and minister in charge of strategic resources, positions that he used to promote his economic agenda.
32. Priority should be given to the rehabilitation of schools, hospitals, road networks, energy sector, vocational education for ex-combatants, and reconciliation processes.
34. McCandless, ‘Economic aspects of reconstruction, recovery, and peace.’
Tony Addison argues that state building or ‘institutionalization’ should not be undertaken per se before economic reforms; changing economic policies that favor a narrow elite (and are sometimes causes of conflict and grievance) are central to achieving a broad-based recovery. Ideally, reform and reconstruction should be addressed simultaneously, and both agendas should be developed with care concerning their effects, especially in terms of equality. This argument assumes, however, that economic policies will actually be targeted at redistributing resources more equitably and addressing grievance, a practice that is hard to find in action.

A sound tax system is central to peacebuilding and financial sustainability. Most countries affected by protracted conflict in Africa, however, do not have well-developed tax policy and institutional structures to support them. Establishing a structure that would allow foreign investors to pay taxes to the state should be among the first priorities aimed at ensuring sustainable revenue flows into the treasury. Transforming war economies into peaceable economies also requires addressing loopholes in the legal and policy structures of the state. Sound, equitable, context-specific, and conflict-sensitive legislation and policies on extractive industries and natural resources endowments should be developed toward this end.

**Partnerships for Transformation**

Developing multi-stakeholder partnerships that include citizens, private sector, public sector, and humanitarian and development agencies is key to the eradication of war economies. While the private sector can provide opportunities for employment creation, the public sector through its policies can ensure the provision of public goods to citizens, as well as create business-friendly environments through effective policies. At the same time, various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can work alongside the private and public sectors to fill in gaps, primarily through micro-credit programs. Support for these various types of intervention must be secured through citizen participation.

In addition, national legal and policy frameworks must work in tandem with regional and international legal and policy instruments. This is important for consistency in terms of implementation and monitoring compliance. Regulation of the public and private sectors in war economies has proven to be effective when policy frameworks are consistent at all levels. The Kimberley Process is one of the most effective policy frameworks on extractive industries to date. The government of Sierra Leone, sub-regional organizations (such as the Economic Community of West African States), and members of the international community have all signed onto the principles of the Kimberley Process. The result has been a significant reduction in the sale of diamonds on the international market by rebels from Liberia and Sierra Leone.

**CONCLUSION: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND INHERENT CHALLENGES**

To stop violent conflict, various mechanisms have been tested to stanch the profits that feed war economies. These methods include sanctions, social responsibility, and

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36. McCandless, 'Economic aspects of reconstruction, recovery, and peace.'
diversion of profitable activities to other resource-generating endeavours for ex-combatants. The salient factor in the Kimberley Process was the motivation of various actors, including diamond industry officials, heads of importing and exporting governments, and NGOs to regulate the diamond market. As a result, national and international markets fell into sync. It is worth noting that although there may be parties uninterested in peace because fighting is more profitable, other parties involved must try to assert enough power to control those uninterested in ending conflict.

Although the Kimberley Process is considered a success, there was considerable challenge to its implementation. Sanctions on conflict diamonds were first adopted in a June 1998 decision by the UN Security Council. For another five years, however, until the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) went into effect (in 2003), rough diamonds continued to be smuggled and sold. A year of limiting export to those with government certification showed the sanctions regime to be ineffective. In 2000, an expert panel attributed this failure to complicity on the part of heads of state in Togo and Burkina Faso. In June 2010, Martin Rapaport, a leading figure in the diamond industry, went on a three-day hunger strike to call attention to abuses of the Zimbabwean government against workers in the diamond industry.

The U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) has been utilized in legal proceedings aimed at enforcing corporate responsibility in resource wars. The ATCA is a federal statute that finds corporations liable for human rights violations when they act in complicity with foreign governments. While it is a step in the right direction, this law is not really a viable solution for ending war economies. Litigation that enforces corporate responsibility may offer redress for victims, but these overseas legal battles do little to interfere with the economies themselves. During the often lengthy litigation, companies are not prevented from extraction or otherwise doing business, so the war economy continues without hindrance.

Central to economic transformation is building constructive and sustainable relationships. Starting with national government policies and donor conditionality and commitments, the private sector, security sector, labor unions, and assorted civil society entities all need to work collaboratively to confront the pressing and urgent challenges of transforming war economies.

The aim of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies is generally understood as a series of strategies to restore the capacities of governments and communities to rebuild and recover from the ravages of war. Addressing the role of humanitarian aid in economic recovery in post-conflict societies is critical to peacebuilding. Creating a viable economy should be accompanied by economic development activities that strategically build upon and maximize humanitarian efforts put in place during the crisis. Such efforts should be done with awareness of the conflict issues and a willingness to design (or redesign) policies and programs with this awareness in mind.

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37. Ian Smillie, 'What lessons from the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme?' in Ballentine and Nitzchke, Profiting from Peace.
38. Ibid.
41. McCandless, 'Economic aspects of reconstruction, recovery, and peace.'
and developing long-term, conflict-sensitive development programs in a coherent and coordinated manner is vital for successful economic transformation.

Resource-based wars have significantly shaped policy prescriptions and perspectives on the role of economic factors in contemporary African conflicts. As stated earlier, there is no mono-causal explanation for all the conflicts on the continent. Conflicts are by nature complex, with constantly shifting dynamics involving political, economic, and social factors. Although resource exploitation is sometimes a source of financing violent civil conflict, there usually also exists underlying socioeconomic and political grievances. Political inequality is a compelling explanation and cannot therefore be overlooked. In many of the conflicts in the 1990s, horizontal inequalities classified by ethnicity (Angola), religion (Sudan), and tribal affiliation (Liberia) were important factors.

The experiences of many national governments, international NGOs, and development partners aptly illustrate the pitfalls of approaches to economic transformation after violent conflict. Donors, the United Nations, and others who champion economic recovery for the sake of economic recovery have often found disappointment in their approach. Economic plans that are designed and developed with economic recovery at their core have at best proven to be only marginally successful. Effective economic transformation in post-conflict societies has to nurture and maintain relationships at all levels of society. Development plans and their implementation must be participatory and designed with conflict sensitivity in mind. Partnerships, no matter how strong, cannot be sustainable if they are not guided by responsive legal and policy frameworks. These are all important factors that need to be considered in order to successfully transform war economies into peaceable economies.
Building and Sustaining Peace: The Development–Peacebuilding Nexus in Post-conflict Reconstruction in Africa

Martha Mutisi

The discourse that dominates international and national strategies for sustaining peace holds that development efforts promote sustainable peacebuilding, and therefore development should be one of the core activities in post-conflict reconstruction processes. The increasing size and value of development assistance to post-conflict societies reminds one that this discourse also translates into practical action. There is currently growing emphasis on post-war strategies of macro-economic stabilization, economic growth, and poverty reduction. The international community’s recent engagement in post-conflict reconstruction has been driven largely by donors, practitioners, and scholars. Some, however, are now wary of the development-led paradigm for peacebuilding. A close analysis of this paradigm reveals larger political and social ambiguities. Also, peace is too complex a reality to be left to the machinations of economic growth and recovery of livelihoods. Although development-centered measures of post-conflict peacebuilding fulfill certain needs, such economic engineering cannot alone necessarily accomplish the tasks of restoring security, guaranteeing political participation, bringing about reconciliation, and helping create inclusive societies. Needed also are multi-faceted social and political interventions that acknowledge the reality of eroded security structures, remnants of violence, and scarred relationships among groups. Although development does play a role in the ‘peace dividend’, other processes—such as transitional justice, security sector reform, institution building, and democratization—are equally important in sustaining peace and hence should be given due consideration in scholarship and practice. A new paradigm proposed here calls for a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy that encompasses hard and soft dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding.

There is an emerging consensus that economic well-being in post-conflict reconstruction is an imperative. Development–peacebuilding nexus has become a common term in the lexicon and practice of post-conflict peacebuilding. This discourse notes that violent conflict destroys national and local economies, ultimately reducing productive capacities and eroding livelihoods. As such, most post-conflict peacebuilding programs are aimed at improving welfare, reducing poverty, and increasing material...
development among populations devastated by war. Scholars and practitioners underscore that peace without development is fragile, emphasizing development as a precondition for security and peace and as a way to reduce the recurrence of violent conflict.

The focus on development-led peacebuilding is based on the assumption that development will catalyze and sustain peace by addressing the structural causes of conflict that are usually economic in nature. This assumption has led to post-conflict reconstruction programs geared toward economic growth, enterprise advancement, poverty reduction, and infrastructural development. In that spirit, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) emphasizes economic recovery in post-conflict reconstruction, and the World Bank focuses on securing development in post-conflict societies. A significant portion of the literature on post-conflict reconstruction seems to focus on the need for development, specifically on the 'hardware', such as rebuilding economies, infrastructural development, and promoting macroeconomic stability. Despite this focus on development and reconstruction, post-conflict societies are still ridden with challenges in attempting to establish and sustain peace.

The development–peacebuilding nexus promotes an ephemeral peace by ignoring some of the dimensions of sustainable peace processes. One should not lose sight of equally relevant factors in post-conflict reconstruction, including effective disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR), transitional justice, security sector reform, and institution building and democratization. Despite its appeal of consolidating fragile peace, the development-led paradigm may not fully address the emergent needs of devastated countries. Poorly informed development policies in post-conflict situations may have unintended effects, especially if they interact with existing systems of exclusion, inequality, deprivation, and marginalization. In some cases, development assistance has been found to create tensions between groups, exacerbate political instability, and worsen relations. It is thus imperative to pay attention to political and relational processes in order to bring about a sustainable peace.

THE DEVELOPMENT–PEACEBUILDING NEXUS

Scholars and practitioners consider armed conflict and civil war 'development in reverse', as they occur amid situations of limited economic progress and reduce gains in development. The United Nations’ *Human Development Report 2005* states that '9 out

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of 10 lowest Human Development Index countries have experienced armed conflict at some point since 1990. In congruence with this observation, contemporary literature has singled out such factors as unequal access to resources, lack of economic growth, and the presence of poverty as drivers of conflict. While conflict is a major obstacle to development, increasingly development is assumed to be a vehicle for peacebuilding. This assumption has given impetus to the development-led paradigm, which is increasingly being used as the template of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Thus, most peacebuilding interventions attempt to address the same concerns as development interventions would alone. Promoting development is perceived as the first priority in advancing post-conflict reconstruction and addressing root causes of conflict. This dynamic can be observed in a number of African countries—including Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Uganda—where nascent and still-evolving peace processes are being accompanied by large inflows of development aid and budgetary support.

Indeed, poverty and inequality are major driving forces for contemporary conflicts in the developing world. Even so-called ethnic conflicts have economic dimensions. Against this background, there seems to be a consensus that it is not enough to simply make peace, but that this peace must be just and address the causes of war, such as hunger and poverty. This reasoning has resulted in massive investments in development-related programs in post-conflict areas through projects focusing on economic stability, re-establishment of livelihoods, and poverty reduction. The concept and practice of development is therefore often a key component of peace agreements and post-conflict reconstruction.

Development assistance has been used not only to reduce economic inequalities between groups but also to diminish economic incentives to fight. Donors have also used development assistance as a conditionality to promote economic and political practices that strengthen peacebuilding. Phrases such as ‘conflict sensitive development’ have emerged to emphasize the growing trend of mainstreaming conflict resolution into development processes. The development-led paradigm of peacebuilding becomes useful not only in addressing the economics of war, but in repairing decimated infrastructures and destroyed livelihoods that often characterize post-war societies.

According to John Burton, conflict resolution is a political philosophy that goes beyond the mere resolution of disputes. Rather, it also concerns activities intended to

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bring parties into a facilitated, interactive situation. Addressing root causes of conflict is intrinsically tied to the satisfaction of basic human needs, such as food, shelter, and access to resources. Antonia Chayes and Martha Minow examine how initiatives in education and economic development can offer refugees, returnees, and other survivors of group conflict reasons to work together and can create a base for relating constructively over time. Development and conflict resolution practitioners have carried forward this Burtonian argument by seeking to provide a peace dividend that meets the material expectations of the population. Notable conflict resolution institutions, such as Rotary International, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme, premise their activities on the notion that conflict resolution must also address root causes of conflict, such as insecurity and poverty.

Johan Galtung, who discusses the concepts of structural violence, negative peace, and positive peace, also emphasizes the argument that structural inequities are inimical to sustainable peace. Yash Tandon asserts that the root causes of conflicts in Africa stem from systemic and structural problems, among them the continent’s history of colonialism along with debt crises and subsequent poverty and inequalities within Africa as well as between Africa and other continents. Paul Collier notes that economics plays a role in the manifestation and nature of conflicts in most poor countries. Some scholars, in tracing the economic causes of conflict, have found poverty to be the chief culprit. As a result of debt, state failure, unfair trade terms, and bad governance, poor countries too often find themselves enmeshed in conflict. Along the same vein, former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan has acknowledged the linkages between poverty, development, and conflict by underscoring the structural causes of conflict, such as insecurity, poverty, unemployment, and underdevelopment. The assumption that poverty in Africa has contributed directly and indirectly to civil strife has resulted in the alleviation of poverty being one of the UN Millennium Goals.

In Mozambique and Namibia, the development–peacebuilding nexus seems to have worked. A smart combination of large foreign investment flows, increased donor funding, and prudent national, macroeconomic management strategies has resulted in significant economic growth, poverty reduction, and livelihood improvements in

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these countries. For example, Mozambique’s economy has grown by more than 10 percent since 1999, thanks in part to the International Monetary Fund’s support of the country’s development programs.13 After the 1992 peace settlement, former belligerents, namely, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), shifted their rivalry from the battlefield to the political arena through elections in 1994 that paved the way for reform. Mozambique is now highlighted as one of the success stories for political transition, reconciliation, and post-conflict economic recovery.

A common strategy of those working in post-conflict peacebuilding has been to empower the vulnerable, disadvantaged, and poor. International institutions, including the United Nations and World Bank, have explicitly embraced the concept of a conflict resolution–development nexus in their various programs for post-conflict societies. The World Bank has enhanced its operational policy on working with conflict-affected countries by continuing its efforts at poverty reduction. The private sector has also found a major role to play in promoting socioeconomic development and reconstruction in conflict-affected countries.14 The successful role of the private sector in post-conflict reconstruction, however, is contingent upon a nurturing regulatory environment that is attractive to both domestic and foreign investment. The World Bank plays an important role in encouraging private sector development in such areas through research, technical assistance, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which supports economic growth and reduces poverty by promoting foreign direct investment in developing countries.

CHALLENGES OF THE DEVELOPMENT–PEACEBUILDING NEXUS

Despite the importance of addressing the structural roots of conflict, especially the economic dimensions, changing structural economic conditions is difficult to implement, let alone realize. When a group of people are newly empowered through development processes, conflicts may ensue at the instigation of those who feel threatened by the phenomenon. In such a delicate circumstance, development can make things worse, rather than better. It could not then be said that development aid has resolved the root causes of conflict.

Even with the realization that durable peace and conflict resolution depend on development efforts and poverty reduction, success remains difficult to achieve. This explains why some conflict resolution practitioners and scholars, including Roger Fisher and William Ury, advocate use of the ‘softer’ strategies of mediation, negotiation, problem-solving, and peace education—approaches that do not significantly attempt


to change society’s violent social structures.15 Eradication of poverty in Africa has proven to be an elusive goal because of underdevelopment across the continent as well as insurmountable geopolitical dynamics and unintended effects.

Mary Anderson argues that humanitarian aid provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) ‘often becomes intertwined with the forces that drive the conflicts that prompted the aid in the first place’.16 According to Anderson and Marshall Wallace, aid agencies inevitably exacerbate, reinforce, or prolong conflict by feeding into and worsening intergroup dividers or by ignoring and undermining intergroup connectors.17 When international agencies and civil society participate in post-war development activities, they are in fact, usurping and shrinking the role of the state. As development agencies engage in conflict societies, they inevitably change the socioeconomic landscape of these communities, perhaps feeding into the war economy, creating new consumer cultures, and causing inflation. Anderson points out that an influx of aid and aid workers can interfere in the local economy, leading to the emergence of alien economic structures, such as restaurants, hotels, and brothels. In communities affected by a burgeoning development industry, for example, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Darfur, prices of staple foods can double, or even triple, while most salaries stagnate.18

Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration

It has been recognized that the provision of security is a precondition for political, social, and economic well-being. One important aspect of the conflict resolution and settlement process is the demobilization, disarmament, repatriation, and reintegration of fighting forces. This process is one of the most immediate priorities and complex challenges in post-conflict situations.19 Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration serve as a transitional safety net for ex-combatants attempting to return to their former lives or build new ones. Effective DDRR processes ensure that former combatants do not become idle after demobilization because this is a recipe for creating new conflict or reigniting war. They also must address former combatants’ immediate reinsertion and long-term needs, which may include housing, medical care, food, education, and cash. The idea of ‘sustainable disarmament for sustainable development’ is not a bad one given the importance of restoring security before being able to realize development needs.20

The ‘security first’ approach to post-conflict peacebuilding has been embraced by major international organizations, including the World Bank, through their demobi-

18. Ibid.
lization and reintegration programs. In cooperation with other multilateral agencies and stakeholders, the World Bank developed the Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program provides a framework for national and international efforts to assist ex-combatants return to peaceful, sustainable livelihoods in Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Security Sector Reform

A report by the United States Agency for International Development contends that in post-conflict environments, ‘a sole focus on these issues [economic growth] may not be sufficient to bring a sense of normality back to the daily lives of the population’. Given the fragile social and political realities of post-conflict environments, strategies must also be employed to instill a sense of security after violent episodes. The ability to provide security is one of the defining characteristics of the post-conflict state, so security system reform is an important part of consolidating peace in countries recovering from conflict. Typically, this involves restructuring core security actors, oversight bodies, law enforcement organizations, and non-statutory security forces.

Relationship Building and Transitional Justice

Armed conflict destroys the social fabric of a country, disrupting community networks, severing relationships, and eroding social capital. Once a peace agreement has been signed, however, there is a tendency for the international community and donors to neglect the need for local and national healing because of their focus on economic development. It is equally important to address the relational dimensions of conflict by confronting hostilities, prejudices, and feelings of vengeance. Hence, the need for transitional justice processes becomes an imperative. Transitional justice refers to a range of approaches that societies can take to deal with the legacies of widespread human rights abuses as they move from conflict to peace and the rule of law. One aspect of transitional justice is reconciliation. The Reconciliation Handbook of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance describes reconciliation as ‘a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future’.

Apart from economic underpinnings, conflict is also a structural and relational affair. As such, there is a need to ‘resolve conflict from the heart’ by addressing issues of connection, meaning, and identity. In this way, conflict is not only resolved, but is also transformed. Some scholars contend that reconciliation helps in transforming hostile impressions among groups about their adversaries. The reconciliatory approach is exemplified by actions taken in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and South Africa, which established truth and reconciliation commissions, paving the way for conflict resolution and development. Rwanda used endogenous gacaca courts to address cases of genocide. Mozambique and Sierra Leone adopted methods of community healing by having traditional healers work with former child soldiers in elaborate and culturally rooted ritual programs of cleansing and purification. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘A cardinal rule in post-conflict justice and reconciliation is to promote open and continuing communication as a key potential antidote to lingering grievances and recriminations, and to avoid relapses into violent conflict.’

Democracy and Political Participation

Democracy and political participation are as important as development in the sustenance of peace because they guarantee the inclusion of people, groups, and communities in the joint project of rebuilding their society. According to Rama Mani, ‘It is the forging of an inclusive political community out of the shards of war that will be the touchstone of a peaceful future.’ Post-conflict elections are generally instrumental in establishing a legitimate, post-war government.

Post-conflict peacebuilding interventions should seek to improve the general climate in a country by supporting democratization efforts. Sustainable peace processes

25. Michelle LeBaron, Bridging Troubled Waters: Conflict Resolution from the Heart (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2002).
30. Timothy D. Sisk, ‘Democratizing and peacebuilding: Perils and promises’ in Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Turbulent Peace.
are often accompanied by strategies of enabling the citizenry to participate in the shaping of governance through electing their representatives, through avenues of local participation, and through a vibrant and active civil society. Rolf Ekeus conceives of democracy as an indispensable facet of sustainable development, the lack of which represents a precondition for structural violence.34 Beatrice Pouligny advocates a "peacebuilding and democracy market place" for societies undergoing reconstruction; she envisages that the nurturing of democratic values at the community level can flow into political levels, and thus into the machinery of conflict resolution.35

According to Nicole Ball, in addition to enhancing material development, international and local development agencies should enhance good governance by strengthening economic and political institutions.36 Elections are a central part of state building, apart from being important instruments for the stimulation of democratic politics and forming new governments. Thus, it is critical to enhance democracy through the capacity building of conflict countries to conduct elections. As with Namibia in 1989, Mozambique and South Africa in 1994 demonstrated that post-conflict elections are particularly important because they are a signal of political maturation, demonstrating effectively that a country has made a decisive break with the past. According to a House of Commons International Development Committee, "Elections provide an important opportunity to engage the whole population, victims and perpetrators, in an acceptance of the peace process and the conferring of legitimacy on its outcomes."37

Apart from channelling efforts towards economic development, the design of electoral processes should be a major consideration in conflict resolution. Post-conflict peacebuilding should seek to enhance political participation, as in the case of Rwanda, where after the genocide the constitution was changed to ensure equitable representation of groups in parliament. The proper design of electoral systems in post-war societies can guarantee the representation of the governed and satisfaction of parties to the conflict.

State Building

William Zartman defines state collapse as "a situation where the structure, authority, law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new."38 Contemporary violent conflicts in Africa are increasingly accompanied by state failure, state collapse, and decay of institutions, as demonstrated by events in Somalia and Zimbabwe.39 More often, the remnants of conflict include brutalized

35. Pouligny, ‘Civil society and post-conflict peacebuilding’.
36. Nicole Ball, ‘The challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies’ in Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Managing Global Chaos.
civilian populations, destroyed economies, decimated institutions, and damaged infrastructure, which are formidable obstacles to sustainable peace. Various scholars have analyzed the impact of violent conflict on the state, especially state failure or collapse. State collapse has become a contemporary development malaise as well as a challenge to sustainable peace.

State building and institution building in post-conflict societies are crucial dimensions of the transition from war to peace, as such processes improve governance and restore stability. A strong state is also necessary to provide security. State building involves three components: rebuilding the political regime or system of government, restructuring the governance framework, and rebuilding state institutions (such as the security forces, the judiciary, and the legislature). According to the OECD, 'state-building rests on three pillars: the capacity of state structures to perform core functions; their legitimacy and accountability; and ability to provide an enabling environment for strong economic performance to generate income, employment and domestic revenues.' If implemented well, state building leads to the construction of functioning, legitimate, effective, prosperous, accountable, responsible, and sustainable state institutions, which are imperative for durable peace. Even with economic growth and poverty reduction, without attendant improvements in governance a peace dividend will go to waste.

CONCLUSION

Although the development–peacebuilding nexus is helpful in ensuring that situations of negative peace are transformed into positive peace, the challenge for the international community remains to rethink this connection by focusing on security, human relations, and democracy as other core elements in post-conflict peacebuilding. This would allow for a more comprehensive approach to the systemic and relational factors that precipitate and (re)produce conflict. Putting development first, before conflict resolution, may not lead to fully resolving conflict. Overall, sustainable peacebuilding should strive to become more integrated, eclectic, and vigorous, with multi-leveled responses that address the root causes of a conflict.


Youth and Conflict in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities for Peacebuilding

Joseph Peter Ochogwu

The youth constituency in any country can be an active change agent as well as a force sustaining the status quo or fomenting conflict. Nigeria, like other Africa states, has a large youth population that often plays a key role in conflict, particularly violent ones. Is it possible to transform the role of youths from one contributing to a culture of conflict to building a culture of peace? Youths face many societal challenges that affect their behavior. Making youths stakeholders creates opportunities for peacebuilding by making them participants in the national project. A sense of positive stakeholding in nation building is essential to making them agents of peace.

Aspiring to peace, freedom and justice, . . . we condemn all domination, save that over the elements; and, for its sake, we must develop the more intensively in our youth and people the spiritual valour, the bodily health, the quality of action, the search for truth, and the spiritual and moral virtues of pioneers and men of high enterprise. Only by these can a nation rise to grandeur.

—David Ben-Gurion, Like Stars and Dust

Youth are the foundation of a society. Their energy, inventiveness, character and orientation define the pace of development and the security of a nation. Through their creative talents and labour power, a nation makes giant strides in economic development and socio-political attainments. In their dreams and hopes, a nation founds her motivation; on their energies, she builds her vitality and purpose. And because of their dreams and aspirations, the future of a nation is assured.

—Olusegun Obasanjo, National Youth Policy, 2001

Human societies revolve on a wheel of change. They have not been static since creation. The quality of change depends upon the time, energy, and resources consciously and unconsciously put into the process. Different societies have experienced different forms of change in their political, social, and cultural affairs; human beings make such determinations. The youths in a population are to a large extent the most significant societal group in regard to determining the processes and qualities of change. A society desirous of positive change and development should give priority to its youths, as

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they possess the physical and psychological characteristics most likely to bring about needed transformations.

Youths can be a catalyst for peace or for conflict, depending on the direction in which the society channels this group's energy and other resources. In Nigeria, as in most African countries, the phenomenon of youth participation in conflict is deeply rooted in a crisis of governance that has ensnared them. These crises have long been manifested in many forms: over the distribution of wealth, power sharing, incapacity of the state to provide for and protect its citizens, arbitrary and solitary exercise of power, mismanagement of state resources, abuse of power, and the collapse of economic and social structures and institutions. These issues stand to predispose youths toward conflict given that the structure of state mechanisms are unfavorable to young people actualizing their potential. The challenge before Nigeria, and other African nations, is how to transform the resources that youths have to offer into building and sustaining peace rather than conflict.

RECRUITMENT AND MOBILIZATION FOR CONFLICT

It is not unusual for youths, often victims or victors of the existential realities of society, to be misunderstood and misrepresented. They are energy-filled forces that some communities and states rely on in times of grave societal predicaments. Nigerian youth are no exception; their roles in anti-colonial and nationalist movements are well documented. Also, youth in post-colonial Nigeria have played critical parts in the sustenance of nationhood in times of conflict as well as peace. Today, however, because of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, coupled with high youth unemployment, young Nigerians constitute a reserve army of unemployed ready for instant mobilization by the state as well as non-state agents who oppose or antagonize the state.

The concept of 'youth' is a highly debated one, differing from one country to another; in addition, different scholars and societies use varying categories to arrive at their own definitions. For purposes here, the definition of youth provided in Nigeria's National Youth Policy and Strategic Plan of Action will be used. It considers the nation's youth to be persons ages 18 to 35. This category represents the most active, most volatile, and most vulnerable segment of the population, socioeconomically, emotionally, and in other respects as well.

Conflict is an inevitable phenomenon of human existence and occurs where there are differences in interests and means to achieve them. These interests include basic human needs, identity, and justice, among other things. Every society suffers some form of conflict, which can lead to social change. What matters, however, is the management of conflict and the extent to which conflict in a given society translates or

escalates into a violent form, which poses severe challenges to human society, as it tends to retard development and promotes poverty and anarchy. On the other hand, peacebuilding is the creation of structures supporting equity and justice within and among nations or groups that remove the causes of conflict and provide alternatives to it. Johan Galtung refers to peacebuilding as social change and economic development that reduces inequity and injustice.5

In Nigeria, the prevalence of conflict, particularly violent conflict—whether communal, religious, political, ethnic, cultic, or criminal—is driven by youths. In some instances, the ringleaders may be older persons abusing the vulnerability of those younger, but youths tend to be the perpetuators of violence, directly negatively affecting society through their actions. Non-state actors are mobilizing and influencing youths more so than the government. Most of these mobilizing agents are criminal or cultic groups that prey on the young, recruiting them into the fold to help further their interests to the detriment of the public interest. The ability of these non-state groups to win over youths and involve them in crime and conflict point to the seeming failure of the state, and by extension communities and families, to respond to the needs and challenges of an inordinately high percentage of their young people.

Youths in Nigeria have in the process become valuable allies or potential adversaries. Warring communities and groups hurriedly recruit youths to stock their fighting machines and gain advantage. For example, in the Niger Delta region, institutions of higher learning, opposing groups, and cultic cells employ different strategies to appeal to or prey upon the developmental, social, and economic needs of potential recruits, cutting across socioeconomic strata and ethnic, linguistic, and geographical identities.

Some youth groups are used to carry out violent acts. They have structures through which they benefit (legally or illegally) from the system. For example, youths such as those belonging to the Niger Delta Militants, the Area Boys in Lagos, Yandaba in Kano state, Omata Boys of Onitsha, and political thugs, among others who take part in most of the violence in the country, have formal and informal patrons who support them financially or sponsor events in which they are involved. In return, the patrons are assured of protection or political support, which oftentimes inflicts disorder upon society as the youths attempt to fulfill their part of the bargain.

In trying to understand the vulnerability of youth to being conflict prone, Angela McIntyre proffers, ‘A generation gulf will always exist between youth and the state and this rings familiar because intergenerational discord, albeit in many forms, is universal. But the difference between youthful protest in Africa and youthful protest in the developed world is that the latter permits safe expression within the family, community or school. These are the structures in a peaceful society that guide youth and protect them from adult moral and political consequences of less-than mature actions’.6

This attempt to explain the vulnerability of Nigerian youth to conflict is, however, not entirely adequate. The poor performance of the economy and state institutional exploitation of unemployed youth are critical variables for youth participation in con-

Conflict. Angelos Stavrou observes, 'The new political violence in Africa has some straightforward practical rationalities that transcend its original context. Africa faces a growing problem of youth employment, war is a surprisingly viable employment option for youth with weak social support and poor educational backgrounds in regions where... clandestine trading opportunities support war-lord activity.' Socioeconomic marginalization of youths remains the single most critical underlying factor behind the proliferation of armed militias in Africa. As Rene Lemarchand asserts, violence-prone youth in Africa are the expression of a diffuse sense of hopelessness in the face of economic and political circumstances beyond their control.

Recently, tens of thousands of youths embraced a federal amnesty granted by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua to ‘militants’ and ‘criminals’ in the oil rich Niger Delta region and the economic support packages that followed his gesture. Nigerian youths nevertheless remain on the receiving end of several failed economic structural programmes and incipient bad governance by most regimes from the 1980s to today. Youths thus have tried to change their victim status to that of victor by engaging in conflict as a livelihood. Because the system is exclusively elite-driven (and designed, from top down), excluding youths from functional participation in the system, the feeling of alienation is pervasive; points of entry into the system are limited or completely blocked. The only apparent entrance is through conflict, mainly violent ones.

Even in parts of Nigeria where there appears to be some level of relative peace, the growing presence of unemployed, educated and uneducated, skilled and unskilled youths poses severe challenges. As political elites use youths as instruments of violence to acquire and maintain political power, the only form of political education they are bequeathed is on the culture of violence. One of the greatest challenges the Nigerian state must contend with is how to transform its youth from instruments of violence into instruments of peace.

Another ugly aspect about youth and conflict in Nigeria emerges from revelations about the evolution of this trend and operations and networks in areas of conflict around the country. Youths typically become involved first as members of small groups engaged in criminal activities and thuggery and then ‘graduate’ to low-intensity conflicts and then metamorphose into participants in large-scale, national conflicts. The Odua Peoples Congress, Movement for Actualization of the State of Biafra, Maitasine Religious Movement, Boko Haram, Niger Delta Volunteer Force, and Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta, among others groups, are representative of instances in which a few people, mainly youths, crystallized into dreaded groups that swelled their ranks rapidly and used violence that affected the psyche of Nigerian society and even the international community. The situation in the Niger Delta and the Benue–Taraba conflict axis is particularly worrisome because of covert structures of mercenary and guerrilla fighters consisting mainly of youths. It is instructive to note that the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone started with about a hundred young guerrilla fighters who recruited alienated brethren to terrorize their nations, with far-reaching regional and international implications.


Exploitation by the State and Private Capital

One of the most critical challenges to peace in Nigeria is the alliance between the state and private capital in exploiting youths already vulnerable because of mass unemployment. Although some might expect capitalist modernization to provide the necessary peace infrastructure for youth development, the reverse has been the case. The state and private institutions are exploiting the youth constituency through bogus employment, entertainment, and marketing schemes using information technology. The unemployment situation thus continues to worsen, as state institutions that should provide a cushioning effect and remedies are instead involved in taking advantage of youths trapped in joblessness.

The capacity of the state and private capital institutions to absorb or engage youths in gainful employment or activities is small, but they nonetheless persist in raising expectations of employment among this group. They have also chosen to turn joblessness into a profit-making venture rather than attempting to address the problem of unemployment. For instance, both seek advantage by collecting registration or application fees from those looking for jobs but who ultimately will not obtain employment. Further, critical state institutions, including the armed forces, police, immigration agencies, and so on, enlist the services of financial institutions to sell online employment application forms through the use of ‘scratch cards’ to potential applicants. The scratch cards, which sell for about 2,000 naira, permit access to online application packets, but only a small number of those who submit forms will be invited for an interview.

The Imo government, in the southeast, instated a programme called Jobs4Youth, with the goal of creating some 10,000 new positions and recruiting qualified young people from the state.9 Applicants must purchase a scratch card at the cost of 2,000 naira and log on to the Web site to complete the state’s public service application, which was once free of charge.10 Imo state has one of the highest literacy rates in the country, and it is estimated that more than a million people will compete for the supposed 10,000 new jobs. The state government thus stands to earn about 2 billion naira in revenue from its employment ‘promo’, while the promised 10,000 jobs will likely be far fewer than advertised.

At the federal level, none of the military services are forbidden to charge youth for application forms. Regardless, the Nigerian army, advertising for citizens to enlist in the 65 Regular Recruit Intake, directed applicants to purchase a scratch card at the cost of 1,000 naira. The card is just the beginning of a long list of expenditures on the part of a potential recruit who is unlikely to be accepted at the end of the exercise.11

Another problematic area involves the police force, which essentially requires potential recruits to unofficially pay bribes ranging from 20,000 to 50,000 naira before being considered for a position.12 Youths experience the same type of exploitative barriers in attempting to gain admission to schools of higher learning. Such state institutions as the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) and various Nigerian

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12. Interview with a job applicant who had tried twice, unsuccessfully, to join the force, Orokom, 5 June 2009.
educational organizations responsible for conducting entrance exams make student applicants seeking admission to universities, polytechnics, and colleges pay application as well as examination fees. In addition, the processes and procedures for admission are more shrouded in mystery than they are transparent. How does one explain when applicants with higher scores are unable to gain admission, while those with lower scores are accepted?

Among private sector employers, global satellite telecommunication companies are particularly guilty of exploiting Nigerian youths. MTN, GLO, Etisalat, Zain, Visafone, Starcomm, and others have convinced youths that they can get huge sums of money if only they make phone calls. Most youths are gullible and easy prey to such stunts. The conspiracy between private capital and state regulating institutions has made these scams a daily bazaar. For example, one Zain television advertisement claimed that one could become a lucky winner and millionaire overnight by making calls on its network. Companies like the telecommunication firms are not helping youths build ethical values based on discipline, hard work, and loyalty, but instead are furthering a culture of easy money en route to a fast-lane lifestyle. This attitude is more conducive to producing a culture of violence than of peace. The pressure of such societal forces on youth easily pushes or lures them toward crime and makes them prone to becoming agents of conflict.

Youths constitute a major part of the working-age labour force and are incubators for innovative ideas that, among other factors, are important to the development process. As the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH) observes, however, a large proportion of them are, as already noted, unemployed. As of 2004, the National Manpower Board put the unemployment rate at 11 percent; particularly disturbing was the youth unemployment rate along with more than 3 million Nigerians graduating every year without job prospects and no indication of a decline in this trend.

CASE ANALYSIS OF FIVE STATES

Nigeria is a federation of thirty-six states and the federal capital territory. In attempting to understand the nexus between youths, violent conflict, and development, an examination of five of the thirty-six states is presented based on a baseline survey report of conflicts there. The survey, seeking ways to promote conflict abatement through local mitigation, was conducted by the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (with the financial support of the United States Agency for International Development, USAID). Two hundred sixty-five youths were selected from Delta, Rivers, Kaduna, Kano, and Plateau states to take part in the project. Delta and Rivers, located in the south, are embroiled in vitriolic conflicts over control of resources, self-

determination, and other activities. Kaduna, Kano, and Plateau, situated in the north, suffer from violent ethno-religious and political conflicts.

Among the survey questions were the following: Are youths involved in violent conflict? To what extent are youths involved in conflict in the state? What are the major reasons for youth participation in violent conflict? Are there any youth-focused or youth development programmes in the state? To what extent do youths participate in decision making that affects them? How much access do you think youths have to government? The responses capture the existential realities and conditions of youth constituencies in Nigeria and the nexus of development and peacebuilding in Nigeria.

As shown in Table 1, 234 of the 265 respondents (88.3 percent) answered yes when asked whether youths were involved in violent conflict, and 31 (11.7 percent) answered no. The response reveals a broad consensus on youth involvement in violence, the extent of which is illustrated in Table 2.

The survey found that 80.4 percent of youth are highly involved in conflict in their respective states, with Delta, Rivers, and Kaduna suggesting significant levels of engagement. It is most likely that should a similar survey be conducted in Plateau today, its 8.7 percent pointing to high involvement would be greater than in Kano and Kaduna because of renewed conflict in the area. Based on these statistics, the level of youth involvement in conflict is worrisome and calls for urgent action to reduce it.

Table 3 shows that 35.1 percent of respondents identified unemployment alone as the reason for youths involvement in violence, while a combined 52.5 percent of them pointed to unemployment, ignorance, elite manipulation, and inadequate punishment collectively. Elite manipulation as a critical factor in youth violence in Nigeria is glaring. According to the report’s authors, ‘The elite find it easy to manipulate these young people because they are idle, hungry and always looking for something to do. The
problem would continue for many more years as respondents argue that there are no meaningful youth-focused programmes in their communities to address the issues.\footnote{Ibid., 9.}

Although there are several state and non-state agencies supposedly involved in youth-oriented development programmes, many youths are confused about them or skeptical that these agencies are indeed geared towards helping them. Table 4 shows youths’ knowledge about the existence of youth-oriented programmes in their state. Only 31.7 percent think there are youth-focused or youth development programmes in their area, while collectively 68.3 percent do not believe they exist or do not know about them. Such responses reflect the absence of any real impact by most youth programmes and organizations on youth constituencies in the five states.

Table 5 indicates that few youths believe they participate in decisions that directly or indirectly affect their constituency. Among respondents, 49.8 percent said participation was very low, and 27.5 percent believed that youths do not participate at all in decision making on such issues. The tendency to foist programmes on youths without some input from them and neglecting to include them in their implementation have no doubt spelled doom for the programmes. As observed, young members of society are not properly involved in the conflict management processes in their respective states.

It is unreasonable to exclude youth groups from programme planning and implementation and still expect to achieve the desired programme goals and objectives. The same holds for youth access to government. As demonstrated in Table 6, such access is

\begin{table}
\caption{To what extent are youths involved in conflict in the state?}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lllllll}
\hline
\textbf{STATE} & \multicolumn{5}{c}{\textbf{Percentage}} & \textbf{Total} \\
\hline
\textbf{Number} & Delta & Rivers & Kaduna & Kano & Plateau & \\
\hline
Highly involved & 54 & 55 & 46 & 35 & 23 & 213 \% 20.4 & 20.8 & 17.4 & 13.2 & 8.7 & 80.4 \\
Involved & 5 & 11 & 11 & 23 & 39 \% 1.9 & 4.2 & 8.7 & 14.7 \\
Not involved & 4 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 13 \% 1.5 & 0.8 & 1.1 & 1.5 & 4.9 \\
Total & 59 & 59 & 48 & 49 & 50 & 265 \% 22.3 & 22.3 & 18.1 & 18.5 & 18.9 & 100.0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\end{table}
glaringly limited or non-existent. About 57.7 percent said they have little access, 30.2 percent have no access, and 12.1 percent have very good access. Although the kind of youth who claim to have very good access to government is not revealed, one can confidently assume that they have worked for politicians or appointees as thugs, electoral aides, campaign hands, assistants, and so on. There have been instances in which youths forced their way into local government secretariats and attempted to coerce council chairs to attend to their demands. Often, the reason youths give for using force to gain access and attention is that they must ensure the electoral victory of a certain officeholder; they then must go to collect their 'share', or prebends.

The youths surveyed by IFESH are representative of others across the Nigerian federation; they all face similar challenges of involvement in violent conflict, elite manipulation, unemployment, exclusion or lack of access to their government, limited assistance from youth development programmes, dumping by stakeholders, and so on. Nigerian youths are vulnerable to participation in violence because they are easy recruits in times of conflict. This situation in and of itself negatively affects youth constituency development and the overall development of the country.

### Table 3

What are the major reasons for youth participation in violent conflict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Delta</th>
<th>Rivers</th>
<th>Kaduna</th>
<th>Kano</th>
<th>Plateau</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ignorance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elite manipulation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inadequate punishment for previous perpetrators</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All of the above</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

YOUTHS AND PEACEBUILDING

Despite the numerous challenges posed by youths to peace in Nigeria, one must still ask, Are there opportunities to engage youth in peacebuilding? The answer, it is argued here, is in the affirmative. Although youths have over the years taken part in cultures of latent and manifest violence, they can also be trained and convinced to serve as catalysts for peace and development. There is no doubt that youths in Nigeria, despite the inherent socio-cultural, economic, and political structures that put them at a disadvantage, have played some roles in the building of peace. During Nigeria’s struggle for independence from Britain, for instance, youths were in the vanguard of nationalist movements. With independence, however, youths suffered political and economic irrelevance occasioned by their progressive relegation to the background. Regardless, their ability to bring about peace in society remains, but it is not being tapped.

Some Nigerian youths have remained in the vanguard of major changes, such as in protesting cases of injustice. For example, youth groups, particularly the National Association of Nigerian Students, have consistently aligned with the Nigeria Labour Congress and other progressive organizations to fight economic oppression and marginalization and promote a transition from authoritarian rule to democratic government. Unfortunately, because of youths’ prominent role in politics and conflict, as independent agents or the pawns of older political actors, they are often perceived as deviants.

Experience shows that youths are often forgotten in the scheme of Nigerian affairs except when politicians need to mobilize them for conflict or electoral campaigns.

### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>Delta</th>
<th>Rivers</th>
<th>Kaduna</th>
<th>Kano</th>
<th>Plateau</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Number of Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Number of Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>Number of Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Number of Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the poem ‘Children of Donkeys’, Simeon Alozieuwa succinctly captures how this phenomenon makes youths feel:

The moon stands in my heart
I cannot join the hilarious choir
Should the moon give way
The streets lie desolate; unsafe
Why the youth entitled to arms of all bounties
Make wild our reason
Dogs of wars
Children of donkeys

Although political parties in emerging democratic states like Nigeria have been quick to use the youth constituency as instruments of violence, they have been slow to involve them in peace processes and development agendas. Problems raised by youth activists and groups—restricted educational opportunities and the lack of health care, shelter,

clothing, food, and water, as well as poverty and unemployment—persist election after
election, from one government to the next. The tendency is for Nigerian incumbent
politicians to forget the youth constituency. This unfortunate situation will continue to
turn youths into landmines and potential ticking time bombs, as witnessed in the Niger
Delta region and other conflict spots around the country.

As along as political and social structures in Nigeria exclude youths, they will seek
alternative means to participate in the system. This includes through civil society ac-
tivities and other outlets. As Nicolas Argenti argues, 'While the authorities look the
other way, young people are reaching a critical juncture in Africa, silently becoming
key figures in the promotion of socio-historical change. The innumerable informal
means, by which they are doing so, make them crucial potential partners in the for-
mulation of development (peace) programmes'.18

The entry point for turning Nigeria’s youth away from a culture of violence and to-
ward a culture of peace lies in the positive utilization of the best qualities that the
youth constituency possesses. Doing so must begin with quality education through
which youths learn the basics about responsibilities toward the family, society, and
state. Such learning should be accompanied by accruable benefits of participation
through their engagement via employment. Youths’ involvement in different sectors of
society is key to the process of transforming them as a constituency into an instru-
ment of peace. It is an essential building block for constructing peace in Nigeria. Any

18. N. Argenti, 'Youth in Africa: A major resource for change' in A. de Waal and N. Argenti (eds.), Young
peace without sufficient participation by youths will only last momentarily, before giving way once again to conflict.

The framework for transforming the youth constituency into agents of peace already exists in Nigeria, but it is underutilized. It includes the ministries of youth development at the federal and state levels, ministries and departments of social development at the state and local levels, the National Youth Service Corps, National Directorate of Employment, National Agency for Poverty Eradication Programme, and others. The problem is making these frameworks’ and agencies’ operations relevant to the daily existence of the country’s youths. The 1999 constitution recognizes the rights of Nigerian youths, but a problem remains in translating these rights and obligations into concrete meaning in their lives. Peace in any society requires the effective mobilization and utilization of the available human and material wealth in it. It entails conscious and on-going nurturing to take root and bear fruit. Positive economic measures and good governance are keys to peacebuilding, and success is eventually determined by the level of youth involvement and improvements in quality of life.

The Nigerian government’s National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) promotes the most comprehensive actionable peacebuilding measures in the country. Its efforts are aimed at wealth creation, employment generation, poverty reduction, and value reorientation. As these measures trickle down through SEEDS (the State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy) and LEEDS (the Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy), it is hoped that the agents of implementation will be conscious of the peace imperative, especially as it pertains to youths’ economic empowerment and value reorientation. Regrettably, inconsistency and lack of continuity in government approaches to development threatens to jettison NEEDS, SEEDS, and LEEDS, replacing them with the inchoate 7-Point Agenda as well as Vision 20: 2020. The agenda focuses on power and energy, food security and agriculture, wealth creation and employment, mass transportation, land reform, security, and qualitative and functional education. Vision 20: 2020, a development planning programme, aims to make Nigeria’s economy one of the world’s twenty largest by 2020.

Transforming youths in Nigeria into agents of peace and conflict resolution is an onerous task that must be consciously undertaken on a daily basis through good governance and genuine empowerment of youths. If existing frameworks (that is, national youth policies, constitutions, and so on) can make a positive difference in the day-to-day survival of Nigerian youths, their transformation is assured; should their intentions remain only on paper, however, the status of youths as conflict agents will continue to prevail.

CONCLUSION

Using youth to achieve political goals and abandoning them afterwards is like setting a bomb to explode, and the target could be anyone. The young are a vulnerable group, and Nigeria’s poor economic conditions coupled with years of bad governance have kept them in the role of victim. Youths, however, can be a source of energy for peace-

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making or for conflict in any society. The extent to which a society enjoys peace is determined by the extent to which it mobilizes and utilizes its youth constituency as a resource to generate development and peace.

There is a need therefore to redefine the current conceptualization and operations of youth-oriented national and state government agencies to meet the ever-increasing needs of the youth constituency. These agencies should be restructured and staff rationalized and re-oriented toward ensuring youth development that will enable Nigeria’s young constituencies to play a role in nation building and peacebuilding. Also, the various structures and norms that foster injustice, discrimination, and the alienation of youth—involving access to government, decision making, and implementation of youth-focused development programmes—should be changed to ensure the rights of youths as guaranteed by the 1999 Nigerian constitution and the African Youth Charter.

A society’s conflict status can be determined by the level of youth unproductiveness and alienation from the processes of governance. There is a need therefore to redefine the current conceptualization and operations of the National Agency for Poverty Eradication Programme, the National Youth Service Corps, and other youth-oriented national and state government agencies to meet the needs of Nigeria’s young population. The government and other stakeholders responsible for developing the youth constituency must start the process of inclusiveness and provide youth with a sense of ownership in the political and economic governance of the nation.
At the Margin of the City: IDPs, Citizenship, and Urban Polarization in Sudan

Mahmoud El Zain

The Sudanese state has relied on juridical regulations to deal with illegal settlements of internally displaced persons (IDPs), but these regulations have resulted unnecessarily in the destruction of life and of much-needed housing, heightening societal polarization and instability. Such policies also did not stop IDPs from flowing into urban areas in search of refuge and settlement, particularly to Greater Khartoum. When the state’s regulations were strongly maintained and implemented harshly, they were effective, to some extent, in preventing possibly larger population movements into riverain regions of central Sudan. In the 1980s, however, these regulations began to break down, enabling migrants and IDPs to claim space in the region that had previously been off-limits to them. In addition, modernist city planning and the urban high culture of the riverain towns sanctioned government regulations against IDP settlements. The IDPs thus adopted strategies in their struggle with municipal authorities over urban space that have helped them retain the right to settle in Greater Khartoum.

Khartoum has been a favoured destination in Sudan for many displaced groups, with the city hosting more than half the country’s registered internally displaced persons (IDPs). The displaced travel long distances and bypass other towns in their trek to Khartoum in pursuit of refuge and a place to settle. Migration to Khartoum has long served as an escape from various tragic situations and problems. Unlike other states, Khartoum state has something to offer—for example, the city’s meagre urban services. In addition, notes Sheref Eddin Bannaga, Khartoum has a concentration of media, which allows NGOs and diplomatic missions to exert political pressure on the state; allows proximity to political authority and executive leadership, amounting to perma-

2. For more details, see M. El Zain, Environmental Scarcity, Hydropolitics, and the Nile: Population Concentration, Water Scarcity and the Changing Domestic and Foreign Politics of the Sudan (Maastricht, Shaker, 2007).
3. Bannaga, The Displaced and Opportunities for Peace, 38. In line with the federal system adopted by the government in the early 1990s, Khartoum province was renamed Khartoum state.
nent pressure on decision makers; offers chances for employment and access to relief and educational services; and hosts government-tolerated unauthorised settlements.4

Khartoum grew quickly in the post-independence era. As the seat of the elite who inherited the governing system from the British, it acquired more power than other parts of the country and was the focus for development. In the late 1980s, Greater Khartoum had ‘76 per cent of the established industries, 80 per cent of banking activities, 75 per cent of the labour force employed in manufacturing and 80 per cent of the commercial dealings, together with an absolute concentration of insurance facilities’.5

STATE REACTIONS

Various governments in the recent history of Sudan have used six basic measures to block migrants and other IDPs from settling in central riverain regions in general and Greater Khartoum, the tripartite capital: repatriation; demolition of homes and eviction; withholding urban services; prohibition on holding tenancies; incrimination and punishment; and indirect measures, such as conscription and emergency laws.6 These measures date back to between 1930 and 1945—that is, the British colonial era and the Great Depression—when migrants, under the Town Planning Act of 1930, were returned to their areas of origin.7 Employment status was used to identify intruders for expulsion and to maintain the towns as the residence of ‘indigenous’ riverain groups, former soldiers, and colonial personnel and other Europeans.8 Khartoum’s population in the 1930s actually decreased, from 278,000 to 255,000.9 When Sudan became independent in 1956, it retained the same restrictions concerning access to the central region’s agricultural niches by certain groups, particularly those from western Sudan. This was especially associated with the Managil irrigation scheme, an extension of the Gezira scheme, in the 1960s.10 The Gezira scheme, devised in 1925, had attracted western Sudanese, who comprised 12.9 percent of tenancy leasers. With the Managil extension, their number dropped to 1.8 percent.11

Beginning in the late 1970s, repatriation of migrants, which by then had come to be known as kasha, gained momentum. These regulations primarily targeted young, ‘unemployed’ migrant males and IDPs pushed to the cities by conditions in rural areas.12

6. El Zain, Environmental Scarcity, Hydropolitics, and the Nile, 297. The ‘tripartite capital’, or Greater Khartoum, refers to Khartoum (between the Blue and White Nile), Khartoum North (across the Blue Nile from Khartoum on the eastern bank and along the eastern bank of the main Nile), and Omdurman (across the White Nile from Khartoum and along the western bank of the main Nile).
8. Ibid.
10. Began by the British colonial administration, the Gezira scheme involved the plains between the Blue Nile and White Nile in Gezira state in central Sudan. It was the largest irrigation scheme in the country and one of the largest in the world.
12. For details, see Salih, Environmental Politics and Liberation in Contemporary Africa.
The repatriation of migrants continued until the collapse of the Nimieri government in 1985. Even the first famine refugees arriving in Khartoum and Gezira from the western provinces were shipped back to their home areas, although it was unlikely that relief would reach them because of a lack of transport. After a period of calm, namely, under the democratically elected regime that ruled from 1986 to 1989, repatriation was resumed in the 1990s. IDP shantytowns, viewed as threatening by urban groups, continued to be demolished.

According to O. M. El-Kheir, "The first action against a shanty town in the capital was taken in 1927, when cardboard shacks were increasing among native habitations in Khartoum North. The British Inspector, Mr. Simpson, replanned the area in plots of 170 to 200 sq. m. in the same place (present location of the deims in Khartoum North)." In 1949, there was a relocation of some 30,000 persons in the deims. After independence, people continued to erect cardboard shacks near industrial areas in Khartoum and Khartoum North, where by 1965 the population had reached 30,000, and its growth started to pose a threat to the government. Under the military government in 1971, the shantytowns in Khartoum were relocated south of the Green Belt, and those in Khartoum North were moved to Haj Yousif, farther to the east, off the bank of the Blue Nile.

The shantytowns described above were different from those that appeared in the 1980s. They were smaller, and their inhabitants were either salaried (pre-independence) government employees, or more often, people looking for better job opportunities in the urban sector following independence. Most important, however, was that the state for the longer part of this period accepted some degree of responsibility in that the people who lost their homes to demolition were relocated. This changed with the large waves of migrants during the 1970s and in 1983 when the state resorted to tough security and juridical measures.

**Population Displacement and Large-Scale Demolitions**

The experience of Umm Badda, one of the IDP settlements in Greater Khartoum, illustrates that tough government measures did not deter IDPs from coming to and settling in Greater Khartoum. The IDPs resisted the governments efforts because of the high risks involved in returning home.

Umm Badda, included in the Omdurman town boundary in 1966, increased in population from 17,400 in 1964–1965 to 182,000 in 1983 and to more than 517,000 in 1990. Settlements such as Umm Badda around Greater Khartoum gained mo-
mentum after the early 1970s. The number of such quarters, known as haras (sing. 
harā), increased significantly. By the mid-1970s, although Umm Badda’s population 
had grown to such an extent as to pose a threat to authorities, it received legal recog-
nition as a town. By 1976, Umm Badda had 16,000 dwellings, as the incentive of legality encouraged settlement within and around its haras 11 through 18. Similar expansion of unauthorized settlements took place in Khartoum and Khartoum North as well. In Khartoum, for instance, ‘after 1970 the whole area south of the Green Belt and between the two Niles along a line from Jebel Aulia eastward to the Blue Nile [was] occupied by squatter settlements, covering an area of 50 km².’ This was a period when pressure from IDP communities—mostly driven by speculators—began to flow from these settlements and satellite villages within urban boundaries.

In September 1983, Sudan’s rulers declared an Islamic government and imposed sharia. According to one source, ‘Demolitions started at the end of December 1983 and continued for 8 months over an area of 25 square kilometers that was estimated at 27 million Sudanese Pounds.’ In addition, ‘15 areas were demolished between March and May 1984 and 33 others were placed under watch.’ The demolition of so many homes was meant to create hardship on a large scale. El-Kheir asserts, ‘The main objective of this policy appears not to have been to relocate squatters as much as to clear government sites. The problem was thus largely seen as illegal occupation of valuable lands more than a need of a sector of the population for shelter.’ Thus, ‘in order to force the migrants to leave, the government ordered the demolition of their houses which were built on the outskirts of town, and used the police and the army to repatriate them to their home areas.’ The government’s actions were also morally sanctioned by a discourse that has continuously alienated those considered outsiders in the riverain zone. Protection of the downstream riverain area during the 1980s took an extremely violent form. S. Harir notes ‘the large-scale removal of squatter-settlers at gunpoint, from the capital Khartoum and the bulldozing of their dwellings.’ This was the period when the regime that ruled the country between 1969 and 1985 began to falter; as a result, it resorted to tough measures, including sharia.

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19. Although these haras have names adopted by the actual communities, the government refers to them by numbers, for instance, hara 1, hara 18, and so on.
22. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. S. Harir, ‘Marginalization of conflict, displacement and the legitimacy of the state: A case from Darfur, Western Sudan’ in T. Tvedt (ed.), Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Human and Ecological Consequences of Warfare (Uppsala, Research Programme on Environmental Policy and Society and Uppsala University, 1993), 16; see also S. El Nagar, ‘The impact of war on women and children in the Sudan’ in Tvedt, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, 111.
In the 1990s, the groups in power were particularly hostile to migrants and IDPs. M. A. Mohamed Salih notes, "The continuation of the practice of Kasha is a clear reminder that the Sudanese state regularly uses brute force and coercion to protect its own interest and those of the political and modern agrarian elite, at the expense of the marginalised peoples and the environment." Under the military regimes, demolition policies and programmes for displacing communities became the norm. The three military governments that ruled during 1958 to 1964, 1969 to 1985, and since 1989 have made the central riverain zone an unpleasant place; nevertheless, none succeeded in keeping the 'intruders' at bay. Thus, under colonial and post-colonial rule, various Sudanese governments resorted to juridical regulations in attempting to diminish the pressure on Greater Khartoum, their seat of power.

As the slums grew in size, and in view of the precedence of resettling thousands of former slum dwellers, authorities had little option but to continue resettling new groups. After 1981, the Ministry of Construction and Public Works investigated and determined the eligibility of households in unauthorized settlements for alternative accommodation. El-Kheir notes, 'By 1984 the phenomenal continued growth of Umm Badda had been accepted and additional haras 19–23 were designated though here, as with haras 11–18, service provision remained negligible.' In fact, despite the official allocation of plots, the government tended to neglect the parallel mass displacement in 1984 caused by the famine that affected broad areas of the country. It is likely that while the names of a few urban dwellers appeared on the government's list for resettlement, a larger number of others lost their homes to demolition.

The displaced continued to pour in to urban areas during the last years of the regime led by Jaafar al-Nimeiri and after its collapse in April 1985. A 1985 report to the transitional Council of Ministers (formed after the government fell) indicated that there were 91 unauthorised settlements—32 in Khartoum, 30 in Omdurman, and 29 in Khartoum North—housing more than half a million people. Despite the change in regime, there was no significant change towards IDP settlements. Under the government elected democratically in 1986, the IDPs were removed 'to remote areas away from the towns, where contact with town communities seem[ed] impossible'. Similar measures continued in the 1990s. Following the coup orchestrated by the National Islamic Front (NIF) in June 1989, the government engaged the IDPs during a fierce campaign of bulldozing their dwellings, killing some in the process of resettling and isolating them far from the cities. The government resorted to other measures as well to discourage IDPs from staying in or around towns. According to

30. Ibid., 164.
31. Ibid., 161.
32. Ibid., 158.
34. Harir, 'Marginalization of conflict, displacement and the legitimacy of the state', 16; El Nagar, 'The impact of war on women and children in the Sudan', 111.
35. A. G. M. Ahmed, 'The human and ecological impact of the civil war in the Sudan' in Tvedt, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, 117.
Bannaga, the state prohibited the extension of services to unplanned neighbour-
hoods, though the latter occupied an expansive residential area.

THE STATE MODERNIST DISCOURSE AND RIVERAIN ‘HIGH CULTURE’: THE GENESIS OF DISDAIN

Although urban areas in the Sudan retain characteristics of villages, they have developed a disdain of migrants from rural areas. Modernist city planning, concerned with power and cleanliness, seems, in association with riverain ‘high culture’, to have informed this attitude and government policies, going back to the colonial era. According to H. Kuklich, ‘Between 1899 and 1912 fundamental decisions were made that were intended to make the city [Khartoum] an embodiment of British imperial notions of social order, in both symbolic and practical terms. The city’s street plan served as a constant reminder of imperial power: over a grid of streets, the major one designated Victoria Avenue, a diagonal network of streets was laid; each diagonal crossing was named after a successful imperial battle, and the diagonal network as a whole was intended to facilitate military control of the city.’

City planners subscribed to the strategic goal of asserting the power of the colonial administration: ‘Khartoum was to be reconstructed along “sanitary lines,” [so] it would testify to “the thorough efficiency of the administration of the country,” justifying the imperial mission.’ Intertwined with the strategic goal of asserting power was the health of new inhabitants of the capital. As Kuklick maintains, ‘Elevated standards of public health in Khartoum would make settlement there attractive to Europeans—the intended principal beneficiaries of sanitary efforts, as was usual in imperial cities.’

The ongoing resistance of indigenous groups to the colonial administration and the pathogens they carried were portrayed as the utmost source of risk to the new residents of Khartoum. Kuklick notes in ‘Salubrious Sudan,’ ‘And because Khartoum was a place through which disease-bearing “natives are continually coming and going and passing through,” posing a clear “danger” especially when they originated in the “humid and typically tropical regions of the Southern Sudan,” the city’s indigenous peoples’ habits were described in a fashion akin to those of its insects, in

36. Bannaga, The Displaced and Opportunities for Peace, 52.
40. Ibid., 208.
41. Ibid.
order to determine the risks they posed to European residents. Keeping specific groups of the indigenous at bay, by making the central riverain regions ‘forbidden’, has long been government policy.

The fashion in which the indigenous are described in the above extract no doubt informed the Town Planning Act of 1930. Following independence, indigenous people feature as a source of disorder, dirtiness, and unpleasantness. This was expressed in connection to illegal settlements by an official from the Ministry of Construction and Public Works during the later years of the Nimieri regime: ‘We are handling illegal housing for the sake of controlling the national capital, for its order, cleanliness and beautification. May God help us towards the benefit of our beloved country.’

The discourse of order and cleanliness continued into the 1990s, centred around making Khartoum ‘a civilised capital’ and its uncivilised appearance attributed almost exclusively to rural migrants and IDPs. The disdain of rural origins, surprisingly, was most aggressive during NIF rule, which is largely a party of people of rural descent. The religious puritanism of this party, combined with long-held urban attitudes, produced harsh utterances against IDPs.

Amin Hassan Omer, who held prominent official positions in the NIF government, illustrates this discourse of disdain in a book he co-wrote with A. S. Al-Mahal. In Escaping to the Periphery: Issues of Displacement and IDPs in the Sudan (1992), he and Al-Mahal present the perspective of Khartoum’s old guard in painting the following picture: ‘Since 1983/84, incredible waves of people poured into the national capital and arbitrarily settled therein. They affected a belt surrounding Khartoum supplying this city with flies, insects, idles, vendors of cold water and cigarettes, burglars (night visitors) and local alcohol and its accessories.’ To old-time Khartoumites, their hygienic and innocuous city had suddenly awoken to find entire neighbourhoods ‘infested with the displaced’.

The IDPs were portrayed as a source of danger to a city of values and economy. According to Al-Mahal and Omer, some of the IDPs were idle: ‘they keep roaming from one shadow to another, where idleness takes them to drinking local alcohol. Furthermore, they very often commit crimes such as theft and looting; so they do remain neither productive nor leaving others to be productive’. The IDP camps were considered a threat to security, as frictions among tribes in these camps, especially in connection with armed groups, were thought to lead to violence. The crimes there violated the values and traditions of conservative society.

Attitudes towards IDPs were since the early 1980s increasingly translated into juridical regulations, primarily sharia. The Nimieri government (beginning in 1983) and the NIF regime (since 1989) launched a reign of terror that largely, if not exclusively,

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42. Ibid., 212.
43. El-Kheir, 'Unauthorized settlements in Greater Khartoum', 161.
44. 'Governor of Khartoum in an unprecedented interview with Al-Sahafa: Immigration to Khartoum is associated to Sudan's economic situation and will not stop before equitable development is achieved', al-Sahafa, 16 April 2001.
45. Al-Mahal and Omer, Escaping to the Periphery, 22.
46. Ibid., 51.
47. Ibid., 28.
targeted IDPs. Mohamed Suliman points out that in 1983, when Nimeiri implemented sharia, incidents of limb amputation as punishment reached 200 cases in eighteen months,49 the majority of them involving IDP *shamas* (vagrant boys).50 ‘The sharia laws’, according to Salih, ‘were implemented not to curb the spread of the corruption within the state machinery, as declared by the proponents of the laws, but as a weapon against the residents of the squatter settlements, the beer brewers and the unemployed’.51

Thus, Islamic laws, interpreted through the lens of riverain urbanite high culture, provided yet another reason for repelling or evicting outsiders from Greater Khartoum. This perspective incriminated many of the cultural practices of the IDPs.52 It portrayed the IDPs as criminals who should on security grounds be evicted from the environs of the capital. A passage on IDPs in the report of a human rights rapporteur on Sudan, as Suliman notes, points out that 96 percent of all women imprisoned between December 1993 and November 1994 were from southern and western Sudan.53

Thus, advancing a despotic religious fundamentalist programme, which continues today, represents the most recent attempt by the ruling elite to block migrants and IDPs from settling in Greater Khartoum and other cities in the central riverain region. The ruling elite would almost certainly lose their privilege should they allow a demographic shift in Khartoum. As in the 1960s, when the presence and increase of rural migrants in Khartoum threatened support for the bourgeoisie parties,54 today the increase of rural migrants and IDPs imperils the fragile base of support for the NIF, especially after it excommunicated some of its supporters in western Sudan. The affirmation by the NIF government that Khartoum remain under Islamic law—following the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement (2005)—is evidence of the insistence of the ruling elite on using culturally informed legal measures to control what in their view has become an unruly situation. These ethnically and religiously informed measures display utter hostility towards IDPs and their cultures and overlook the processes of ecological marginalization, uneven economic development, and cultural and political suppression. They ultimately blame the victims.

**IDP RESISTANCE AND CLAIMS OF RIVERAIN ZONE ‘CITIZENSHIP’**

Sudanese state policies in urban areas have increasingly made IDPs conscious of the need for group members to work together and to assert their citizenship rights. In fact, cultural, political, and economic contradictions in urban areas and the dwindling legitimacy of the military regime have created a political opportunity from which IDPs

50. See also Salih, *Environmental Politics and Liberation in Contemporary Africa*, 67.
51. Ibid.
52. M. El Zain, ‘The political potential of displacement to urban areas: How has the “ethnic discourse” transformed the culturally polarized milieu in the Sudan?’ *Peace and Conflict Review*, 1 (July 2006).
stand to benefit. In urban areas in general and in Khartoum in particular, IDPs were used to justify the prevailing religious discourse and to legitimise ruling regimes, but on the other hand, they were also used by opposition forces in their efforts to transform sitting regimes. As a result, IDPs were praised and embraced by some urban political actors, but condemned, ridiculed, abused, and damned by others. Therefore, IDPs ventured into urban politics on their own behalf to create new space for themselves in Sudanese society.

Although this situation has caused some conflict among the displaced, even among clans, an implicit alliance of the displaced in opposition to an alliance of old-time urban dwellers has emerged, bringing localized micro-politics into the macro-political discourse. The cultural norms of central and northern Sudan riverain groups were the measures against which culturally and politically permissible and legally sanctioned acts were judged. The alliance of the IDPs can be viewed as an umbrella of rural networks that emerged in an urban setting.

As early as the 1960s some significant changes were taking place in how rural networks in urban settings perceived the dynamics surrounding them. According to A. G. M. Ahmed, ‘[W]ith the growing consciousness of the unequal development among regions of the Sudan, a new form of association started to appear on the political scene. These were the ethnic or “tribal” associations in large urban areas. They were organised by ethnic groups from remote underdeveloped areas of the country with the purpose of making the voice of those areas heard by people in power, and at the same time, of organising self-help programmes in their [urban neighbourhood] areas’. What is important to note here is that these ethnic associations adopted some form of modern organisation. Their leadership, according to Ahmed, ‘was made of people with some experience with labour unions, and although they were not openly supported by CPS [Communist Party of the Sudan], the influence of that party in their programmes is unmistakable’.

One prominent right for which the IDPs have fervently fought is that to assert their citizenship, that is, recognition that they are Sudanese nationals entitled to settle anywhere in the country. They sought to oppose the state’s harsh measures, and although they were not united, they adopted similar methods of resistance in the various unauthorised settlements. Their isolation and alienation from urban society combined with a lack of material and social services and opportunities to access them made IDPs unified in their cause. Salih notes, ‘In addition to starvation, the urban refugees have been confronted by a new set of problems, such as lack of employment due to the widespread economic recession (even when jobs are available, they do not have the skills or the education to take them); social problems related to the despair and uncertainty inherent in the psychology of hunger and devaluation; and housing problems, which have culminated in a series of confrontations with the municipal authorities, especially in the towns of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman’.

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57. Ibid., 27–28.
58. Salih, Environmental Politics and Liberation in Contemporary Africa, 60. Al-Mahal and Omer (Escaping to the Periphery, 27–28, 49) point out that the majority of IDPs are unskilled workers who are not competent in the local market, thus they pursue marginal jobs that may not contribute to national development.
Because of their marginalisation, as well as the alienation they experienced in urban areas, the tribal solidarity of IDPs remained intact. The Nuba community, which has faced the most aggressive attempts at cultural assimilation, is a worthy example of how groups can achieve solidarity in the face of alienation and excommunication. The Nuba, whose homeland is in the south of Kordofan, moved in large numbers to urban areas because of ecological marginalization (which resulted in the collapse of their subsistence economy), increased insecurity, and forced eviction from their homeland by the government and its tribal allies. The Nuba, who lack cohesive tribal institutions, increasingly found themselves in need of organisation to confront their seemingly endless ‘frontier status’.

In their displacement, the Nuba showed persistence in sustaining communal integration, a task for which several community-based organisations (CBOs) were created. ‘Traditional institutions such as tribal clubs, village and clans chiefs’, according to A. Al-Karsani, ‘were formed in the urban centres to administer the affairs of clan or the village displaced, solve problems and to link the new comers to Greater Khartoum with old residents’. These CBOs played a key role in keeping the Nuba’s traditional forms of social organisation and traditional system of caring intact.

According to M. Kevane and E. Stiansen, ‘While there is no question that Nuba groups no longer consider important, or even remember, many of the cultural practices described earlier by anthropologists, this does not mean that the Nuba have become “detribalised”, to apply the British colonial term. Men and women, migrants and villagers, the young and the old, all continued to challenge, validate and ultimately to enact representations of their local identity’. Though the majority of Nuba who migrated to Greater Khartoum tended to organise themselves along village lines, the 1980s effected a shift in this form of organisation by way of enlarging the community along broader, regional lines. This was, namely, the administrative level of Area Council. This move was viewed as necessary for achieving unity in the face of state repression, which took the form of evacuations of the Nuba from the streets of Greater Khartoum.

The IDPs’ 1980s ‘renovation’ of their indigenous forms of social organisation is an old strategy that migrants usually implement as a way of dealing with problems involving government. El-Kheir notes an incidence from the late 1940s that illustrates this pattern. When the British administration resettled the inhabitants of Khartoum’s deims, there was no space for privacy in the new settlements: ‘Houses were packed in blocks of approximately 100 square meters surrounded by 40 meter roads.’ The people there certainly met with some difficulties living in the dense settlement blocks. ‘However, this depressing picture was brightened by the social values of the population who shared loyalties and kept a well-integrated community which mutually supported its members. Bound by their tribal origin relations, they were clustered together in groups named after their home towns or tribes, such as Deim Ta’iasha, Deim Gawama’a, Deim Tagali and Deim Nyala or Deim Telegraph where inhabitants were mostly working in the Post and Telegraph Department. This cohesion was

60. Ibid., 51.
63. El-Kheir, ‘Unauthorized settlements in Greater Khartoum’, 156.
perhaps one factor why the deims became seriously congested after the post-war in-
flux to Khartoum. The same strategies of mutual support and cohesion have gained 
momentum since the early 1980s. In the words of Al-Karsani, 'The Nuba associations in the 
urban communities are gaining increasing influence among the Nuba migrants and 
displaced.' Al-Karsani continues, 'The numerous organizations are a reflection to the 
Nuba poly-ethnic nature. They also reflect the feeling of uncertainty and anxiety among 
the Nuba. The “frontier status” is still at play.' The Nuba and other communities resis-
ted their isolation by strengthening their cross-settlement ties and provided the social 
services that they were denied by government.

Communal solidarity, expressed in forms of political organisation and in self-help 
institutions, became more effective in catering to IDP needs, especially in Khartoum. 
M. El Sammani and his colleagues note that 'the lack of government resources means 
that frequently basic infrastructure services and social services are not provided. As a 
result in many areas of the conurbation, communities have developed self-help 
associations in order to provide such essential services.' Equally, community associa-
tions, acting as ‘political pressure groups’, were successful in defending settlements 
against demolition and therefore in claiming the right to settle in Greater 
Khartoum. In Khartoum, as Deborah Potts argues, 'the ability to organize politically 
is a key factor in preventing settlement demolition'.

Communal organisation and solidarity in urban areas by different groups (to dif-
ferent degrees) helped IDP communities acquire a space in the urban environment, as 
the case of the Umm Badda settlement illustrates. M. E. Abu Sin and H. R. J. Davies 
view Umm Badda as representing how ‘squatter settlements, called “community plan-
ning”[…] as opposed to government-[-]advocated standard planning, managed to 
acquire an “urban status”'; literally forcing the government to recognize their rights. They 
also assert, ‘Umm Badda set the pattern for forced recognition for other settle-
ments by adopting self-generated institutions which tap the community resources and 
design the settlement in a way to be acceptable as a de facto situation by the author-
ity. This process has confused the authority so that it is no longer sure where to put 
the line between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” and thus encouraged other migrants 
to adopt the Umm Badda model as a step towards official recognition.'

Oppression by the dominant urban culture, taking the form of modernist urban 
planning, pushes all those on its periphery to dwell inside tribal solidarity. It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find solidarity groups even among those who had no notion

64. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 51.
68. Ibid., 257.
69. D. Potts, Urban lives: Adopting new strategies and adapting rural links’ in C. Rakodi (ed.), The 
Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of Its Large Cities (Tokyo, United Nations University 
Press, 1997), 481.
70. M. E. Abu Sin and H. R. J. Davies, ‘Conclusion: A future for the capital region’ in Davies and Abu 
Sin, The Future of Sudan's Capital Region, 265.
71. Ibid.
of ethnic solidarity, for example, children and youths in urban areas. Groups of vagrant children, including those of Nuba descent, created their own solidarity; they were ‘mostly linked by tribal affiliations and usually include[d] children of different ages. Displaced children in the 1980s even invented Rondok, a camouflaged “language” to help shamasa escape the punishment and surveillance technologies of the state’s repressive apparatuses as well as those of the established urban society.

A significant factor that seems to be underreported in the scholarship on Sudan is the weight of the IDPs in Greater Khartoum. The Nuba again here provide an illustrative example. Due to their demographic numbers, in 1986 the Sudan National Party (SNP)—a Nuba-backed party—won a parliamentary seat for ‘the squatter settlements of Omdurman (the centre of Sudanese nationalism during the struggle for independence), indicating that the Nuba were taking centre stage in Sudan’s national politics. This, theoretically, means that the Nuba’s representation is likely to increase, as might the potential to bargain to be part of coalition governments. Regaining democracy in the Sudan and using the ballot box might bring about major, and maybe surprising, results. The demographic and thus political weight of IDPs in Khartoum may allow them representation attuned to their interests in legislative and executive bodies.

Other important factors are the presence of international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and pressure by the international community on the Sudanese government to respect human rights. The moral support provided by this presence and pressure represents, to some extent, a shield against government cruelties, and therefore are an important factor in the attraction to urban areas and an important route through which IDPs can assert their agendas. Bannaga, the NIF minister of engineering affairs, said such pressure had compelled the state to abandon other responsibilities and pay attention to IDP issues in order to lessen media and foreign political pressure. The fact that the phenomenon of displacement came increasingly under the international media’s spotlight proved to be a great aid to the IDPs in their struggle with their own state.

**INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO IDP PRESSURES**

Despite Sudanese government efforts to demolish settlements of IDPs, they all ultimately succumbed to pressure to assist them. At the peak of the 1984–1985 famine, upon the arrival of IDPs, the military regime, after a period of disinclination, established offices to deal with the situation. According to Gamal Mahmoud Hamid, it created a military committee to direct relief operations, the Higher Council for Relief, and the Higher Council for Mitigation of Disasters, Drought and Desertification. These institutions, however, were incapable of coping with the magnitude of the problem and providing quick solutions. Similarly, the implementation of Islamic law failed

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74. Bannaga, *The Displaced and Opportunities for Peace*, 38–39; see also Suliman, *Sudan’s Civil Wars*, 397.
to save Nimeiri’s rule. The popular masses, including the agonised shantytown dwellers, brought his regime to an end in April 1985.

The change of regime resulted in clear policy changes regarding IDPs. El-Kheir notes, ‘The Council of Ministers in October 1985’—six months after the collapse of the military dictatorship—‘passed resolutions concerning the formation of the Directorate for Spontaneous Housing and a relocation project involving 50,000 families’.76 During democratic rule from 1986 to 1989, the Umma Party–led ruling coalition ‘recognised’ the plight of the IDPs. Thus, in 1986 the government established the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to provide basic and urgent services for the IDPs.77 In 1988, the National Council for Internally Displaced Persons’ Affairs was set up with the objectives of surveying IDPs to assess their relief needs, formulate a security plan to prevent crime among them, and mobilise and coordinate national and international resources to rehabilitate affected areas.78 During this period, a couple of towns, each with the name Dar as-Salam (house of peace), on the outskirts of the tripartite capital, were planned and constructed for slum dwellers to occupy.79 Of the 1.35 million IDPs, according to the official estimate for June 1985, note S. El-Bushra and N. B. Hijazi, ‘some 600,000 (45%) were located in the Capital Region’. These IDPs were settled in 23 sites recognised as settlements by the government.80

After NIF bulldozing campaigns against IDP dwellings, the government eventually resorted to ‘accommodating’ some of the IDPs along lines similar to Umma Party policies.81 Following the adoption of the extended federal system in Sudan, the NIF government in 1993 renamed the RRC the Commission of Voluntary Action (COVA). In 1995, as IDP problems became more complicated, and as the number of NGOs operating in Sudan increased, Khartoum state created the Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC), a special apparatus catering to IDPs, replacing and carrying out the functions of the RRC and COVA.82 Around the tripartite capital alone, the number of permanent settlement sites for IDPs had reached thirty-eight.83

Interestingly, during NIF rule, some researchers known to be active NIF cadres and government officials who had conducted extensive research on the IDP phenomenon came to believe in a ‘political economy’ cause of and approach to displacement, thus, refuting the stigma-based attributions to this phenomenon characteristic of NIF ideology.84 The fatalistic approach, with its inherent denial of material needs, was, thus, gradually being renegotiated, even among Islamist politicians. According to Bannaga, the mass displacement of populations was attributable to the impact of economic

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77. Bannaga, The Displaced and Opportunities for Peace, 63.
79. Bannaga, The Displaced and Opportunities for Peace, 78.
81. Bannaga, The Displaced and Opportunities for Peace.
82. Ibid., 63.
structural adjustment policies and the unsuccessful development policies of previous governments.85

The NIF wali (governor) of Khartoum state believed that the war- and drought-affected states of the country should receive assistance so their inhabitants would no longer desert them.86 The minister of agriculture of Khartoum state also engaged in this discourse, asserting the need to involve international organisations in carrying out development for building sustainable self-capacity instead of simply concentrating on relief.87 The suggested strategies in line with this approach, however, remained proposals only, as the regime used an iron fist to silence popular demands, and many of its members engaged in corruption. Nonetheless, it is important not to minimize the shift in belief among the NIF’s cadres, which had persistently ridiculed the aspirations of ordinary people for a dignified life of material and social well-being. The presence of IDPs indeed caused a shift in the strategies of modernist and Islamist urban elites.

The IDPs came to take centre stage in the discourse about unity, citizenship, and peace. The presence of the IDPs in Khartoum, according to H. M. Mohammed, was good for acculturation and solidifying the unity of the Sudan.88 In the view of Bannaga, the population dynamics were not all negative, as the IDPs concentrated in Khartoum could be a factor in achieving a common good, as they represent the potential for productive economic power if properly employed.89

CONCLUSION

The effect of the displaced on Sudan’s political life and the influence of urban political actors is undeniable. According to Al-Mahal and Omer, the displaced who made up some 40 percent of Khartoum’s population went on to become social, economic, political, and security instruments.90 According to these authors, although the IDPs had primarily remained distant from the arena of decision making— influencing others and being influenced by them—they eventually came to effectively influence political life in the capital.91 The previous technologies of control at the disposal of those governing collapsed; ethnic networks were consolidated and centralised hegemonic ideologies were discredited, especially in terms of the divisive Islamist discourse.

Asserting different forms of social organisation, IDPs challenged the high culture of elites in their own den. The failure of the apparatuses of the high culture to eliminate IDP organisations shows not only the ability of the latter to manoeuvre but also points to their demographic weight, which became significant. The IDPs transformed themselves from prey of the riverain high culture in Greater Khartoum into organised groups that exerted pressure on this culture every day. IDP demographics can influence existing power relations, depending on the conditions in the urban area and the compatibility of the agendas of actors there with those of the displaced. Essential to

86. ‘Governor of Khartoum in an unprecedented interview with al-Sahafa’.
90. Al-Mahal and Omer, Escaping to the Periphery, 51.
91. Ibid., 60.
this process was the IDPs’ ability to reinvent their traditional forms of social organisation, which initially contributed to breaking open the political arena for them and earned them recognition.

The demolition of IDP settlements by government authorities ranks as ‘urbicide’ in its scale and, most important, in its destruction of cultural heterogeneity. Families, that had lived together for more than two decades and had built social and cultural networks within their neighbourhoods suddenly lost this social capital and found themselves with new neighbours, starting from scratch. With the geographical distance between their former and new locations and paralysing poverty, they may never reestablish their previous community ties. Within an increasingly ethnicized urban space, they may find it too difficult to build the sort of multi-ethnic symbiotic relations they once had. What remains to be further investigated is the social and political polarization that the authorities have caused through resort to ethnically and religiously biased legal measures and whether relatively dormant conflicts, such as in Darfur, which broke out in the 1990s, are triggered primarily by the urban politics of IDP settlement arrangements and the violence and disdain that accompanied them.
State Fragility and Restoring Order in Zimbabwe

Albert Makochekanwa and Marko Kwaramba

Zimbabwe has experienced state fragility resulting from economic meltdown, repressive and undemocratic government, actions of self-interested groups, land redistribution, and corruption. The costs to Zimbabweans and the economy include a brain drain, political and social trauma, breakdowns in the provision of public services, unemployment and de-formalization of the economy, and increases in hunger and stress. The costs have also been borne by South Africa, as economic and political refugees from Zimbabwe have flooded across its border, taxing an already overstretched government with the financial burden of providing basic services (including health care) and dealing with increases in crime and violence, as well as suffering bad publicity as a result of xenophobic acts.

[F]ragility is created by someone (or some set of forces), and serves particular interests.
—Keith Krause and Oliver Jüterbogen ‘Seeking out the State: Fragile States and International Governance’, Politixis, no. 42, 2007, 9

ZIMBABWE HAS NOT BEEN AT WAR SINCE 1979, but it is currently ‘suffering from war-like trauma to its polity and economy’ and a host of horrific consequences resulting from state fragility.1 No universally accepted definition of state fragility yet exists, but the condition and its symptoms are widely recognized.2 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines fragile states as ‘those where the state power is unable and/or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people: security, protection of property rights, basic public services and essential infra-


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Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 3:1 (June 2010), 64–79.
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structure’. One group of scholars views fragility as a situation ‘wherein government cannot or will not provide an environment for households to reduce, mitigate or cope with poverty and other risks to well-being’. Based on these and other definitions, along with results generated by four instruments and indexes used to measure the different dimensions and indicators of state fragility, Zimbabwe has qualified as a failed state since 2000. It has been one of the worst performing countries of the new millennium.

The past and present problems facing Zimbabwe are multifaceted. One issue has been hyperinflation, with the last official figures (from July 2008) putting the monthly inflation rate at 231.2 million percent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the hyperinflation rate for September 2008 to be 489 billion percent, while one independent analyst, Steve Hanke, calculated an inflation rate of 6.5 quindecillion novemdecillion percent—that is, 65 followed by 107 zeros—for December 2008. Severe economic meltdown has characterized the Zimbabwean economy, with growth in gross domestic product (GDP) having dwindled by more than 54 percent since 2000; per capita GDP fell from $755 in 1980 (at independence) to less than $265 in 2008. Production facilities currently operate at around 10 percent of capacity. Political violence and social trauma, the breakdown of basic public utilities and services, massive capital and human flight, and 94 percent unemployment are among the other problems facing Zimbabwe.

STATE FRAGILITY

Controversy over the definition of the term ‘fragile state’ stems from its overlapping the concepts of the failed state, crisis state, and conflict state. The Crisis States Research Centre offers the following as a comprehensive definition of a fragile state:

A ‘fragile state’ is a state significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its subsystems. It is a state that is particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts. In a fragile state, institutional arrangements embody and perhaps preserve the conditions of crisis: in economic terms, this could be institutions (importantly, property rights) that reinforce stagnation or low growth rates, or embody extreme inequality (in wealth, in access to land, in access to the means to make a living); in social terms institutions may embody extreme inequality or lack of

4. The year 2000 marks the start of a large-scale redistribution of land. Although there were some bad policies prior to 2000, such as unbudgeted payments to war veterans in 1997 and sending troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998, the economic free fall for the country began in 2000.
access altogether to health or education; in political terms, institutions may entrench exclusionary coalitions in power (in ethnic, religious, or perhaps regional terms), or extreme factionalism or significantly fragmented security organizations. In fragile states, statutory institutional arrangements are vulnerable to challenges by rival institutional systems be they derived from traditional authorities, devised by communities under conditions of stress that see little of the state (in terms of security, development or welfare), or be they derived from warlords, or other non-state power brokers.

The UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) defines a fragile state as one where ‘the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’. Here, core functions include the provision of basic services, such as education, health, safety, and security.

Zimbabwe, during the period under study, exhibits a number of characteristics and behaviors identifying it as a fragile state. All its systems—political, economic, social, and health related—have experienced a multitude of crises. For example, a cholera outbreak in August 2008 was said by the government to have killed at least 4,000 people; analysts suspect the actual number to be double this estimate, as many people in rural and other areas did not report their deaths. The government, led by the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), was unwilling to provide an environment for households to reduce, mitigate, or cope with poverty and other risks to well-being. The state power was also unable or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people, causing limited or no access to such services as health, education, and water and sanitation. The country’s lack of properly defined or secure property rights, particularly in regard to land, has been at the forefront of exacerbating an economic meltdown. In general, the institutional setting has been under constant challenge, not only from other political parties, such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), but also from nongovernmental organizations, both local and international, including the National Constitution Assembly (NCA), an association of civil society groups and organizations advocating transparency and public participation in the creation of a constitution.

Measuring Fragility

The debate surrounding the definition of fragile states has resulted in the creation of analytical frameworks, instruments, and indexes that attempt to measure the various dimensions and indicators believed indicative of state fragility and failure. The four fragility measurement instruments and indexes are as follows: the Low Income Countries under Stress index (LICUS, developed by the World Bank); Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP, originating in a geopolitical database and supported by the Canadian government); the Political Instability Task Force index (PITF, developed and funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency); and the Failed State Index (FSI, managed by the U.S.-based Fund for Peace). As shown in Table 1, when (available) information is tabulated for Zimbabwe, all the indices consider it a fragile state.

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10. Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen, ‘Fragile states’.
It is common knowledge that Zimbabwe has been in an economic, social, political, and legal meltdown since 2000. The IMF alludes to the fact that economic disruptions, mainly as a result of chaotic hyperinflation and a deterioration in the country’s business environment, resulted in a whopping 14 percent decline in real GDP in 2008 alone, which is over and above the 40 percent cumulative decline from 2000 through 2007. Thus, for the eight-year period 2000 to 2008, Zimbabwe’s real GDP contracted by more than half, that is, by more than 54 percent. The country’s supply side, espe-

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11. International Monetary Fund, ‘Preliminary conclusions of the IMF Article IV consultation mission’.

### Table 1

**State Fragility Index Ratings for Zimbabwe, 2005–2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity Scores</td>
<td>Fragility index</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>6.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>6.77</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>4.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>5.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Cutting Themes</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>6.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator Clusters</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>8.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human development</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Failed State Index | Social Indicators | Demographic pressures | 9.7 | 9.7 | 9.7 |
| Economic Indicators | Refugees and displaced persons | 8.9 | 8.7 | 9.0 |
| | Group grievances | 8.5 | 8.8 | 9.5 |
| | Human flight | 9.0 | 9.1 | 10.0 |
| | Uneven development | 9.2 | 9.5 | 9.6 |
| | Economy | 9.8 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Political and Military Indicators | Legitimacy of the state | 8.9 | 9.5 | 9.5 |
| | Public services | 9.5 | 9.6 | 9.6 |
| | Human rights | 9.5 | 9.7 | 9.8 |
| | Public apparatus | 9.4 | 9.5 | 9.5 |
| | Factionalized elites | 8.5 | 9.0 | 9.3 |
| | External interventions | 8.0 | 7.0 | 7.0 |

**LOW INCOME COUNTRIES UNDER STRESS** | 2.5 |

**POLITICAL INSTABILITY TASK FORCE*** | –4 | –4 | –4 |

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**Note:** In the case of CIFP rankings and the FSI, scores above 6.5 indicate that a country is performing poorly relative to others, and hence defined as fragile, while lower scores, 1 to 3, indicate that the country is performing well relative to others. For the LICUS index, a score of 3.0 or less indicates that a country is fragile. The PITF index varies from strongly autocratic, –10, to strongly democratic, +10. The PITF index for 2000–2004 was –3.5.
cially the provisioning of basic needs, failed to such an extent that it could no longer provide the five basic needs of food, clothing, water, housing and electricity, and health care.

Table 2 tracks Zimbabwe’s economic and social indicators since independence. The country enjoyed positive economic growth for nearly eighteen years, with the exceptions of 1984 and 1992, during which it experienced severe drought. This growth trend, however, changed for the worse beginning in 1999, as economic growth rates became increasingly negative. Also as noted above, since 1999, per capita GDP, a rough estimate of citizens’ social and economic well-being, has been in decline. In other words, Zimbabweans are now relatively poorer than they were at independence. On the inflation front, the annual rate was below 10 percent for the first sixteen years after independence, then in 2001 it hit three digits, became four in 2006, and by the end of 2008 had reached 12 digits.

Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the country’s multifaceted meltdown across its economic, political, and social spheres within the course of a decade. Such events are normally akin to countries engulfed in civil war, acute political conflict, or full-blown war. The IMF noted that as a result of state fragility, Zimbabwe’s expenditures declined by an unbelievable 83.3 percent in a three-year period, from approximately $1.5 billion, or 37 percent of GDP, in 2005, to $251 million, or 8 percent of GDP, in 2008, resulting in the almost complete collapse of public services.12 Public sector wages declined to a meager $2–3 a month, and many schools and hospitals were closed. Absenteeism exceeded 50 percent among the ranks of the few remaining civil servants.

CAUSES OF STATE FRAGILITY IN ZIMBABWE

David Carment and his colleagues count negative trends in such indicators as economic activity and democracy as among the causes of state fragility. They identify as well self-interested groups, criminality, and corruption as some of the factors leading to and perpetuating fragility in societies.13 Table 3 offers a synopsis of the causes of Zimbabwe’s state fragility, noting these issues as well as others.

Economic Debacle

IMF statistics indicate that Zimbabwe’s economic activity cumulatively shrank by nearly two-thirds, that is, by 62.6 percent, from 1999 to 2008. This economic downturn is far worse than the declines witnessed in other African countries undergoing full-scale civil war (see Fig. 2). For instance, during civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, GDP cumulatively declined by 6 percent between 1999 and 2003, by 22 percent in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1996 and 2001, and in Sierra Leone a cumulative 51 percent between 1996 and 1999. In contrast, Zimbabwe’s decline occurred during a time of ‘peace’. Also the purchasing power of the average Zimbabwean, as indicated by GDP per capita, drastically fell during a ten-year period to levels lower than

12. Ibid.
### Table 2: Zimbabwe’s Economic and Political Performance, 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product</th>
<th>Per Capita Gross Domestic Product</th>
<th>Annual Inflation Rate</th>
<th>Corruption Perception Index(^1)</th>
<th>Political Environment(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In billions of U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Percentage growth</td>
<td>In U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–1998</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>740.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>198.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-10.4</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>598.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>132.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>585.8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>1,281.1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>108,844.1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-14.1</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>489,000,000,000.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^1\)Based on a range of zero (highly corrupt) to ten (very clean).

\(^2\)Political rights and civil liberties are measured on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. Countries with combined average ratings that fall between 3.0 and 5.0 are ‘partly free’ and those between 5.5 and 7.0 are ‘not free’.
in 1953. While 35 percent of Zimbabweans lived below the poverty line in 1996, this segment of the population had increased to an estimated 80 percent by the end of 2003 and is believed to have exceeded 90 percent by the first quarter of 2009.

Zimbabwe’s inflation rate stands in sharp contrast to that of many other African countries, where it was in the single digits during the period under review, as opposed to the current 12 digits, as noted above. It also experienced the severest shortages, not

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only in foreign currency, which resulted in a thriving black market, but also in local currency, as the government’s printing machines could not cope with the rising demand for cash notes.

**Government Repression**

Zimbabwe’s political environment is typified by severe restrictions on political and civil liberties. A glimpse at the political rights and civil liberties indexes from Freedom House shows that the country’s ratings since 2000 have been above six (6), indicating a repressive environment (Table 2). The intensification of political and macroeconomic instability following the rise of the opposition MDC in 1999, implementation of controversial land distribution policies beginning in 2000, and increasing isolation in the international community resulted in political factors being among the major determinants of Zimbabwe’s fragility. The dictatorial, repressive, and undemocratic nature of the government created an environment in which leaders felt no compunction to assist the majority of citizens in alleviating poverty or a desire to ensure access to adequate basic services.

**Land Ownership Policies**

In February 2000, the government introduced policies concerning land ownership that resulted in the erosion of Zimbabwe’s agricultural production capacity. The programme was instituted after former freedom fighters (popularly known as war vets) had begun ‘land inversions’—that is, land grabs—mainly targeting commercial (white-owned) farms. Following the takeover of most commercial farms, agriculture, which had been the backbone of the economy in terms of income earnings, began to falter, while employment and foreign currency earnings dropped. Production of maize, the national staple, declined by 86 percent between 2000 and 2005 and had
worsened by the end of 2008.16 This rapid decline was mainly due to at least 80 per-
cent of productive commercial producers being forced out of farming, not because of
drought or donor withdrawal as the government asserted.17 As a result of land grab-
bging and farm seizures, production of tobacco, the country’s number one foreign
currency earner, drastically declined, with its export falling by more than 60 percent
by 2005.18

Self-Interest
A group of Zimbabweans, mainly former liberation war veterans and ZANU-PF
politicians, have for years been manipulating governance to greatly benefit them-
seves.19 For instance, the land grabs and farm seizures primarily benefited these two
groups to the exclusion of the majority of citizens. The agriculture enhancement pro-
grams enacted in 2004 through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), involving farm
mechanization and other input schemes, were exclusively for ZANU-PF politicians
and their relatives. All the while, most Zimbabweans were denied access to any mean-
ingful government assistance to help them survive.

Corruption and Criminality
Corruption in Zimbabwe has been on the rise over the past decade according to
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The organization
defines corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ and uses the
CPI to rank countries according to ‘the degree to which corruption is perceived to
exist among public officials and politicians’ as observed by business people and
country analysts. The index ranges between zero, which is highly corrupt, and 10,
which is very clean. Tabulated information shows that Zimbabwe’s degree of cor-
rup tion for the period under study worsened significantly beginning in 2002, when
it was 2.7, and on into 2008, when it was 1.8 and the country was ranked 166th out
of 180 countries (see Table 2).

A number of senior ZANU-PF politicians, including the controversial reserve bank
governor Gideon Gono were being investigated following the disappearance of 300
million South African rand that had been advanced by South Africa to help augment
the country’s agriculture preparations in 2008. This followed evidence that the money,
which was supposed to have been distributed to farmers in the form of seeds, fertiliz-
ers, pesticides, and so on, never reached the intended beneficiaries. According to one
newspaper, the minister of agriculture, Joseph Made, and the reserve bank governor

detail/5300.
18. ‘Zimbabwe: Selected issues and statistical appendix’, IMF Staff Country Report no. 05/359, 4 August
19. R. Davies, ‘Memories of underdevelopment: A personal interpretation of Zimbabwe’s economic de-
were implicated after the discovery of tractors, combines, and other equipment on the minister’s property.20

International Isolation

Zimbabwe’s diplomatic, political, commercial, and trade relations, especially with major economic powers, has declined sharply over the past decade. In addition to implementing the controversial land invasions in 2000 and the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina, a slum-clearing action that made more than 700,000 urban families homeless in less than a week,21 the government also opted to leave the Commonwealth group of nations in 2003. This resulted in Zimbabwe being unable to profit from potentially constructive engagements with other countries and ‘good Samaritans’ in areas such as official development assistance. The IMF and World Bank suspended the country’s voting rights and blocked most, if not all, financial assistance to it. The donor community and various countries followed suit, although they continued to provide humanitarian assistance.

CONSEQUENCES OF ZIMBABWE’S STATE FRAGILITY

Lisa Chauvet and her colleagues note three types of consequences normally associated with failing states but that also apply to fragile states.22 These are domestic poverty, local violence, and costs inflicted on neighboring citizens and countries, in this case South Africa.

Brain Drain and Mass Flight

More than 3 million Zimbabweans, or one-third of the population, are believed to have been living outside the country by end of December 2008. Most of them were working age. Estimates from the Progressive Teachers Union (PTU) suggest that more than 18,000 teachers left the country between 2000 and 2006, with an additional 4,500 thought to have migrated in the first four months of 2007.23 Thus, from 2000 to 2008, more than 25,000 teachers left Zimbabwe. The same trend was observed among universities and technical and teachers colleges, where more than 80 percent of lecturers have left since 2000. For instance, at the University of Zimbabwe’s faculty of medicine, approximately 90 percent of lecturers exited the country, more than 60 percent of them senior professors and specialists. Statistics from the health sector indicate that from 1999 to 2008 more than 70 percent of registered nurses and 60 percent of doctors fled Zimbabwe, predominantly going to Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Table 3

Causes and Consequences of State Fragility in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Issues of Concern</th>
<th>Indicators and Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Economic Performance          | • Rapid economic decline—including falling incomes, hyperinflation, exchange rate collapse, a thriving foreign currency black market—has affected material living standards, exacerbated dissatisfaction with government performance, and resulted in scapegoating of economically privileged minorities | • Continuous negative GDP growth rates  
• Cumulative 62.6 percent decline in GDP  
• Significant decline in per capita GDP  
• Hyperinflation rate above 489 billion percent  
• Exchange rates: black market rate US$1:Z$200 quadrillion compared to official rate of US$1:Z$4 million (January 2009).  
• Declining foreign direct investment  
• External debt exceeds $6 billion  
• Increased inequality (rise in GINI from 0.56 to above 0.60) |
| Land Redistribution           | • Disregard for property rights  
• Seized farms lying idle for nearly a decade (since 2000), vandalized, and looted  
• Seized farms allocated only to politicians from the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and their relatives | • Rapid decline in agricultural production of more than 90 percent since 2000  
• More than 9 million people (or 75% of the population) in need of food assistance (2009) |
| Self-interested Groups        | • So-called ‘fast-track’ land reform that primarily benefits independence war veterans  
• Mining rights available to ZANU-PF politicians and their relatives  
• Fiscal and monetary policies designed and implemented to buttress politicians and other government officials | • Consolidation of power by a few through repression and dictatorial governance  
• Majority discontent with self-interested groups |
| Human Development             | • Poor and degenerating material living standards have increased the risk of violent conflict  
• Increased poverty has contributed towards civil strife  
• Lack of or decline in basic public services, such as health care, education, safe water, and sanitation, has resulted in reduced confidence in the state  
• Unmet expectations regarding educational and other opportunities for social advancement have increased discontent and civil strife | • Frequent water cuts and sewer breaks, limited access to clean water sources and sanitation  
• Decline in life expectancy from more than 65 years to around 34  
• Inability to contain disease outbreaks, such as cholera  
• Failure of schools, colleges, and universities to open (since January 2008)  
• Reduced primary, secondary, college, and university enrollments |
| History of Armed Conflict     | • Inability of the state to resolve conflict through institutional channels has led to a greater inclination for armed forces to engage in political disputes | • Arrest, abduction, torture, disappearance, and killing of opposition activists and dissident voices by elements backed by ZANU-PF |

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Issues of Concern</th>
<th>Indicators and Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| History of Armed Conflict    | • Low state capacity to provide basic security has resulted in a loss of confidence in state institutions and legitimacy  
  • Refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing conflict have produced destabilizing effects in neighboring countries, primarily South Africa and Botswana | • Increased numbers of economic and political refugees  
  • Increased numbers of internally displaced persons |
| Governance and Political Instability | • Lack of representative and accountable political institutions through which grievances can be channeled has resulted in outbursts of violent conflict  
  • Denial of civil and political liberties, such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association, and censorship has increased the probability of dissenting views being expressed in violence, demonstrations, and strikes  
  • ZANU-PF interference in court proceedings and judicial appointments has shaped the legal system to serve it | • Dictatorial government  
  • Press restrictions and banning of such media as the BBC, Zim DailyNews, and so on  
  • Adoption and implementation of draconian and repressive laws  
  • Unlawful detentions of political activists and supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change |
| Corruption and Criminality   | • Endemic corruption by political elites and public figures has resulted in the loss of confidence in state institutions  
  • Corruption has permeated the judiciary system and security services and the awarding of government tenders | • A 2008 ranking by the Corruption Perception Index of 1.8 (extremely corrupt) and 166th out of 180 countries  
  • Government ministers and officials under investigation |
| Militarization               | • Excessive military expenditures, indicating militarization of the state apparatus and resulting in reduced investment in social sectors (including health and education) and development solutions, fueling potential crises and threatening state legitimacy  
  • Shifting and increased military imports—especially in 2008, at the height of political tensions due to disputed elections—causing destabilization in southern Africa  
  • Increased military expenditures at the expense of salaries, resulting in tensions and resentment within the armed forces and looting of shops by soldiers and armed personnel | • Increased military expenditure as a percentage of GDP  
  • Increased political intimidation  
  • Increased recruitment of soldiers, police, and so on. |
| International Relations      | • Decreased diplomatic, political, commercial, and trade contact has resulted in an inability to profit from potential constructive engagements, especially with economically powerful countries and ‘good Samaritans’ in development assistance  
  • Negative publicity worldwide  
  • Need for international financial assistance of at least US$8.3 billion needed to jump-start economic activities | • Opted out of the Commonwealth (2003)  
  • Revocation of voting rights by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund  
  • Refusal of international donors, institutions (since mid-May 2009), and countries to assist financially  
  • Reduced tourism |

Source: Albert Makochechanwa and Marko Kwaramba.
According to the *Herald*, following an interview with Levy Nyagura, vice chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe, ‘Brain drain . . . mainly caused by poor working conditions, had resulted in the closing of the [university’s] departments of geology, metallurgy and surveying. . . . [It] might be forced to close more departments after failing to meet staff requirements’. The vice chancellor was quoted as stating, ‘In the last two years we lost a lot of academic staff, including some who were using university accommodation’.24

**Unemployment and De-formalization of the Economy**

As with people experiencing war, most Zimbabweans now operate in an informal economy. During the period under review, people were forced to turn to the black market and informal activities, ranging from foreign dealings to cross-border crossing businesses.25 A January 2009 report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) indicates that at the end of 2008, Zimbabwe’s unemployment rate had reached 94 percent, with only 6 percent of the working-age labor force population being formally employed; in 2003, 30 percent held formal employment. In number terms, the OCHA figures translate into only 480,000 people being formally employed by the end of January 2009 compared to 3.6 million in 2003.26

**Stress**

From interviews with citizens and through observation, one can see how stress has become a characteristic of daily life in Zimbabwe. Although there are a number of factors contributing to this stress, economic hardship, in part caused by hyperinflation, features as a main cause and sustainer of stress in the country.

**Political Violence and Social Trauma**

Since 2000, ordinary citizens have suffered intense trauma emanating from organized violence and intimidation by state agents. According to Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, reports by the Amani Trust and the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO forum indicate that security forces, intelligence services, and a barrage of government-supported militias have constantly terrorized civilians, committed gross human rights violations, and infiltrated and disrupted the political opposition.27 Norman Kriger notes that tactics from guerilla warfare, including re-education camps, propaganda bombardment, and all-night political functions, were employed by the ruling ZANU-PF.28 The main agenda was to force the majority to support ZANU-PF; the strategy failed, however, as reflected by the March and June 2008 general elections, in which the majority voted for the MDC.

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25. Cross-border crossing businesses involve importing various items (mainly clothes, cell phones, and so on) for resale. This is mainly done by individuals without registered companies or firms.
Abductions and Torture
Multiple human rights activists, political opponents, and supporters of the opposition MDC were allegedly ordered harassed, abducted, arrested, tortured, and killed by ZANU-PF. The perpetrators of these atrocities include members of the central intelligence organization, youth militia popularly known as Green Bombers (because of the color of their attire), policemen, and soldiers.

Breakdown in the Provision of Basic Services
A combination of factors, including government bankruptcy, brain drain, and political repression, have resulted in the breakdown of basic services, such as health, education, and water and sanitation, being provided by the government. The situation had become so severe in 2008 that most hospitals, clinics, and health facilities had to close due to a lack of medicine and doctors. The health care delivery system was further exposed by the cholera outbreak of August 2008.

Increased Hunger and Poverty
As a result of the rapid decline in agriculture production after implementation of the land inversions, the majority of Zimbabweans have been surviving on food assistance from the donor community. As of January 2009, the International Federation of the Red Cross estimated that some 9 million Zimbabweans, or 75 percent of the country’s 12 million people, were expected to face severe hunger in 2009 unless food assistance was enhanced. The UN World Food Program was only targeting 7 million of those in need of assistance. The country once considered the breadbasket of southern Africa thus found itself reduced to begging for bread. According to the Red Cross, in early 2009 Zimbabwe was the third largest consumer of food aid, behind only Afghanistan and Ethiopia.

Trouble for South Africa
As noted above, many Zimbabweans who fled the country became economic and political refugees in neighboring South Africa. Large numbers ended up in Johannesburg. The influx of refugees overtaxed the provision of basic public services, such as health care, water, and sanitation in some South African towns and cities. For instance, in the border town of Messina, many of the patients receiving medical treatment there were Zimbabweans, not South Africans. Health services in the town were additionally overburdened in August 2008 following the cholera outbreak, as victims crossed the border in search of treatment.

The flow of foreigners increased unemployment in cities and towns of South Africa, leading to spikes in violence and organized crime. Acts of criminality ranged from carjacking and armed robbery to murder. Such activity has been recorded across South Africa’s towns and cities, with Johannesburg being the most affected.

The combination of reduced government services and a more competitive job market caused by the influx of migrants into South Africa resulted in expressions of anger in local communities. South Africans complained that foreigners were taking jobs from them and were being given preference over them, especially in the competition for menial jobs, because they would accept lower wages. In May 2008, violence aimed at Zimbabweans erupted, especially in areas of high unemployment, such as around Johannesburg (Alexandra Park) and Pretoria (Mamelodi). Although the situation was brought under control after a month, foreigners continued to live in fear. The violence attracted international attention and bad publicity for South Africa.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In February 2009, Zimbabwe’s two main political parties—the MDC and ZANU-PF—formed a new national unity government. To reduce or eliminate the causes and consequences of state fragility, there are a number of steps that Zimbabwe’s government and donors should consider implementing.

DEALING WITH THE CAUSES OF STATE FRAGILITY

Economic meltdown. The government should consider providing incentives to kick-start economic production (mainly in the manufacturing, mining, and agriculture sectors), which is currently below 10 percent. Such incentives might include reduced business taxes and providing rebates on import duties for production inputs. The government should also offer financial incentives to encourage firms to invest in equipment required for value addition, rather than exporting primary products (raw materials), especially from mining. Public-private partnerships could be created to improve infrastructure, communications systems, and so on.

Repressive and undemocratic governance. The problems involving governance in Zimbabwe could be assuaged through the drafting of a new people-driven constitution. It should ensure security for all, not just members of a certain political affiliation, as has been the case since independence. The new constitution should explicitly enshrine basic rights, such as rule of law, and freedom of expression. Steps towards crafting such a constitution have already begun.

Land policies. Zimbabwe needs a property rights system that transcends political party and benefits all citizens. Its provisions should be included in the new constitution.

Self-interest. A constitution should be adopted that clearly defines the powers of the state and private institutions and protects the rights and well-being of all Zimbabweans against well-positioned self-interested groups.

Corruption and criminality. Local communities need to be involved in budgeting processes and expenditure tracking to help reduce incidences of corruption in government.

International isolation. Zimbabwe must re-engage with the international community. This, however, depends upon the restoration of basic human and political rights, such as rule of law.
**Dealing with the Consequences of State Fragility**

Many of the suggestions for dealing with the consequences of state fragility are tied to suggestions made above for addressing its causes.

*Brain drain and human flight.* The out migration of professionals may be reduced if the government puts in place strategies to boost economic activity and rein in political intimidation.

*Unemployment and informal economies.* Increasing economic production will lead to a reduction in unemployment and revitalize formal economic activity.

*Breakdown in the provision of basic services.* The government must work with relevant NGOs and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) that have the capacity to help provide basic services. It should reconsider allowing NGOs and IGOs to fully participate in such activities. There is also a need to remove stringent requirements affecting the flow of humanitarian aid.

*Increased hunger and poverty.* The government should invest in contract farming to ensure adequate supplies of agricultural inputs and the availability of food at affordable prices. This could help restore Zimbabwe as the breadbasket of southern Africa.
Information Gathering after Trauma:
Considerations for Human Rights Work, Peacebuilding, and Interviewing

Laurie Leitch

The collection of information from victims of human cruelty, as well as survivors of natural disasters, can provide essential information for use in promoting justice, enhancing peacebuilding, and developing preventive programs. Victims and interviewers often believe that telling the story of what has happened will not only provide needed evidence, but also represents the beginning of healing. Today neuroscience can contribute positively to the way that traumatic-events evidence is collected. The way that someone’s story is told has a powerful impact on whether the interview or debriefing process will be re-traumatizing to the victim (or survivor) or will be a step toward healing and will promote or reduce the likelihood of secondary traumatization for the interviewer. The trauma resiliency model for collecting evidence seeks to manage high arousal, contribute to the healing and resiliency of survivors, and reduce potential secondary traumatization and burnout by interviewers.

WHEN TRAUMATIC EVENTS OCCUR, the documentation of what happened from the point of view of survivors can provide valuable information for use by truth and reconciliation commissions, courts, the media, social service workers, and peacebuilders. Services for survivors often include debriefings in groups in which each person is able to ‘tell the story’ of what happened. Individuals can begin to feel understood, ‘seen’, and supported when they know that their experience has been witnessed. This can create a sense of solidarity with others who have also experienced the same or a similar event. There is, however, an underbelly to the process of being witnessed and giving evidence—the potential for re-traumatization of the survivor and secondary traumatization of the interviewer or debriefing group members.

Current knowledge of the ways the human nervous system responds to trauma, and how it responds when hearing about the trauma of another person, offers the potential of reshaping interviewing and debriefing processes in ways that promote healing rather than reinforce nervous system dysregulation and re-traumatization. The

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trauma resiliency model (TRM) is a skills-based intervention program that uses a manual based on the biology, rather than the psychology, of traumatic response. The approach draws on neuroscience research, including neuroimaging studies, that shows how trauma affects cortical and subcortical processing of information, and as a treatment modality, the resolution of post-traumatic stress activation through the completion of thwarted fight and flight responses and skills of self-regulation. TRM offers concrete guidance to individuals who collect evidence by interviewing survivors as well as to those whose role it is to initiate a process of healing from traumatic events that includes telling the story of what happened.

EFFECTS OF DISASTERS AND LARGE-SCALE TRAUMATIC EVENTS

V. J. Carr and his colleagues describe two sets of psychological consequences—threat effects (those occurring in the immediate aftermath) and disruption effects (those extending weeks, months, and sometimes years beyond the disaster)—that arise from experiencing a disaster, but can also characterize other catastrophic or large-scale traumatic events, such as tribal and ethnic violence and terrorism. Disruption effects include constant exposure to debris and damage to infrastructure, disillusionment with governmental agencies, living in resettlement housing and camps, displacement, fear of the next hurricane, flood, or fire season and so on, property and job loss, fragmentation of families, financial stress, tensions with and danger from opposing political, ethnic, and tribal groups, and an array of emotional symptoms associated with each effect. The study by Carr and others highlights the fact that many traumatic events are not circumscribed events with a defined endpoint.

When left untreated, traumatic stress reactions have been found to lead to long-term negative mental health effects. Further, symptoms from a traumatic event can still be present after many years and may not spontaneously remit. Levels of symptoms found early in the post-disaster period have been found to be strong predictors of later symptoms.

The Body and Trauma

There is growing and substantial evidence that in addition to psychological trauma, survivors of trauma also suffer significant and often debilitating physical or somatic symptoms resulting from their experience. Thus, traumatic stress causes both mental health problems and a variety of serious somatic symptoms, including loss of bowel and bladder control;8 shaking, trembling, and increased heart rate;9 myofascial pain;10 diabetes;11 heart disease;12 and a continuum of stress-related diseases.13

The trauma field is now seeing the arrival of body-focused interventions, such as TRM, in which the primary emphasis is on traumatic symptoms as patterns of dysregulation in the nervous system rather than on cognitions and emotions. Research using neuroimaging finds that even under a relatively mild emotional challenge, negative emotion significantly affects many components of cognitive functioning.14 Biologically based models focus on brain stem survival responses and dysregulation in the autonomic nervous system (ANS) rather than on neo-cortical cognition. These models have benefited from advances in neuroimaging techniques that show autonomic nervous system arousal patterns following traumatic events.15

Patterns of dysregulation increase the risk of physical and psychological illnesses, such as immune system disorders, depression, anxiety, and cognitive impairment.16 Studies like those above highlight the importance of interventions that use knowledge of nervous system responses to trauma and trauma processing and that target regulation of the ANS. Their findings also highlight the value of monitoring arousal patterns during interviewing and debriefing and using patterns of questioning that help maintain nervous system balance.

15. Lanius et al., 'A review of neuroimaging studies of hyperarousal and dissociation in PTSD'.
Secondary Traumatic Stress

In Rwanda in 2006, a woman being trained in TRM told of having lived with a sharp pain across the top of her head that she described as feeling like a slash from a machete. She had been checked by physicians and had been told that there was nothing physically wrong with her. Although the woman had not been wounded with a machete during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which hundreds of thousands died or witnessed people being attacked, she had heard clients describe their terror as the genocide unfolded, their own wounds, and what they had seen happen to others. Her sensory experience of a slash on her head was, most likely, the result of secondary traumatization that had not lessened over the years.

Social service providers, human rights workers, and other professionals are often thought to be immune from the typical traumatic responses that ‘ordinary people’ experience. Even when an individual has not directly experienced a trauma, listening to the after-effects of the events as described by those directly affected can result in what is commonly referred to as vicarious traumatization, or secondary traumatic stress (STS). It can also in some instances result in traumatic stress and the development of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

B. E. Bride’s study of STS symptoms in 282 social workers found that 25 percent of the sample reported the following STS symptoms on a scale of occasionally to very often: intrusive thoughts about clients, avoidance of clients, diminished activity level, emotional numbing, foreshortened future, irritability, and difficulty concentrating. A study by A. Luce, J. Firth-Cozens, S. Midgley, and C. Burges found that individuals who experience a trauma as a civilian and as a professional have higher levels of symptomatology than those that experience the traumatic event solely as one or the other. The traumatic stress reactions that often follow a catastrophic event can hinder the ability of local responders to function at pre-event levels among their constituencies. Secondary traumatization can also impair the willingness and ability to fully connect with clients and can lead to high levels of staff turnover due to burnout.

During her training in Rwanda, the worker described above volunteered to do a demonstration with me. Using TRM skills, which are focused on releasing stored traumatic energy and resetting the ANS, she was able to shift her awareness between the pain across the top of her head and places in her body that felt no pain or even felt positive (calm or relaxed). After about twenty minutes of this shifting of attention between the pain and no-pain, she described sensations of warmth on the top of her head and down her face. The pain had disappeared completely. I continued to check with her about the pain over the several days of the training; it had not returned. TRM skills can also be used by training and treatment teams for self-care. Their use helps stabilize the nervous system and maintain the resiliency of a team, whose members can then better respond to the needs of trainees and survivors.

THE STORY AND WAYS TO TELL IT:
THE TRAUMA RESILIENCY MODEL

Neuroscience has shown that when the nervous system is overwhelmed, it becomes dysregulated, which can cause a cascade of physical and psychological symptoms. Nervous system dysregulation can occur when an experience is perceived as frightening or life-threatening. It can also occur and be reinforced when someone is asked to tell the story of what happened or when listening to the stories being told. The question therefore is What can be done to minimize being overwhelmed while at the same time collecting necessary information or helping a survivor feel heard and understood? The answer lies in the way the story is told.

A core skill of TRM is called titration. The term comes from chemistry: when making a chemical compound, instead of adding the entirety of one chemical to another, the chemical is added in titrated (small) increments, with the researcher watching the reaction after each titration in order to modulate reactivity. Peter A. Levine adapted the concept to his biological model of intervention. Among TRM skills are Levine’s, including titration, as well as others. Working with small increments of traumatic material (titration) is a key element of TRM’s intervention program, as is the development of somatic resources. Such resources are protective, helping make individuals sturdy and adaptable. Inside the body, resources are places of less negative or of neutral or positive sensation. In other words, resource sensations are places of nervous system organization in the body, in contrast to places of nervous system disorganization (such as pain, agitation, and numbness). Used together, the skills of titration and resourcing reduce the likelihood of escalation of arousal, flooding, or re-traumatization and help develop a sense of mastery and self-management over intense somatic states.

Using TRM’s model, the story of an event is collected in ways that titrate the traumatic aspects of it and emphasize the survival or mastery parts of the story (resource). A survivor is usually either reluctant or unwilling to tell the story or ready to tell it in its entirety in one breath. Guidance is required of the interviewer. The goals of the interview or debriefing dictate the choicepoints and actions of the interviewer. Certainly the foremost goal is to do no harm (and ideally to do some good). Another goal is to collect the necessary information or to be a witness to the experience of the survivor.

Where in the story should one start? How many details need to be told in one titration? How does one handle strong emotions or high levels of arousal? How does one know when someone is in a state of high arousal? Sometimes survivors go into a frozen state, in which they may look calm on the outside but are actually in a high state of activation internally. Both hypo- and hyperarousal are indicators of dysregulation and nervous system activation.

The TRM model develops resources first, before delving into traumatic material. This is done in the sequencing of questions. For example, rather than beginning with ‘Tell me what happened to you’, one would start with a titrated request along the lines of the following:

- ‘Tell me about the moment when you knew you had survived’.
- ‘Tell me when you knew it was over’.
- ‘Tell me about when help arrived’.
- ‘Tell me what is helping you to get through this now’.

Requests such as these are considered resourcing questions. They orient the survivor toward aspects of the experience that are of lesser trauma. They remind the individual that they have lived or survived or are managing in the face of all their challenges.

TRM is biologically focused. The goal is to help the nervous system return to balance. TRM treatment helps the survivor learn how to track the sensations associated with resourcing. One would say to the survivor, ‘And as you tell me about that moment when you realized it was over, what do you notice inside right now?’ Sensations are the language of the nervous system, and so the skill of sensory tracking is a part of TRM treatment sessions.

During treatment, if the survivor is not asked to track the sensations associated with the resource, but only to talk about the resource, the intervention becomes merely a cognitive intervention. The intervention should, however, be on a sensory level. In interviews without a treatment component—that is, those focused on information gathering—the interviewer monitors the survivor’s nervous system arousal by observing such things as posture, gestures, rate of breathing, changes in skin coloration, and muscle tension patterns. As the arousal level is observed to increase—an indicator of the sympathetic branch of the ANS being activated or of the nervous system going into freeze—the interviewer shifts to questions focused on mastery, self-management, competency, or social engagement. Resourcing questions access the parasympathetic branch of the ANS and help create calm or nervous system balance.

Recently, I was working in Sichuan province in China following the earthquake of 12 May 2008. We had intended to provide TRM training to a group of first responders, but when we arrived at the training site, it was clear that most of the responders were in a high state of distress or arousal. Cognitive functioning is impaired by high levels of distress, and trainees who are themselves traumatized will not be able to learn effectively. We postponed our plans for training and instead provided TRM stabilization treatment to the responders, with their permission.

I worked with a man who had removed the bodies of more than twenty co-workers, friends, and others from the rubble. His wife had also died in the quake. This was a situation in which saying ‘Tell me about the moment when you knew you had survived’ seemed inappropriate. So many had died that being a survivor was often
something about which people felt guilty. Instead I asked, ‘Tell me who else survived.’
The man pulled out his cellphone and showed me a photo of his young son. That was
where we began the story. I asked him to tell me about his son and what they do to-
gether. I asked several questions along this line in order to intensify the resource sen-
tations. Our brain is programmed for survival and is programmed to attend first and
foremost to anything perceived as being threatening to survival. The TRM skill of re-
source intensification helps override a single-point focus on traumatic material and
uncomfortable emotions and sensations in the body and encourages balance by ac-
cessing the parasympathetic.

As the man began to tell me about his son, I was monitoring (or sensory tracking)
his breathing and other nervous system indicators. I saw him becoming increasingly
relaxed. Since this was a treatment session, I worked with what I was seeing. Had it
been an interview to collect information only, as I observed the relaxation or calming,
I would have known that I could then shift back to his story and begin to ask some
questions about the traumatic event. I would alternate between questions about the
traumatic event and questions about resources, inquiring about what was helping him
get through each day, connections to others, and sources of support and even pleas-
ure. Alternating sets of questions in this way helps maintain an individual in what is
called the resilient zone, a nervous system rhythm in which there is congruence be-
tween thoughts, emotions, and sensations.

Managing arousal levels when the trauma story is being told is done by titrating the
traumatic details of the story. This is accomplished by shifting between questions
about resources (and the corresponding sensations associated with a description of
resources) and questions about the details of the traumatic event. Using the skills of
titration and resourcing increases the likelihood of allowing trauma data to be col-
lected without causing more trauma. The survivor stays in the resilient zone, or at
least is helped to return to that zone if he or she becomes hypo- or hyperaroused. In
debriefing groups, the facilitator can help group members titrate between traumatic
details and resources in such a way that models, and even restores, the normal rhythm
of the ANS (to a balance between the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches).
The process of telling the story or providing the data needed in investigations then be-
comes an experience of self-regulation and healing.

CONCLUSION

The way a story is told and the way trauma data is collected is extremely important in
situations where telling the story of trauma is deemed helpful for the healing of an in-
dividual or is needed as part of information gathering, such as involving treatment
intakes or a human rights or legal process. Biological models of traumatic response,
such as TRM, that place primary importance on nervous system regulation and dys-
regulation, have much to offer survivors as well as interviewers and responders.
Regardless of the treatment and healing modality being used—whether ritual, story-
telling, debriefing, legal testimony, or intake interviews—and regardless of the culture,
the goal is to do no harm. Understanding the relationship between the sympathetic
and parasympathetic branches of the autonomic nervous system and ways of moni-
toring arousal levels (including signs of hypo- and hyperarousal) promotes interview
and intervention techniques that stabilize rather than contribute to dysregulation and
distress. In addition, when a survivor is helped to report information from within the resilient zone, the accuracy of the information provided is likely to be considerably better than it would be otherwise.

The human nervous system reacts in the same way in its response to threat and fear regardless of culture, country, or ethnic group. The meaning that symptoms of dysregulation and distress might have can vary widely across cultures, but the symptoms themselves are the same. TRM’s biologically based training and treatment are appropriate for use across cultures. Biologically based interventions have much to contribute in the many arenas that focus on survivors of large-scale trauma. Benevolent and gentle, yet efficient, methods of interviewing and treatment that enhance hope and resiliency are the very least that survivors and those who respond to them deserve.

AFTER I WAS ASKED TO WRITE A REVIEW OF Richard Dowden’s *Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles*, I proceeded initially with a great deal of skepticism. I have always been troubled by attempts to portray the African continent as homogeneous, failing to acknowledge the rich cultural, geographic, and historical diversity of its countries. The title of this volume immediately put me on the defensive, but as I began reading it, I realized that I had been wrong to ‘judge a book by its cover’ (or in this case, its title).

Unlike other books that claim to offer a comprehensive analysis of an entire continent, Dowden’s recognizes the complexities throughout Africa and the heterogeneity that exists from region to region, country to country, and village to village. This book is the story of each of the villages that Dowden has lived and worked in throughout his career in various parts of Africa as well as the story of the nations of Africa and their people in post-colonial times; Dowden has made it not just an autobiography, but also the story of places and other people.

In one of the earlier chapters, Dowden writes of his vicarious introduction to the continent through his grandfather’s travels and work in ‘faraway’ Ghana and speaks of his own introduction to the cultural complexities and riches of Africa when he took a teaching position in southwestern Uganda. The author then goes on to speak of his life experiences throughout Africa.

The book examines the colonial legacy inherited by the countries of Africa and their ensuing problems in the post-independence era. Dowden accurately summarizes the period when he states, ‘Independence officially restored power in Africa to Africans, but the countries created and the systems that the Europeans imposed on Africa as they left were not rooted in African culture or experience and not strong enough to

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Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 3:1 (June 2010), 88–89.
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contain social and ethnic pressures that lay immediately beneath the surface’ (p. 59). He then goes into detail about how the newly independent states became the playing field for cold war politics, being pushed and pulled by political agendas set in Washington and Moscow.

Dowden’s experiences, coupled with his ability to analyze the problems of the continent from an outsider’s perspective, have given him a unique vantage point from which to assess the conflicts that have plagued Africa. While reading this book, one realizes that the author is both an insider and an outsider in regard to the Africa about which he writes using an almost anthropological paradigm. He has the ability to be critical of damaging colonial and post-colonial policies, but he does not stop there, refusing to absolve local leaders and populations of the plight of their countries; he is as critical of the local warlord who profiteered from cold war politics as he is of U.S. and Soviet policies. In fact, Dowden’s analysis highlights the complexities of the relationships among people, leaders, and their cultures and the role the rest of the world has played in creating and perpetuating Africa’s problems. One gets a sense of just how complicated the issues facing Africa are and that no individual African country, or the West, can be relieved of responsibility in helping resolve them.

Instead of adopting academic jargon and technical writing, Dowden takes the reader on an easily accessible journey across Africa. He gently weaves statistics and historical facts into the narrative, making this book an informative read that caters to the scholarly community as well as to past and future visitors to Africa. It is apparent throughout the pages of this book that for Dowden, Africa represents a personal and a spiritual journey. His book leaves the reader wanting to discover Africa for oneself and to be able to understand what Dowden expresses as ‘I am because we are and, since we are, therefore I am’ (p. 21).
It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower, by Michela Wrong


Reviewed by Sandra Nyaira

It is late 2007, following a disputed general election in Kenya, a country many considered to be one of Africa’s bright spots. Within weeks, the world would be stunned by the wanton destruction of tribal mayhem, as hundreds of Kenyans lay slain and hundreds of thousands found themselves displaced.

A former British colony independent since 1963, and surrounded by countries such as Uganda and Somalia that had over the years suffered their share of violence and chaos, Kenya had largely remained a stable country, holding multiparty elections and having established a sound economy that was the envy of most African nations. Kenya had been expected to grow, even as it grappled with corrupt political leadership. How then to explain it turning in a short span of time into a lawless land of machete-wielding men and women chopping and bludgeoning each other to death?

In It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower, veteran journalist Michela Wrong tries to explain how corruption, moulded along ethnic lines, led to bloody, post-election chaos in 2007. Wrong, a former correspondent with the London-based Financial Times, tells a gripping story by following the trajectory of John Githongo, named Kenya’s anti-corruption czar in 2002. Githongo’s appointment followed the ouster of the long-ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) of former president Daniel Arap Moi by Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition. The country was electrified when Kibaki overwhelmingly defeated Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of the late president Jomo Kenyatta. Only the sky would be the limit for the wanachi, or ordinary folk, who had been waiting for real change for so long. Kibaki was elected on a platform of rooting out the vices—chief among them corruption—holding back this proud nation.

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During Moi’s tenure, corruption had become so endemic that average people might pay up to sixteen bribes a month to ease their way through day-to-day life; the palms greased included those of police officers and government workers. Having promised to tackle corruption, Kibaki chose Githongo—Wrong’s friend, a former fellow journalist, and the executive director of the corruption-monitoring organization Transparency International—to lead the clean-up effort.

Corruption had filtered through Kenyan society along tribal lines. Members of the Kikuyu had become more affluent than those of most other tribes, having benefited from the launching pad provided by Kenyatta as the country’s first president. When Moi, who had been largely marginalized by Kenyatta, came to power in 1978, he did the same for his people, the Kalenjin. In the process, the rot that had characterized post-independent Africa settled in; corruption and greed among Kenya’s elite became rampant under Kenyatta and entrenched under Moi, who maintained a tight grip on power for more than twenty-three years, brutally oppressing perceived and real enemies. Wanting to get back to the trough, the Kikuyu, the country’s largest tribe, managed to persuade long-suffering, anti-Kalenjin tribes to join them in opposing Moi’s KANU. As a result, Kibaki, a Kikuyu, was elected in 2002 based on promises to fight graft and other ills.

Githongo had his work cut out for him. Working a stone’s throw from the president’s office, Githongo knew that to be effective he would have to go after everyone; there could be no sacred cows, as Kikuyu members were to discover much to their consternation. It’s Our Turn to Eat expresses the frustration of Githongo, many Kenyan citizens, and others in post-independence African states. While on the one hand Kibaki claimed that he wanted to deal with corruption and nepotism, on the other he stocked his cabinet with fellow Kikuyus referred to as the Mount Kenya Mafia. Having been in the wilderness since 1978, the members of this group did not waste time enjoying the spoils of their electoral victory. According to Wrong, they believed they had the God-given right to govern Kenya, after having guided the resistance that had led the country to independence, and were driven solely by one philosophy: It’s our turn to eat. They thus pillaged, in some instances allegedly becoming involved in corrupt schemes to raise funds on behalf of their party.

Wrong opens the book at Kibaki’s inauguration in historic Uhuru Park, with hundreds of thousands of ordinary Kenyans in attendance. As Moi delivered a farewell address, some members of the audience pelted him with sand because of his sins. The hopes of the people were high in Nairobi. ‘The era of anything goes is gone forever. Government will no longer be run on the whims of individuals,’ Kibaki told the crowd as he referred to years of ‘misrule and ineptitude’ by his predecessor. ‘I will be your servant in all humility and gratitude.’ ‘Corruption will now cease to be a way of life in Kenya’ (p. 5), declared Kibaki.

Wrong’s thoughtful book is more than just the story of John Githongo, the whistleblower who documented corruption in the Kibaki government and exposed top ministers’ involvement in large-scale corruption and fraud. She also traces the roots of corruption in Kenya to colonial days, initially flourishing with the establishment of black majority rule and becoming increasingly entrenched. It is also about Kenya running off the rails and then coming back from the brink. Wrong’s depth of reporting offers readers an incisive discourse on Kikuyu history, the world of international aid
and development, and contemporary Kenyan history, including the development of a new language by Nairobi’s youth.

Wrong writes without fear about the role played by donor nations and western organizations in aiding and abetting corruption in developing countries. She says that it became clear to her and many in Kenya that for every minister willing to take a bribe, there was a western company willing to pay it, despite anti-bribery laws. She also writes of the Chinese handing out huge bribes with impunity in Africa.

Githongo’s well-documented exposé of corruption involving Anglo Leasing—in which top government ministers were said to have siphoned billions of dollars from the government using briefcase companies based in the United Kingdom—was treated with disdain by Kikuyus, who felt he had betrayed his own. Many continue to believe that he ‘sold out’ to former imperialists after a few years of being in the hot seat. Githongo’s report highlighting Anglo Leasing showed how deep the scourge went and the close ties of some corrupt ministers to the presidency. Donors accepted the report passively when Githongo released it from the United Kingdom, where he had fled in 2005 as he prepared to release his findings. It was reported that he had received death threats from colleagues he had been investigating. Githongo had resigned quietly, after attempts to speak with President Kibaki about corruption had not yielded positive action; he concluded that the administration lacked the will to rid the government of graft. In the end, only the Netherlands froze aid to Kenya following the Anglo Leasing episode. ‘If the donors were not going to make an example of Kenya over Anglo Leasing, it is hard to see when they would ever get tough’ (p. 280), wrote Wrong.

Despite being a rare gem, Wrong’s book has some minor shortcomings. Although often referring to the Anglo Leasing scandal, she never provides much detail about how it worked. In one chapter, she says the company did not exist in the United Kingdom, but in another, she states that the British police confronted the company and others in their investigation only to back off because of a lack of cooperation in Nairobi. Kibaki’s role in the Anglo Leasing scandal is never thoroughly examined, leaving the reader unclear about his willingness or unwillingness to participate in the scheme or whether he was taken advantage of by the Mount Kenya Mafia when he suffered a stroke soon after he assumed the presidency. A few token officials from the so-called mafia lost their jobs but were back in the corridors of power after the 2007 general election.

The tragic denouement that Githongo had feared erupted after Kibaki’s blatant attempt to steal the 2007 election from Raila Odinga, his main challenger and a member of the Luo tribe. Pent-up tribal resentment, going back to the Kenyatta era and exacerbated by the long tradition of unchecked corruption, exploded when Kibaki had himself sworn in with the speed of lightning, rejecting calls for a new vote or negotiations with his opponent. In an instant, the election dispute set off a wave of ethnic killings; massive displacements became the order of the day, especially in areas where Kikuyus had bought land for a song in the early days of independence. Neighbor turned against neighbor. Following the intervention of African statesmen, a unity government was eventually set up with Kibaki as president and Odinga as prime minister, bringing Kenya back from the abyss.

The mayhem proved Githongo correct in the most terrible way. Githongo had long predicted conflict if the Kenyan leadership continued to rule the country along tribal lines, with the Kikuyu, in particular, benefiting at the expense of other groups. Long
before most Kenyans, he had recognized the potential of graft’s ethnic arrogance to destabilize and destroy. Had Kibaki dealt with the corruption in the way he had promised and not seated a Kikuyu cabinet, maybe things would have been different.Wrong asserts that there could have been few more lurid illustrations than the post-election crisis to confirm that government corruption, far from being a detail of history, actually matters.

Wrong, as a western journalist working out of Africa, carries on in the vein of many before her and many now who paint a pessimistic picture of the continent. She devotes more than 300 pages to it without providing possible solutions or proffering answers to the question important to most ordinary Africans or Kenyans: What next? Wrong eloquently writes about the looting in Kenya and the efforts of Githongo, but she fails to go the extra mile, to go where many other western writers have also failed to go in their exposés of corruption by the Big Men of Africa and their governments. Instead, the book is merely descriptive, though written brilliantly.

Also like other western writers, Wrong is caught in a web of generalizing about Kenyan society. She does not provide the reader sufficient knowledge about the society, instead bundling Africans into a monolithic entity as she relates the story of Githongo. She deserves credit, however, for looking back at history as she attempts to help readers understand the nuances of the story. Kenya, like most Africans nations, suffers from acute ethnic self-awareness, leading Wrong to assert (rightly or wrongly) that the tribe and tribal affiliations define the Kenyan landscape. She spends a lot of time trying to prove that Githongo was predestined to be a whistle-blower. In her efforts to guide readers in understanding his role in fighting corruption, she unfortunately manages to confuse at times as she jumps back and forth, from one year to another. Despite its shortcomings, Wrong’s book is a gem that could be used by non-governmental organizations, by students of international relations, and by those fighting corruption on the continent. Of note, Githongo has since returned to Kenya and is considering running for political office.
Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women’s Lives through War and Peace in Sierra Leone, by Chris Coulter


Reviewed by Beth W. Stewart

The realities of life for girls in rebel forces in Africa’s civil wars remain largely unknown and consequently insufficiently studied. In post-war environments, these young women seem similarly to slip below the humanitarian radar. As Chris Coulter explains in Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers, accessing these women and their stories is difficult and ethically delicate. She describes how many former ‘bush wives’ and girl soldiers from Sierra Leone’s civil war live with constant shame of their past and fear of stigma. Consequently, they often choose to be silent about that part of their lives. Over a period of several years, Coulter, an anthropologist, lived ‘in the field’ in Sierra Leone’s northernmost district, where she built trusting relationships with her ‘informants’. While Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers does not move the field of gender and conflict in a new direction, it is nonetheless a moving and important ethnography of war and post-war stories of young women abducted by rebels.

Two central themes guide the analyses of the book, through which discussions of gender are woven and stories of fear and shame are expressed. The first theme explored is the power of narratives as both limiting and as a tool of agency. Coulter positions the narratives of the girls’ initial abduction, life in the bush, and post-war reintegration in relation to local and international discourses on the war. Some young women, for example, tell stories of having escaped from the rebels when actually they had been demobilized at the end of the conflict. Coulter explains that their tales of escape reflect the prevailing morals of the local dominant discourse about the war, in which women who stayed with the rebels were seen as ‘perpetrators’ but those who escaped were considered ‘victims’. Most, however, used silence to position themselves socially and to protect themselves from the shame of having lived with the rebels. Coulter also reveals, however, that such positioning within the accepted narrative of the war sometimes limited their opportunities. Refusing to disclose their association

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with the rebels kept them from accessing humanitarian assistance, which was pro-
vided only to those registered as former rebels with the disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) programs.

In situating the young women’s stories against the international humanitarian nar-
ratives of the war, Coulter exposes the deficiencies of the DDR programs. Most
women Coulter interviewed thought the DDR, truth and reconciliation commission,
and special court to be one and the same. The latter two institutions clearly defined
the victim/perpetrator binary in their proceedings, and as a result, girls feared being
arrested if they sought humanitarian aid by attempting to register as former rebels.
Meanwhile, the ‘gender-blind’ DDR definition of ‘rebel’ limited access to assistance for
most women whose wartime identities did not meet the required characteristics of a
fighting soldier. Cultural misunderstandings between Sierra Leone and the aid pro-
grams’ western discourses of justice and reconciliation led to misguided attempts at
healing. While navigating the numerous narratives of war to avoid further suffering
and shame, Coulter’s informants demonstrate that many young women consequently
attempted reintegration without assistance.

Continuities and disruptions constitute the second theme of the book. The disrup-
tions were substantial and deserve the attention and detail Coulter provides through
her intimate interviews. The magnitude and completeness of the disruptions have
been well documented, and here Coulter identifies continuities in the war-affected
lives of these young women. While some continuities are obvious, such as the impor-
tance of marriage before the war and in the bush, she also points to more nuanced ex-
amples. For instance, gender identities persisted, so girl soldiers acted within the same
identity as before the war. Traditional culture in Sierra Leone, Coulter explains, views
women as wild and dangerous. Fighting was thus interpreted as a manifestation of this
wild side.

Disruptions, however, dominate the stories, particularly after the war. The book of-
fers painful tales of rejection by families and communities. Coulter carefully examines
the complex social and cultural environment that these young women navigated to
survive or, if lucky, be accepted into after the war’s conclusion. No skills, no education,
and a ‘damaged’ reputation from being a ‘bush wife’ meant that many women could
not marry; they also could not support themselves and their children. Coulter ex-
plores the legacy of rape by rebels and makes the nuanced distinction that the reputa-
tion of a girl was more important than the fact of her having had pre-marital sex, as
exemplified by the acceptance and even marriage of some returned women who con-
formed to traditional expectations of feminine behavior. Despite such examples, the
war experiences of many girls severed relationships with families and communities.

Coulter writes eloquently and accessibly while addressing an impressive range of
topics. The stories of the young women are rich and left to stand on their own, illus-
trating the diversity of experiences. There are many branches throughout the book that
deserve further exploration. The gendering of ‘bush wives’ and how their bush identi-

cies are understood by local communities, as well as the ‘unhuman’ aspect of rebel ide-
ology and how this is gendered, could be further examined. What elements make some
communities more flexible or accepting of these girls than others? Coulter’s discussion
of agency, in particular, begged to be fleshed out theoretically. The matter of ‘rebel ba-
bies’ is notably absent, save for four pages. Their experiences demand much more at-
tention. Coulter offers an intriguing new idea in regard to the rampant sexual violence
of the war in suggesting that the particularly brutal epidemic of rape might be linked to the prevalence of pornography in the 'global warscape' (p. 128). Unfortunately, she does not follow up with serious discussion. These issues may belong to subsequent books, suggesting that perhaps Coulter tried to cover too much ground.

_Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers_ affirms many of the ideas raised and debated over the past decade without moving in new directions. Ultimately, however, by compassionately linking voices to some of these important issues, Coulter’s book is a valuable contribution to the continued effort to advance the profile of girls in fighting forces. Because of its broad scope, development practitioners and scholars, policy makers, activists, and gender theorists will all find something of interest in this volume.
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**‘Bi Nka Bi’—Bite Not One Another**

African symbols known as *adinkra*, named after a legendary king and widespread in Ghana, are used on fabrics, walls, ceramics, and logos. ‘*Bi Nka Bi*’, the adinkra symbol for harmony, means ‘bite not one another’. Based on two fish biting each other’s tail, it is representative of peace, visually cautioning against backbiting, provocation, and strife, and instead urging a community spirit of sharing, group cooperation, justice, equity, fair play, and forgiveness.