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**Book reviews**—critical assessments of new books that integrate peace and conflict concerns (1,500 words maximum).

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- Submissions should be prepared electronically, preferably in Microsoft Word.
- For notes and references, use the short-title system (not the author-date system) as per *Butcher’s Copy-editing: The Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders*, 4th edn (2006).

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Guest Editor’s Note

In Africa, the past two decades have witnessed unprecedented levels of the criminalization of civil strife and an equally serious focus by the academia and policy community on attempts at understanding the political economy of these contemporary conflicts. Most of the conflicts have been characterized by predatory exploitation of lucrative natural resources and the pervasive criminalization of economic life. Another strange characteristic of these conflicts lies in the nature of the conflicts. Conventional wars have been replaced by asymmetrical wars which are generational, unending and difficult to contain.

At the same time, the democratization process in the continent has increased calls for good governance in all aspects of public life thereby bringing about accountability and transparency in some quarters. The failures in governance and transparent economic management have brought about grievances which have led to conflicts with humanitarian consequences. The increased youth population of the continent coupled with high levels of youth unemployment and rampant corruption has sown the seeds of radical religious and ethnic extremism in several countries.

The broad trends with regards to the consequences of these security and governance challenges are captured by Damaris Manyange in her article on ‘Societal Security and Youth Radicalization in Kenya’. Damaris asserts that, there is a relationship between societal security and youth radicalization within the context of the relentless attacks by Al Shabaab in Kenya following Kenya’s military involvement in Somalia. Kenya has found it extremely difficult to contain these attacks considering that, they are carried out by radicalized Kenyan youths. She points out that Kenyan youths perceive threats to their identity as Muslims in Kenya through policies of discrimination and deprivation and therefore have succumbed to the pull factors of Islamic radicalism. She recommends that the Kenya authorities and stakeholders should make a deliberate effort to implement prevention strategies which lie in social justice to stem this tide of youth radicalization.

The issue of social justice has been brought to the fore with the advent of democracy in the continent. In South Africa post Apartheid has witnessed the growth in social movements which have taken the fight for social justice at another level. This is the theme adopted by Tyanai Masiya as he explores the contribution of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) to South Africa’s HIV/AIDS policy. He argues that, the TAC has drawn its strategies from the anti-apartheid struggle and adapted to the new post-apartheid context by relying on demonstrations, education, litigation, alliance building, courting international support as well as appealing to the moral high ground to change the perspective on how the country addresses HIV/AIDS. He attributes the South African policy change from denialism to prevention of mother to child transmission programme, a public anti-retroviral programme and a National plan on HIV, STI and Tuberculosis prevention and treatment to the actions of the Treatment Action Campaign.
The struggle for social justice in Africa also relates to the fact that the majority of Africans do not benefit from the immense natural resources found in their land. The reason has been the lucrative exploitation of the natural resources without due consideration of the local populations or the environmental effects of over exploitation. This is best explained by the unequal power relations which exist between the multinational corporations and African governments as well as the inability of the governments to adequately protect the populations where the resources are found. In this regard, Godfrey Maringira examines the relationship between the Zimbabwean soldiers deployed to the Chiadzwa diamond fields in Eastern Zimbabwe and the artisanal miners and how they negotiate and co-opt each other into the illegal and selling of diamonds from 2006-2009. He argues that while the two groups work hand in hand in this illegal and criminal exploitation of this natural resource, they continue to see each other as distinct from each other. It is clear that in such criminal transactions, very few people benefit from resources which could have been exploited for the general good. This could only be possible within the context of a complete breakdown of law and order following Zimbabwe’s political meltdown in the 1990s.

As previously indicated, the exploitation of natural resources in Africa has taking very little consideration of environmental factors and has given rise to environmental related conflicts. The locus classicus is the conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. However, Jacob Mwitwa, Lumbiwe Mwana and Ignatius Mukunto examine the critical issue of environmental resource governance and conflict in Western Zambia. They argue that, this latent conflict flared up in 2011 in spite of the fact that, the conflict has been long over shadowed by national politics. They attribute the conflict to serious structural and systemic problems inherent in the country’s social system. It is noteworthy that several latent conflicts exist in several countries in the continent. However, policy makers have been overwhelmed with violent conflicts and have simply reneged on dealing with such conflicts which at some point in the future the conflicts degenerate and evolve into violent conflicts.

The inability of African countries to deal with latent conflicts usually results in deep seated grudges which boil over to violent conflicts. More so the conflicts which eventually arise have provided serious challenges to the conventional armies of these countries. It is theme adopted by Osumah Oarhe on the responses of Nigerian security forces to the asymmetrical warfare by the Boko Haram Islamic Sect in Northern Nigeria. According to Osumah, while the operations of the security forces have yielded gains within the context of recovery of captured communities, rescue of some women held captive and the arrest and killing of several Boko Haram militants, these gains have been undermined by the failure to stem the tide of attacks by the Islamic sect. Osumah attributes these failures to poor financing and ill-equipment of the security forces, and poor coordination across various units and services of the security forces. The paper calls for the need to address these limitations for the purposes of effective counterinsurgency warfare.

Counterinsurgency tactics especially by the United States has come under scrutiny especially with the deployment of drones in countries in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen. The development of use of Aerial unmanned vehicles with the capacity to deploy lethal forces has led to the death of several innocent citizens in the countries facing terrorism. However, the use of drones has also been used by the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo especially for reconnaissance and surveillance
missions. This is supposed ‘anomaly’ is captured by Philip Attuquayefio and Michael Yekple as they analyze and point out the challenges with regards to the storage, dissemination of the surveillance data derived from the drones. They however indicate that, the huge geographical characteristic of the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo with its notorious absence of infrastructure makes the use of drones critical to the achievement of the mandate of MONUSCO.

The ideas contained in the papers should help inform debates and focus conversations about how the continent and its leadership begin to deal with issues of natural resource governance, environmental issues related to natural resource exploitation, asymmetric warfare and the important role of social movements in addressing social injustice. At the turn of the twenty-first century, African governments have to move away from rhetoric about addressing the challenges of a high youth population which should be considered a resource rather than a burden to concrete actions which can help harness this youth energy for economic transformation of the continent.

Prof Polydore Ibrahim  
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From the Managing Editor

The approach to the study and understanding of conflict in Africa corresponds to the diverse meaning and manifestations of conflicts in the continent. A main dividing line is between those that seek its causes and analyze its treatment by looking at conflict as a pathological state and those that take conflict for granted and study the behavior associated with it. Among the latter, there is a further division between those that examine the participants to a conflict in all their complexity - with regard to both rational and irrational behavior, conscious and unconscious and to motivations as well as calculations- and those that focus on the more rational, conscious, artful kind of behavior. Crudely though, the latter treat conflict as a kind of contest, in which the participants are trying to win.

The articles in this issue of the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal focus on six different but related themes which explain the complex nature contemporary conflicts in Africa. They include the issue of youth radicalization as it manifests in Kenya within the framework of terrorist attacks; the struggle for social justice in South Africa through the Treatment Action Campaign’s struggle to influence policy towards HIV/AIDS treatment; the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Zimbabwe by both government agencies and private miners; the important link between environmental governance or lack thereof in creating a conflict situation in Zambia; the approach to asymmetrical war by the Nigerian government in the face of Boko Haram insurgency; and the adaptation and pitfalls of embracing lethal technology such as the use of unmanned Aerial vehicles- drones – by the united nations to enhance its peacekeeping role in the Eastern part of the democratic Republic of Congo.

The approach to all the above mentioned studies correspond to not only the nature of the challenges but the conventional approach in Africa of looking at the challenges through a pathological lense by seeking the causes and prescribing the treatment. The delicate balance for African academics is to avoid the pitfall of assuming that the actors to all conflicts are rational, intelligent and motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages- a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system. This may not necessarily be the case especially with regards to the growth of terrorism in west and eastern part of Africa. It may be hard to explain the rationale and consistency of a value system in situations where the interpretation of the value system in actively in dispute.

There is a general agreement that Africa needs to move towards prioritizing conflict prevention and confront active conflicts through deterrence. Those who grapple with the idea of deterrence are motivated largely by immediate problems of insecurity. However conflict prevention with its reliance on a slow and painful process of addressing the root causes of conflicts may appeal to immediate problem solvers and therefore may often be seen as resting within the purview of post conflict.

Africa faces several immediate challenges of violent conflict, environmental degradation, unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and growth in extremism, radicalization and terrorism etc. The continent therefore needs a comprehensive
strategy which creates a pathway towards long term and sustainable resolution of these challenges. The response can be seen in Agenda 2063 with seven key aspirations:

• A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development
• An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance
• An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law
• A peaceful and secure Africa
• An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics
• An Africa where development is people-driven, unleashing the potential of its women and youth
• Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner.

These seven aspirations over the next 50 years hold the key to a continent bedeviled by persistent instability, bad governance and corruption.

Samuel Kale Ewusi PhD
Managing Editor
Africa Peace and Conflict Journal
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Abstract

There is a relationship between societal security and youth radicalization in Kenya. Radicalism is driven by societal insecurity, when members of a community perceive their identity to be threatened and therefore turn to violent extremism in retaliation for perceived injustices against them. There are multiple push and pull factors that motivate radicalism. It is driven by powerful narratives or “emotional hotspots” that create solidarity and emphasis on injustices on particular groups. This creates the ‘we’ versus ‘them’ scenario that fuels radicalism. Radicalization takes place at the individual, family, institutional, and community levels and also within the internet space. Key challenge are; ending self-radicalization taking place through the internet and reversing radicalization once it has happened. Therefore, the solution lies in implementing prevention strategies so radicalization does not occur.

Introduction

Radicalization in Kenya is associated with terrorism and often linked to youth; as key targets for recruitment, indoctrination and as perpetrators of violence connected with extremist views. Radical groups tend to justify terrorist tactics, condone violence and other forms of extremist behavior, as a legitimate course of action in search for a perceived just cause and to put pressure on the government to address their concerns. Kenya has a domestic radicalization problem of its own with Kenyan nationals receiving training and indoctrination from the Al-Shabaab in neighboring Somalia and returning home to recruit others into the group.

However, the exact number of youth who have been radicalized locally or in Somalia is unknown; what is discernable are the patterns and increase in the number of families reporting missing youth believed to have travelled to Somalia and the dozens arrested while trying to cross the border. In some instances families are scared of reporting for fear of being victimized, stigmatized or are in denial.


Societal Security and Youth Radicalisation in Kenya

Damaris Nyaboke Manyange
This study was conducted in Eastleigh area, Nairobi, the epicenter of radicalization activities in the country, where the recruitment, transit, return and planning of violent activities is domiciled. Qualitative data was collected through in-depth key informant interviews, focus group discussions and desk research. Study was unable to interview a radicalized member of radical group.

Conceptualizing Societal Security and Radicalization

Societal insecurity occurs when communities feel their identity is being targeted or threatened. This happens when a community defines an event or development as a threat to their survival which depends on the maintenance of an identity. Therefore perceived or actual threats to their identity propel societies to seek to defend themselves in many ways including by radicalizing its members. Therefore, any threats to identity will be met with resistance and the development of extreme views to sustain its existence. States can be made insecure by perceived or real threats to sections of their societies, who often seek to use violence to protect their identity.

Engelhard argues that societal security is about the construction of group identities and distinguishing them other groups. These identities often lead to conflicts with other groups whose identity with different from theirs. Kaldor asserts that in the era of globalization, new wars are emerging, based on the consolidation of group identities which creates a dichotomy of “us” versus “them” in order to mobilize peoples political identity within the state. When states fail to reconcile the divergence of group identities then conflict and confrontations are inevitable.

Similarly, Buzan states that societal security is about identity and how communities and individuals identify and perceive themselves. Thus, societies have different vulnerabilities depending on how their identity is constructed and maintained. The referent objects in societal security are large self sustaining groups identified by tribe, clans, religions, races and civilizations and the extent to which they can function independent of the state. Societal security concerns the sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and customs. In addition, Weaver states that societal security is about the self-conception of communities and individuals who identify themselves as members of a community. When threatened, societies respond by strengthening their identity and recourse to invoking their culture, myths and symbols. Societies also use their language, religion, culture, history as referent points to achieve their unity and to deter the enemy.

The term radicalization emerged following the bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) and has since become central in the war on terror discourse and coun-

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3. ibid
ter terrorism programs. Most of the literature on radicalization focus on Islamism extremism and jihadist terrorism and is linked to the concepts of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization. However, there is no agreement on a definition of radicalization, but there is a consensus that it is a gradual phased process through which individuals or collectivities change behavior and tend to use violence to address grievances.

Malthaner & Waldmann argue that radicalization results from political and social processes that involve a collectivity of people. It evolves as a process that leads to commitment by members of a group to use violence due to enmity towards certain social groups, societal institutions and structures. Similarly, Della & Gary see radicalization as a process through which individuals mostly youth are introduced to extreme ideological messages and belief systems that transform them from moderate mainstream beliefs towards extreme perspectives. Radicalization is manifested in the commitment to intergroup violence and interactions between the violent groups and their environment.

Likewise, McCauley & Moskalenko posit that radicalization refers to a fundamental change in beliefs, perceptions, feelings and behavior to justify intergroup violence and it demands making sacrifices to defend the groups’ ideals. Radicalization is evolving over time as a process by which people are indoctrinated with ideological and religious belief systems that motivate them to adopt revolutionary and militant behavior.

Duckitt & Fisher argue that radicalization is attributable to three main factors; a radical ideology, individual cognitive biases and established networks with radical individuals. These are brought about due to perception of impeding threat or uncertainty which is beyond the control and influence of a group, radicalism is also driven by a sense of disillusionment amongst members of a group experiencing, alienation, discrimination, marginalization, disenchantment, availability of funding and logistical support locally and from foreign countries and underlying perceived historical injustices among others.

Therefore, construction and sustaining collective group identities is a central pillar for radicalism. Members of radical groups take closed- minded view of their identity that contradicts other groups’ identities. For instance, large numbers of displaced Somalis have lived in prolonged exile in Eastleigh since the 1990s. They have settled and changed the demographics and the economics of the area. The area has transformed into a hub for Somali family networks, trade, and a global information centre with connections with wider social networks and opportunities.

10. Malthaner Stefan & Waldmann Peter, Radical Milieus, (Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2012)
An Opinion leader\textsuperscript{14} stated that in Eastleigh area, the group identities are confined to the dominant ethnic and religious characteristics that mainly refer to Somalis and the Muslim faith respectively. These identities are closed and exclusive and constitute the pool for majority of recruits, sympathizers and direct supporters of radicalism. They provide the target from which the Al Shabaab group recruits members into violent extremism through persuasion depicting themselves as advocates of a holy war and use of nationalistic propaganda based on the solidarity of being Somalia and Muslim.

**Push and Pull Factors of Youth Radicalism in Kenya**

There is no single cause of radicalization but a complex combination of internal and external factors that motivate individuals and groups. Sageman\textsuperscript{15} contends that the drivers of radicalism can be discerned at three levels; at the micro-level by assessing the drivers that motivate individual to radicalism, the Meso–level looking at the wider radical milieu that comprises the socialization of individuals and the surrounding that provides training, membership and comradeship to the radical groups and a focus on the macro–level that concerns societal relationships and interactions between groups and governmental actions at home and abroad. These causes of radicalization are multiple and emanate from the social, political, economic and cultural contexts of the individuals and groups.

Zakaria\textsuperscript{16} in a survey of root causes of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the USA argues that youth bulges combined with slow economic and social change provide a foundation for resurgence of Islamic extremism in the Arab world and other parts of the world. In addition, Urdal\textsuperscript{17} argues that countries that invest in secondary education experience lower levels of conflict and elaborates on the relationship between youth bulges and political violence in Asia and sub-Saharan African cities. On his part Gurr\textsuperscript{18} advocates for a motive–oriented or grievance perspective that perceives the eruption of violence in a society as a rational means to address the economic and political grievances.

Eastleigh area constitutes the radical milieu within which the socialization of individuals and groups tends towards violent extremism. A description of the area and the conditions under which the inhabitants live provide a trigger that is used to entice the youth to radicalism. Eastleigh is host to a large Somali population involved in thriving business ventures. It is a densely populated area with dilapidated roads and the streets are always crowded with petty businesses making the roads impassable. The overcrowding is attributable to the effects of influx of refugees from Somalia living in overcrowded conditions, where the available space is used as shops in the day time and

\textsuperscript{14.} Interview with community leader, Nairobi, 1 March 2014.
houses at night. The unregulated expansion has outpaced the improvement of public infrastructure. It may fit the description of the “ungoverned space”.

Informants stated that Eastleigh has been forgotten by successive governments for decades, and that the Al-Shabaab operatives were offering opportunities and messages of emancipation to the youth that encourage them to leave the area. Al-Shabaab offers an ideological narrative and a sense of belonging and growth. It also provides organizational infrastructure and ventilation for the disaffection of youth in the area. These provide vulnerability for radicalization in Kenya and internationally that attracts the youth.

Radical clerics in mosques have recruited youth into radicalism and are linked to recent terrorist attacks across the country. Consequently; radicalization in mosques across the country has spiraled and is prevalent in Coast, Nairobi and North-Eastern parts. The Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SEPKEM) in April 2015 unveiled an emergency program to check the lure of youth joining Al-Shabaab. SUPKEM pledged to vet preachers and Koran teachers to check radicalization of youth in their institutions. Similarly, following the terrorist attack at Garissa University College in April 2015, political leaders in the area acknowledged that some youth from the region had been radicalized in Somalia and joined the Al-Shabaab ranks.

An informant asserted that the epicenter for radicalization in Eastleigh area is around Pumwani Riyadha Mosque, where clerics are popular for their jihadist preaching, the distribution of radical literature and video clips of speeches from Al-Qaeda leadership with translations into Kiswahili and Somalia languages.

Similarly, a United Nations Report stated that the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) also known as the Pumwani Muslim Youth domiciled at the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque had formed a radicalized, secretive group of Kenyan jihadist in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Manderan and other towns. The MYC is sympathetic to the Al Shabaab from whom they draw inspiration, and seek to support financially, and by sending recruits to enforce their ranks. They also contribute in implementing the jihadist agenda in Kenya through terrorist attacks and violence. The MYC has recruited hundreds of Kenyan Youth to sustain attacks until the Kenya defense forces troops withdraw from Somalia.

The Societal identities and perceptions of potential recruits living in a society where their beliefs are shared by a minority is a driver to radicalization. A respondent stated that the Muslim populations in Eastleigh area do not feel they belong to Kenya and that they are often unfairly targeted in counter terrorism programs. He argued...
that the area is referred to as “Somalia Ndogo or Mogadishu” by most Kenyans. This profiling helps to alienate the community and makes them easy targets by extremist groups that reach out to them to exploit their sentiments and legitimize their claims. The radical groups seek to tap into their patriotism with much success in recruiting youth in Eastleigh.

Similarly, a youth leader expressed frustration at perceived anti-Somalia attitudes; stating that the group is viewed as foreigners, illegal immigrants, terrorists and lacking in allegiance to Kenya. He asserted that the community is forced to feel uncomfortable being Somalia and Muslim and accountable for terrorist acts. Another informant stated that as a Somalia you are guilty until proven innocent whenever there is a terrorist attack or incident in the country.

Additionally, the influence of the radicalized youth in the community plays a significant role in influencing other vulnerable peers to recruitment and indoctrination. An informant argued that recruitment is open and publicized among the target group in the area, they are often receptive and view violent extremism as a means for providing security and contributing to the good of the community. He also stated that most of the school age youth in the area do not attend school, creating an available pool for recruitment.

A key informant stated that radicalization brings pride, power and success to the individual, because radicalized youth are feared and respected in the area. He stated that they earn a good salary; their work is clandestine and is not demanding. In addition, personal attributes and motivations pay a role in radicalism; some recruits are attracted by values and solidarity with the radical groups. The personal accounts and the selflessness of their role models, friends and family experiences play a critical role too.

Similarly, self-gratification, comradeships and convictions of the resort to violent causes of the group are key pillars in the radicalization process. This is giving rise to categories of radicalized youth classified as “self-recruiting” or “want to bes.” This refers to those recruits who acquire the extremist views on their own; driven by propaganda, the actions of perceived martyrs, internet researches, videos, radical preaching and conversations in media. They include those who have never had any contacts with the radicalization networks but admire or are sympathetic to their course. This category also includes individual social deviants and sadists seeking alternative identity or to belong to a group as substitute to family or community.

In contrast focus group discussion revealed that violent extremism is an “employer of last resort” and not one of choice. It is the structural conditions within the society that propel the youth to radicalism and if these were eliminated the youth would not be willing to be recruited. However some youth were prone to peer pressure and influence and easily follow the actions of others without questioning. The adventurous nature and naivety of some youth also leads them to join radical groups.

26. ibid
27. Interview with Youth leader, Nairobi, 1 March 2015.
28. ibid
29. Interview with community leader, Nairobi, 15 February 2015.
30. Interview with university student intern with civil society organization, Nairobi, 22 March 2015.
31. Focus group discussion with students, Nairobi, 3 March 2015.
Similarly in-depth discussion with social worker established that most of the youth who are vulnerable to recruitment are those that have had problems with law enforcement agencies or whose relatives or friends have been incarcerated at one time. The discussion revealed that youth in the area are at times rounded up during police crackdowns for various accusations including being in the country illegally and on suspicion of being terrorist sympathizers. This targeting helps to harden their resolve and drives them towards radicalism.

Additionally, while incarcerated in the police cells, recruiters and sympathizers visit and engage them with promises to help secure their release and offer them job opportunities once they are free. Relationships whose aim is radicalization are often established and sustained in this manner. On release most of those affected begin to exhibit extremist tendencies and continue their association with those who helped them secure their release, this associations tend to resemble support groups that purport to assist them to reintegrate into the community and support them while their court cases continue. In the long term these support groups are transformed into radical groups.

For instance, during the operation Usalama (Security) Watch in April 2014, security forces conducted door to door searches in Eastleigh area, where members of the Somali community complained of; deliberate government targeting, forceful entry into their premises, harassment, arrests, ill treatment and extortion. In the process, those found to be illegally in the country were incarcerated; others were relocated back to the refugee camps, whereas others were deported back to Somalia. The extensive media coverage of the events of the Usalama operation, helped to raise emotions and convince some sections and the Somalia ethnic community that they were being profiled as potential terrorist. Media report of ethnic Somalis being bundled out of public transport vehicle hardened the resolve of the community and drew them to the defensive.

Communities and groups always have grievances, real or perceived which inform radicalism. These grievances may be personal, group or community relating to experiences of discrimination or alienation or linked to association to external events and relationships. Key Informant discussions revealed that the Somalia community in the area has adopted a “victim mentality” based on perceived historical grievances which are used as justification for resorting to radicalism in Kenya. The discourse is often on community alienation and marginalization which are used to support the radical ideals by outlining the nature and the causes of the perceived problems and to prescribe future actions and solutions revolving along radical approaches.

32. Interview with social worker, Nairobi, 4 March 2015.
33. ibid
36. Ranstorp, Magnus & Herd, Graeme P., Approaches to Countering Terrorism; In The Ideological War on Terror, Worldwide Strategies for Counter Terrorism; in Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd (eds), (Oxford, Routledge 2007)
37. Interview with secular academic, Nairobi 15 March 2015.
Kenya is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural community with approximately forty-two ethnic communities, prescribing to diverse religions and cultures. The Muslim community constitutes about 11% of the total population of 43 million Kenyans. The Somalia ethnic community accounts for 30% of the Muslim adherents, 10% are Boran community whereas, the rest are minorities living in Christian dominated areas. The ethnic Somalia population is estimated to be two million. The community perceive themselves as marginalized and occupying an area that is least developed in the country. Most Kenyan Muslims belong to relatively minority ethnic communities that occupy the arid and semi-arid parts of the country, which are also characterized by low economic development. Therefore some radicals capitalize on the feeling that Islam is a religion of the minorities to propel their agenda. They also capitalize on low ratios in employment, access to government services and education to oil their propaganda. The radicals also invoke Islam phobia.

In-depth informant discussions revealed the centrality of widely believed community narratives or “emotional hotspots” that enforce youth radicalization in the area. The narratives revolve around a system of beliefs and perceptions which are held as unique and true for which members are willing to defend at all costs. These are enhanced by incongruous worldviews brought about by divergent ideologies of individuals who have had exposure to radical religious dogmas. Radicalism therefore relies on the magnitude to which the narratives are shared, actualized and normalized.

These narratives are both local and global. They tend to evolve, shift and adapt to the agenda of the radicals, who interpret and package them in extreme views that easily resonate with the community. Over time the Somali community has constructed their solidarity in speaking against events that have had negative impact on them. These include the shifta war insurgencies between 1963-1968 when ethnic Somalis attempted to secede from Kenya and join the greater Somalia. After the war the government declared a state of emergency in the area which lasted three decades. Similarly the Wagalla massacre in 1984 during which the security forces repressed an uprising that led to the death of several people and created resentment among the Somali community. More recently, the war on terror and more profoundly Kenya’s military incursion into Somalia, have been interpreted by the community as targeting them. These occurrences are used to lobby and rally the youth. The use of symbolism of occurrences that impact on the Somalia community members helps to develop shared grievances and shape radical narratives. These events provide clear identity of the enemies versus friends and shape the groups identities and define targets for future action. The re-telling of events and their symbolism to the community leads to the construction of myths and realities that sustain the group’s identities.

Most informants referred to the unfolding events locally and internationally as driving radicalism in Kenya, by enhancing resentment towards the government which is easily exploited by the extremists. Informants also made references to events beyond Kenya that sustain the regional and international links of radicalism. These include

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events leading to the Arab spring and long drawn conflict in the Middle East which inspires radicalism and draws sympathizers. Consequently, a number of youth are attracted to travel for training so as to join the global jihad. Some respondents felt that those events were likely to be replicated in the region and they felt the need to be prepared in advance to counter such threats.

The Transnational nature of the narratives is shared by networks across the globe. The informants discussed global narratives which are prevalent and are associated with jihadist. They argued that the world is characterized by struggles between Muslims and non-Muslims over injustices and atrocities committed. These are also reinforced by anti-western sentiments. The Informant asserted that most youth empathize with the Muslim world because of the perceived unjust foreign policies adopted by the United States Of America and European Union countries that have caused war in the middle East, Egypt and Libya and that Kenya supports these policies without question. Kenyas’ counter terrorism strategies are perceived to be targeting the Somalia community hence the

A Key informant argued that religious leaders and traditional Somalia community systems have lost legitimacy and authority. They are no longer recognized by the radicalized youth who opt for emerging new interpretations, strands and teaching of the Quran that espouse extremist views, ideologies and narratives. Roots of youth radicalization in Kenya can be attributed to the competition between two religious ideologies; the extremist Shia or Shiites and the moderate Sunni for supremacy. This is gradually leading to the replacement of Sufi dogmas by Salafist and Wahhabism ideologies and influence from the Gulf states.

Specifically, from the 1970s to date, Kenya Muslims have been exposed to various schools of radical Islamic views associated with Wahhabism, whose turning point was witnessed in the 1990s with the entry of religious radicalism from the Al Qaida and Somalia militant groups al Itihad Al Islami (AIAI) which recruited Kenyan Somalia youth, some from Eastleigh area and mobilized funds through mosques to support its activities. The AIAI created a formidable secretive network that has been inherited by successive radical groups operating in the area and other parts of the country.

**Layers of Recruitment into Radicalism in Kenya**

Focus group discussions revealed several layers of youth radicalization in Eastleigh area. Firstly, several informants stated that radicalization takes place at the individual level. The youth are driven to radicalization for personal reasons including self grati-

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42. In-depth interview with Islamic scholar, Nairobi, 11 February 2015.
43. Interview with religious leader, Nairobi, 28 January 2015.
45. United nations monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea; Report of the monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea; July 2011.
46. Focus Group Discussions with members of Muslim Student Association, Nairobi 16 March 2015 and Focus Group Discussion with students opcit.
fication, unpatriotic and selfish needs. With most families adopting sedentary lifestyles, there is little time left for nurturing and mentoring children, therefore most youth turn to making their own decisions with little input from parents. Some rely on their peers for guidance which enhances the propensity for recruitment.

Wilner & Dubouloz⁴⁷ argue that individuals construct a radical narrative to their lives to accommodate their insecurities or frustrations. Other individuals formulate ideologies, attitudes and beliefs that divert from the mainstream standards which gradually become radical and aggressive over time. They also believe that only aggression can resolve their problems. In addition, Moghaddam⁴⁸states that radicalization is caused by cognitive biases of individuals who misinterpret events and circumstances which lead to violent behavior and radical narratives to justify their actions.

Secondly, youth get radicalized within the family setting, where norms and narratives are inculcated that tend to create a “we” versus “them” demarcation. An informant⁴⁹ stated that children from an early age are introduced into radicalization through their choice of toys. Whereby boys are mainly introduced to gun and military track toys, they are taught how to aim and shoot. The girls are introduced to dolls which are depicted as being the images of the enemy⁵⁰, they are encouraged to destroy them into pieces and cut off the heads as local narratives are told of the perceived enemies that must be destroyed.

Thirdly youth are radicalized in various institutions including; through the learning institutions, several informants stated that youth are approached by giving them incentives like scholarships, paying for school trips and joining religious clubs where recruiters often come to offer talks and rewards which are very attractive in the area⁵¹. A key informant⁵² revealed that while, incarcerated at a police station, following a crackdown on illegal immigrants and suspected terrorist he was exposed to sheds of opinion that were against the status quo and while in the police cells suspects contemplated taking measures to address the perceived injustices against their community which they felt was being targeted unfairly.

The fourth level of radicalization is the community within which the youth reside, as part of the socialization process. This is mainly through peer pressure and established code of behavior and expectation of its members. There is a sense of belonging and brotherhood in the area that makes it difficult for outsiders or non Somalis to penetrate due to a close neat identity that has developed over time. The fifth level concerns radicalization through the virtual-space; of the stateless and borderless media outlets. The youth are able to have free access to or subscribe to radical internet

⁴⁹. Interview with social worker ,op cit
⁵⁰. Most dolls and toys are made with European or western identities and color, hardly do they reflect Muslim or African identities and dressing.
⁵¹. Interview with head teacher in Nairobi, 17 March 2015.
⁵². Interview with youth incarcerated during Usalama Watch crack down on illegal immigrants 16 March 2015.
sites, download videos and in some instances have telephone conferences with their networks beyond Kenya.

Lastly, radicalization takes place abroad, fuelled by the aspiration of any potential radical to travel to the "no- go- zones" that include; Somalia, Iraq and Syria for training and for self actualization. There are a number of youth who are eager and willing to travel abroad for training, some join the local groups as a means to gain trust ad get an opportunity to train abroad.

Modes of Recruitment and Indoctrination into Radicalism

Scott & Sara \(^{53}\) present four methods of terrorist recruitment used by Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups which include the Al Shabaab terrorist cell operating in Kenya. Firstly, terrorist use the net pattern, mainly targeting homogeneous groups that are receptive to a common message or narrative. They exploit the religious beliefs, demographic similarities and geographic locations. This is prevalent in Eastleigh area, where radical preachers in some mosques target a receptive audience with little resistance and exploiting the demographic characteristics of a large number of Somali speakers who are Muslims and who can easily be sympathetic to the Al Qaeda ideals when packaged with radical interpretation of Islam and relevant local narratives of perceived injustices \(^{54}\).

Secondly, recruiters use a funnel method which is a gradual process carried out in phases. The recruits are transformed and radicalized over a period of time and graduate into dedicated members of the group. This is done through indoctrination, messaging and training in use of violence as a means of expression. They use rewards, incentives and influential opinion leaders within their ranks. Recruits undergo actual training in the radical group camps.

Thirdly, radical groups use the infection method to get their targets by getting trusted agents to mingle and associate with the population. These agents rely heavily on their personal appeals, persuasive powers and their sources of credibility. This methods works well in sections of society that are disgruntled against the existing establishment and have little power to influence change or determine their conditions. A key informant \(^{55}\) stated that recruiters are targeting persons working within the security sector who are disgruntled over their conditions of service. He contended that the security forces have been infiltrated by some members who espouse radical ideals and seek to influence their colleagues by offering inducement to win recruits.

Fourthly, individual get radicalized through the seed method. This refers to the self-recruitment, where youth identify with the views and aspirations of terrorist groups and voluntarily seek information from multiple sources including the media, radical literature, various internet sources run by the terrorist groups. \(^{56}\)

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53. Scott Geruerhr & Sara Daly, Al Qaida Terrorist Selection and Recruitment ,Rand Corporation, USA,2009), 73-80.
54. Interview with religious leader, 11 March 2015.
55. Interview with security officer, Nairobi, 11 March 2015.
56. Scott Geruerhr & Sara Canna, opcit
Regional and international Links of Youth Radicalism in Kenya

Radicalization of youth in Kenya is part of the larger radical infrastructure that contributes to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The Al-Shabaab terrorist group has over time established a cross border network among the population in Kenya with links to Somalia and beyond. Youth radicalism becomes internationalized through the presence of foreign fighters and trainers in the country. The long term goal of radical groups to establish an Islamic caliphate in Africa enhances collaboration of radicals across the world.

Similarly most informants stated that training and indoctrination of youth takes place in Somalia and other foreign countries. In March 2015 the Al-Shabaab released a video recording of movement and training of recruits in camps in Somalia, where a group of youth were trained in Somalia and later linked to attacks in Kenya. For instance, former Kenyan police commissioner stated that hundreds of Kenyan youth trained and radicalized in Somalia were returning to Kenya and were likely to conduct terrorist attacks. He further stated that Al Shabaab rely on the radicalized youth in Kenya to support their activities in Somalia.

The interdependent nature of security relations between the states enhances the establishment of networks that recruit, train, indoctrinate and deploy the radicalized youth to undertake violent activities and include acts of terrorism in the region and beyond. Specifically, the Horn of Africa faces multiple security challenges and is characterized by fragility that is manifested in violent conflicts and terrorism which are perpetuated by extremist militant groups. The region’s states face threats from an increase in radicalization and adoption of extremist ideals amongst its youth populace.

Frameworks for De-Radicalization in Kenya

The government has over time implemented measures to address the issue of youth radicalism including; the freezing of funding sources for the radical groups and banning the operations of the organizations in the country. In addition the government has instituted long term measures to address the perceived grievances of marginalization through development and infrastructural programs in the affected areas. These have contributed to modest progress in addressing radicalization. However, evaluation of the de-radicalization initiatives is challenging due to the levels of secrecy and covert nature of these programs, which are also characterized by a lack of collaboration between the state and non state actors.

The government has often resorted to the use of ad-hoc policy measures which at times work, but can also be unsustainable in addressing the root causes of radicalism. Most attempts have been reactionary tactics in response to the increase of the threat levels of radicalism. For instance, interview with key informant revealed that some committed members have withdrawn from radical groups for various reasons including; risks and unmet expectations. Similarly, constant police crackdowns, searches in

59. Interview with parent of former radicalized youth, 22 March 2015.
suspect's premises and the harassment of relatives and parents of suspects serve as turning points for some radicals. Another informant\(^\text{60}\) narrated the stigma which parents and families of recruits go through, by being shunned by others in their neighborhood; they use their plight to appeal to their kin to abandon radicalism for the sake of their family, sometimes they may succeed in convincing the recruits but at times they turn against their own families.

The government offered amnesty to radicalized youth and returnees from Somalia in reaction to terrorist attack in Garissa University\(^\text{61}\). This was done without elaborate long term strategies to sustain the program. The use of security operations and crackdowns targeting suspects, recruits and their sympathizers have also tended to be counter-productive.

The key approach in addressing radicalization is to prevent the phenomenon from occurring. This is because; it is difficult to change people's perceptions, beliefs, culture and world views. These are part of what constitute societal security and any attempts to change are often resisted. Adherents have a closed mind incapable of accepting opposing views, it is thus unfeasible to de-radicalize extremist who claim to have found their true calling\(^\text{62}\). Therefore the challenge lies in addressing the drivers that create vulnerability to radicalization. Prevention or anti-radicalization programs aim to reduce the number of new recruits, avoid violence and victimization within communities and to re-affirm the ideological views of potential radical group members\(^\text{63}\).

In instances where radicalization has already taken place, the de-radicalization program focus on disengagement and re-integration of the affected. Disengagement strives to re-orient the ideological views and attitudes of recruits so as to reduce the number of active radicals. It works to disassociate with violence and extremist activities, movements and organizations. Whereas, re-integration aims to re-socialize ex-radicals back to normal life by providing exit options from violent extremism. Therefore an understanding of how to reverse radicalization is at the core of de-radicalization programs\(^\text{64}\).

De-radicalization programs can incorporate political, social, legal, educational and economic initiatives directed towards individuals and communities that have adopted extremist views aiming to dissuade or re-integrate them back into society. These aim to tackle the drivers that propel individuals to radicalism\(^\text{65}\). There are other measures

\(^{60}\) Interview with informant whose family member joined the radical group, 22 February 2015.

\(^{61}\) Daily Nation, Nkaissorsy Announces Amnesty for Young People Who May Have Joined Violent Extremist Groups, (Tuesday 21 April 2015), i. & Hassan ole Naado, Amnesty Is A Positive Counter Terrorism Move, the star, (Wednesday April,2015), 25.


that may be used to target individuals and groups including, giving amnesty, counsel­
ing, dialogue, demobilization, disbandment and reconciliation66.

An informant67 stated that there are varied factors that de-radicalization initiatives
can focus on to dissuade individuals; a desire for a normal life devoid of risks, family
pressure, disappointment with the violent groups’ leadership, unmet expectations,
trauma that comes with combat experience, imprisonment or death of colleagues. The
success of de-radicalization programs is dependant on voluntary individual commit­
ments and confidence building measures.

De-radicalization may be achieved through the use of influential intermediaries,
counter-ideological narratives to sow dissent within the violent extremist groups,
continued monitoring to avoid recidivism, formation of support groups of repentant
radicals who can play an active role in influencing their former group members.
In some instances states have been forced to use approaches such as repression
which forces the radicals to rethink their continued use of violence and sustaining an
asymmetrical war, the use of inducements to win the hearts and minds of the radicals
and their sympathizers and deliberate initiatives that target change in behavior and
dogmas of the targeted radicals68.

Radicalization can also be addressed by focusing on community resilience to em­
power and strengthen them to identify early indicators and support initiatives to
counter violent extremism. This can be achieved by addressing the social, economic
and political grievances in vulnerable communities and in the long term measures
have to be put in place to tackle the ideological roots of radicalism

CONCLUSION

Youth play a role in violence in many communities, where they relied upon to protect
collective beliefs and identity. Community narratives define threats and promote the
rejection of the status quo which fuels radicalism. These make the youth easy targets,
sympathizers and supporter of the radicalization networks. Reversing the trends and
implementing de-radicalization initiatives poses challenges. Therefore the solution
lies in instituting proactive measures to prevent it from occurring.

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66. Rik Coolsaet (ed) Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge: European and American
67. Interview with probation officer, Nairobi, 22 March 2015.
68. Omar Ashour, the De- radicalization of Jihadists : Transforming armed Islamist Movements,
Why Social Movements Matter: A Case of the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa

Tyanai Masiya

Abstract

Social movements have gradually played an increasing role in influencing public policy since the advent of democracy in Africa. This paper discusses the contribution of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) to South Africa’s HIV/AIDS policy. Drawing its strategies from the anti-apartheid struggle as well as adapting to the new post-apartheid context, TAC relied on demonstrations, education, litigation, alliance building, international support as well as appealing to the moral high ground to change the South African perspective on how it addresses HIV/AIDS. Following TAC campaigns, the South African government abandoned its dissident (denialism) perspective, embraced prevention of mother to child transmission programme, a public antiretroviral programme, a National Strategic Plan on HIV, STIs and Tuberculosis and is set to revisit its patent laws to promote access to medicines.

Introduction

This study is a contribution towards an understanding of influence of social movements in society using the case of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa. It is motivated by the fact that in the last decade, it has been noted that limited attention has been paid to the study of outcomes and consequences of social movements in preference of studying their origins and trajectories. In view of this gap, this study makes a contribution towards understanding the impact of social movements on policy and to an extent on their environment as well.

Social movements can be defined as “sustained challenges to authorities.” However, they are often perceived as political outsiders who have no business in the

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public policy processes. In early social movement history, they were seen as dangerous demagogues, impractical idealists and sometimes mere dreamers. However “throughout human history, people have still organized social movements to try to improve their lives and the society in which they lived”\(^4\). Consequently, social movements have influenced changes in society, some in a radical way. Even where they would not have achieved most of their aims, parts of their proposals were accepted and incorporated into the social order. This has been the main, or “manifest,” function of these movements. Since the turn of the 20th century, social movements have influenced a plethora of policies around the world, including in the areas of women’s rights, environmental protection, workers’ rights, health care and housing among other policies.

Social movement literature can focus on how social movements emerge, why social movements emerge, their outcomes and their effects. This study takes the view of most scholars which posits that social movements have at least some impact on public policy processes, whether that impact is direct or indirect\(^5\). It analysis this impact of social movements by discussing the role played by South Africa’s TAC in the reform of the country’s HIV/AIDS policy in the last fifteen years. In the absence of a clear HIV/AIDS policy that covered various areas including the provision of Anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs), prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) and favourable drug patent laws, TAC fought to transform a state whose leadership had a so called “dissident view” on confronting the HIV/AIDS scourge. This view contended that HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment measures in existence were a ploy by western multinational corporations to make more profits with drugs that did not ameliorate the disease but perpetuated it\(^6\). Pursuant to TAC’s advocacy, South Africa today has an elaborate HIV/AIDS policy.

This study is based on an elaborate analysis of documentary evidence to trace the influence of TAC on the country’s HIV/AIDS policy. The paper is structured as follows; the first section discusses what social movements are. The second section gives an understanding of why social movements matter. The third section focuses on the background to South Africa’s HIV/AIDS policy debate. Finally the study delves on the role of TAC in influencing SA’s HIV/AIDS policy to date.

What are Social Movements?

Social Movements are collective attempts to bring about social change by influencing social institutions. They are not mobs or crowds but are concerted organised action groups that are much more integrated. They last longer than mobs and crowds though they may function without having one over-all formal\(^7\).

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Social movements vary widely in their ideologies; some movements are revolutionary in their aims, some advocate reforms to the existing system, and others are conservative in their orientation and work to oppose changes in society. Social movements vary in scope as well. Many movements are limited to local policies while others have an international outlook.

Different authors have attempted to provide a definition of what constitutes social movements. Diani defines social movements as informal networks of individuals and/or organisations, sharing a collective identity and the same side in political and/or cultural conflicts. Other authorities contend that social movements are a mobilised demand for change in society by arguing that they are “a set of opinions and beliefs which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social and/or reward distribution of a society”. Social movements have also been viewed as a collectivity acting with some degree of organisation and continuity outside of institutional channels for the purpose of promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or world order of which it is a part.

However the definition of what constitutes a social movement has been contentious largely because of the diversity of collectivities that may be termed social movements. In the same light, Charles Tilly states that for many years he had avoided the term ‘social movement’ because it sponged up so many different meanings and therefore obscured more than it clarified.

While it may be difficult to have a single standing definition of what constitutes a social movement, from the above definitions, we can discern that social movements are a form of group action, i.e. large groupings of individuals and/or organisations focused on specific political or socio-economic issues, carrying out, resisting or undoing a social change.

This study adopts the view that social movements “consist of a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment”. Often times this is done through social movement organisations (SMOs). SMOs develop to manage the interdependencies of adherents and activists committed to the movement. In this regard it suffices to say

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10. McAdam, Doug & Snow, David. 'Social Movements: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues' In McAdam, D & Snow, D (eds), Social Movements: Readings on their Emergence, Mobilisation and Dynamics, (Roxbury: Los Angeles,1997).
social movement organisations are formed to advance a lasting cause for social movements as they will play a coordinating role and pulling together of resources\(^{15}\).

Subsequently, throughout history, people have struggled collectively to challenge social conditions that they have not liked. Through social movements they have looked for opportunities to claim new rights; others have responded to threats and violence; some have sought political and economic emancipation and gains while others fought lifestyle choices they disliked or feared\(^{16}\). Social movements are the main source of political conflict and change and are often the first to articulate new political issues and ideas. Therefore “it is typically movements outside the political system that force insiders to recognise new fears and desires”\(^{17}\).

However, during the period preceding the 20th century, social movements were regularly hunted down. In fact, in the *Communist Manifesto*, Frederich Engels remarked that during this period, “wherever independent proletarian movements continued to show signs of life, they were ruthlessly hunted down”\(^{18}\). Indeed even in the early stages of the development of social movement theory, social movements were viewed negatively. Early studies of social movements in the 18th and 19th centuries perceived social movements as “madding crowds”, and associated them with extremism, deprivation and violence. Up until the 1960s, social movements were to a large extent perceived as dangerous mobs who acted irrationally, blindly following demagogues who sprang up in their midst\(^{19}\). In other words they were assumed to be irrational if not outright irrational\(^{20}\). In the Early 19th century for example, sociologist, Emily Durkheim and other observers concluded that social struggles by movements were a result of anomie and social disorganisation.

The 20th century was however the hallmark of the interpretation of social movements. It is also a period when the perception of social movements was redefined from a negative perspective to a recognised institution of social change. There was a gradual incorporation of their ideas and membership into social democratic institutions.

As a result of this new view of the positive contribution of social movements,

> “In the last fifty years alone, the American civil Rights Movement, the peace, environmental and feminist movements, revolts against authoritarianism in both Europe and the third world and the rise of new Islamic movements have brought masses of people into the streets demanding change. They often succeeded but even when they failed their actions set in motion important political, cultural and international changes”\(^{21}\)


\(^{17}\) Ibid, p.4.


In Africa the rise of social movements was more closely associated with the struggle for liberation from colonial bondage. Through to the mid-20th century, such movements were characterised by mass movements (sometimes peasant based or led by chiefs and spirit mediums or clergy or emerging from the urban poor) and powerful trade unions. Religious protesters, women's groups, students and youths played catalytic roles that changed history in given locales. From the nascent anti-colonial ethnic based resistances in the 19th century, social movements surged to cover popular uprisings such as Mau Mau (Kenya) in the 1950s, the Maji Maji revolts in Tanzania, the Abako (Association du Bas-Kongo) as well as the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the 1980s South Africa.

Three key elements are known to facilitate the emergence and sustenance of social movements, namely political opportunity structure, resource mobilisation and framing processes. Political opportunity structure explains opportunities or constraints that may or may not be available as a result of the nature of the political environment prevailing in the state. Political opportunity structure can be defined as “consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure”. Regime shifts, periods of political instability and leadership changes are also part of political opportunities that influence social movements. Both limitation and expansion of political opportunity can be equally positive or negative for mobilisation.

Another driver of social movement mobilisation and collective action is said to be the ability to mobilise resources (knowledge, money, media, labor, solidarity, legitimacy, and internal and external support from power elite) that sustain the development, life and success of the social movement. These resources are needed to make the social movement effective as dissent and grievances alone will not promote mobilisation and collective action. Resources also include established repertoires of contention (creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering), that is, the means of claim making which range from peaceful sit-ins and letter-writing campaigns to acts of vandalism or violent attacks upon individuals or state institutions. The extent to which resources may influence claim making is affected by their availability and alliances.

Further, social movements may emerge as a result of actors who engage in the framing of issues for the constituency, antagonists and bystanders or observers. The production of meaning or framing enables individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large thereby making

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events or occurrences meaningful to them. It is this derived meaning that helps to organise and guide action. It inspires and legitimises the activities and campaigns of social movements. Mobilisation hinges on the success of social movements in “boundary framing” in ways that captivate the targeted constituencies. Thus strong movements can emerge through organisers who outline their issues in a way that resonates with or makes sense to potential recruits thereby promoting collective identity. This can also occur where activists create an identity based on membership of the movement itself.

**Why Social Movements Matter**

Social movements influence policy by changing the government and public’s policy preferences and its intensity of concern about particular issues. Therefore, social movements have important consequences as part of the political and policy process. Many scholars study social movements because they indeed believe that they are an important source of policy change. As a source of policy change, social movements do not only influence promulgation of new policies but also ensure that the policy is transformed into collective benefits for the target group. Both policy promulgation and policy implementation are critical yardsticks of success for social movements.

Therefore, social movements can have deep and long-lasting consequences for public policy. They emerge because there is a problem or matter of concern in society. They surface due to a lack or absence of political channels that address actual or perceived contentions from the social movement perspective. It has also been argued that, "Campaigns for policy change (by social movements) are generally needed when governments are divided from campaigners by differences in interest or ideology: the campaign can then be analysed as a process in which campaigners try to pressure or persuade political power-holders to revise their understanding of their interests.”

Social movements use institutionalised tactics (such as lobbying, litigation, demonstrations, strikes) to produce social change by influencing policy makers. Thus by taking action, social movements can influence public policy by bringing public and policymakers’ attention to their issues.

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Efforts to influence policymakers can produce political changes in a number of ways. For example movements may alter power relations between themselves and the policymakers. Movements may also directly force policy change. They may also influence “broader and more durable systemic changes, both on the structural and cultural levels”32.

Further, social movements emerge as part of a heightening sense of grievance around issues of identity and adverse social relationships33. This might occur because of political and economic changes that generate new reasons for grievance, or because of endogenous changes that lead social groups to become more aware of reasons to complain, and more articulate in framing and voicing such complaints34. In this regard social movements can promote alternative thinking. Social movements raise consciousness, provide civic education and promote the emergence of new charismatic and visionary leaders or the arrival of new support organisations (such as NGOs or religious organisations) that seek to change social order.

In the context of structural changes, social movements arise in circumstances of broad political crises such as depressions, wars and other periods when established interests are more likely to accommodate the claims of challenging groups. As such social movement actors are bound to respond to the economic and political shifts that may occur as they create opportunity for the movement to make contributions towards a new social order35.

Social movements can also be a response to changes in the state that are influenced by public policy. Meyer argues that government policy can influence the development of social movements36. He attributes this to the fact that policies can directly affect the permeability of the political arena by either creating opportunities or constraints that affect the attractiveness of social mobilisation. Such social mobilisation gives an indication of a community’s policy preferences against what the government offers. Social movements use the popularity of their arguments, or strength of their support, to “convince authorities to re-examine and possibly change their policy preferences37. This is because governments (mainly in democracies) seek to ensure that diverse voices are included in decision making.

In light of this, social movements can alter both the substance of policy as well as how policy is made. They can even compel governments to create new institutions, departments or agencies to facilitate certain policies.

As a result social movement action is often directed at governments. The increasing dominance of the nation-state in the era of advanced capitalism means that government plays an important role in the affairs of citizens. Government equally plays an

32. Ibid, p480.
37. Ibid, p.32.
important role in implementing reforms advocated by social movement actors. The importance of the government in implementing public policy promoted by social movements is confirmed by a plethora of works on the policy outcomes of social movements. The following narrative of TAC action also confirms the gigantic role of social movements in the public policy arena.

The HIV/AIDS Debate in South Africa

It is estimated that 12% or 6 million of the South African population is HIV-positive. The genesis of HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa seems to have been the most controversial of any country despite some quarters labelling the pandemic of “catastrophic proportions”. The development was plagued by government inaction, dissident science and conflict between politicians, HIV and AIDS organisations and scientists.

Initially the spread of the HIV/AIDS virus in the 1980s received little attention especially in the majority black population. This may be as a result of the fact that most of the population’s efforts were focused on the fight to transform South Africa into majority rule. It has also been argued that HIV/AIDS received little attention in the political domain because it was mired in many conspiracy and racial theories with the white minority regime viewing blacks as sexually irresponsible while blacks avoided being seen to be supporting this claim.

Following the country’s liberation in 1994, more accurate HIV/AIDS prevalence rates began to be made available. However controversy hindered adoption of a clear government HIV/AIDS policy. For a long time the controversy centre around the debate on whether poverty or HIV was the major cause of AIDS thereby immobilising public policy on HIV/AIDS. When President Thabo Mbeki took over leadership in 1999 controversy appeared to escalate. Some authorities posit that the country entered an era of HIV/AIDS denialism under his leadership. However Mbeki’s ideas on HIV/AIDS were criticised by the broader society.

The South African President had reservations about the scientific consensus around the relationship between HIV and Aids. He was more sympathetic to the view that doubted the link between HIV and AIDS. He propounded that HIV did not cause Aids, but that the link was promoted by those who felt the condition had to be treated

by drugs that were mainly manufactured by Western drug companies and that the 
drug companies promoted the view that HIV caused AIDS in order to create their own 
drug markets and continuous profits. Subsequently, he would confess that he did not 
know anyone who had died of AIDS and honestly confirmed that he did not know 
anyone who had HIV. As a result of this perspective, at some point he was also 
quoted as follows,

“He (Mbeki) says South Africans are being used as “guinea pigs” and conned into 
using dangerous drugs. He likens the use of drugs in the DA-controlled Western Cape 
to “biological warfare of the apartheid era.”

The DA-controlled Western Cape approved the administering of AZT to HIV/ 
AIDS patient in 2000 through its municipal health services infrastructure. Mbeki’s 
then Health Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma opposed the use of the AIDS drug 
AZT and argued that the government preferred to focus on prevention rather than 
treatment while all ANC run provinces rejected the use of AZT on the basis of cost 
despite the manufacturer cutting the price. AZT is an anti-HIV medication designed 
to reduce the amount of the HIV virus in the body by slowing down or preventing 
damage to the immune system thereby reducing the risk of developing AIDS-related 
illnesses.

Dlamini Zuma’s successor, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang promoted the use of un-
proven herbal remedies such as ubhejane, garlic, beetroot and lemon juice instead of 
HIV/AIDS medical drugs viewed as poisonous by the President. At the 16th Global 
AIDS Conference in Toronto, South Africa famously displayed garlic, lemons and 
beetroot as remedies for HIV/AIDS. The President made reference to a 2001 US 
guideline on the use of antiretroviral drugs which pointed out that the drugs were 
becoming as dangerous to alleged HIV/AIDS patients’ health as the disease that they 
were supposed to treat.

When critics condemned President Mbeki’s statement, his then spokesman, Parks 
Mankahlana argued that the position of the critics was not based on their anxiety to 
see the eradication of HIV/AIDS but by the likely effect of the President’s statement 
on the profitability of their HIV/AIDS treatment products. Pharmaceuticals produ-
cing HIV/AIDS drugs were viewed in the same light as the military industrial complex 
that propagated fear to increase their profits. They would therefore not have any in-

44. Address to African National Congress MPs at a caucus meeting in Parliament in Cape Town, Mail 
46. Forrest, D., “Behind The Smokescreen: The Record Reveals President Thabo Mbeki’s True Stance 
47. Sapa, ‘Stop us providing AZT and we will sue: Leon, accessed from http://www.news24.com/
49. Barber, Simon and Wyndham Hartley. “Mbeki Sparks a New AIDS Drug Row; President’s Strong 
interest in developing drugs that would wipe out the virus as this would put them out of business.

The indifference to HIV/AIDS displayed by the government militated against many HIV/AIDS mitigation programmes such as the administering of antiretroviral drugs to AIDS patients and the prevention of mother to child transmission for pregnant mothers. President Mbeki, questioned the utility of antiretroviral drugs such as nevirapine. Nevirapine is also an antiretroviral drug (ARV) for people with HIV infection but is also used to prevent transmission of HIV from pregnant women to their unborn babies.

Mbeki’s reservation with HIV/AIDS drugs such as AZT has been ascribed to his contacts with a range of so called “AIDS denialists” who believed that the drugs were toxic51. The level of the influence of these denialists (sometimes called dissidents) to Mbeki’s thinking can be seen in the composition of the Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel (just under half of the panel members were AIDS dissidents) that sought to establish evidence of viral aetiology of HIV, appropriate remedies and the authenticity of HIV testing. Mbeki strongly believed that it is not only HIV that could cause the immune system to collapse but a whole range of other issues including poverty and poor diet52. The report of the panel was eventually produced in 2001 with a lot of controversies dominated by the so called dissident view. This view tended to continue to influence government’s lack of urgency and HIV/AIDS policy.

It took unparalleled efforts of the TAC social movement to politicise the need for a comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy and to make it a salient issue for South Africans. From a high of 18.1% of HIV population infection in 2005 to 12% by 2014, these falling figures have partly been attributed to TAC, battling the ANC government over HIV/AIDS policy which impacted on the response to the epidemic53.

The Case of Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)

The TAC was established in 1998 with an agenda to ensure that people living with HIV in South Africa got access to safe and effective treatment and antiretroviral drugs. At the time of its formation, drugs were already available and widely used in developed countries but in South Africa these were limited and antiretroviral treatment was so expensive that only a few and the rich could afford it. TAC structure is explained on its website54. It is a membership based movement characterised by a National Council that meets four times per year. It also has a smaller group - the National Office Bearers responsible for day-to-day political decision making in the organisation. The National Council and National Office Bearers are political structures supported by an executive

52. Sharon Kay Jenkins, Aids Education and Prevention, (AuthorHouse: Bloomington, 2009).
committee which is an operational structure that oversees the day-to-day management together with a regular staff complement. To ensure proper governance and financial accountability, TAC also has an independent Board of Directors. Through utilisation of an array of social movement tactics over the years, commentators have argued that TAC is one of the most outstanding social movements active on AIDS in the developing world.

As highlighted earlier, social movements achieve their objectives by combining organisation with relevant tactics, such as disruptive protests, persuasive protests or institutional means to influence public policy. The TAC used a combination of strategies drawn from the anti-apartheid struggle, as well as strategies adapted to the new post-apartheid context. These included street action, education (including pamphlets spelling out scientific arguments), lobbying, alliance building and litigation. It was launched on December 10, 1998, International Human Rights Day with an objective to respond directly to HIV/AIDS policy gap, South Africa’s most significant health challenge at the time. TAC uniquely positioned itself as a grassroots and racially representative AIDS organisation. Further to this, TAC attracted people who perceive social action as an effective mechanism for securing state concession in the promulgation of people oriented public policies.

For TAC, an elaborate HIV/AIDS policy would facilitate “access to affordable and quality treatment for people with HIV/AIDS; prevent and eliminate new HIV infections and improve the affordability and quality of health-care access for all as well as a unified health system with sufficient human and financial resources”\(^{55}\). It campaigned against government inertia and pharmaceuticals that challenged the importation of cheaper generic drugs.

In 2001, when pharmaceutical companies took court action against the state legislation allowing the importation of cheaper generic drugs, TAC intervened on behalf of people living with HIV and AIDS to block the courts from handing down judgment in favour of the pharmaceutical giants. It also engaged in public demonstrations that were meant to publicly embarrass the companies for infringing on social justice, the human right and right to life of the HIV/AIDS patients\(^{56}\).

Appealing to human rights and social justice issues amounted to framing the HIV/AIDS policy argument through appealing to the ‘moral high ground’. Pharmaceuticals and government were forced to show that they were not greedy and aggressive to place profits ahead of life. TAC secured strategic international allies to pressure multinational pharmaceutical companies with head offices abroad. These companies feared to be portrayed as irresponsible or unsympathetic to the poor.

Further, on moral grounds, the leader of TAC himself, Zackie Achmat, who was living with HIV, refused to take antiretroviral drugs until the drugs were made available


to all South Africans. Through these actions, TAC forced some of the world’s most powerful pharmaceutical companies to abandon their court case. Intensive public scrutiny following TAC campaigns also eventually forced drug companies to lower the price of ARVs in South Africa and poor countries.

When TAC secured this victory, its next target was to force the government to dispense ARVs at public health facilities. Initially the government rejected the “rollout” of ARVs as it favoured lengthy pilot programmes to test them, in particular as the President (Mbeki) denied the efficacy of ARVs, labelled them toxic and denied the link between HIV and AIDS itself. In alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions TAC mobilised campaigns to force the government to rollout ARVs, including approaching the Courts. TAC also approached opinion leaders (such as Nelson Mandela), as well as police officers, the media, business leaders, the Catholic Church (despite sharp differences over condom use), professionals (such as lawyers and medical specialists), SA Council of Churches, SA NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), the Medical Research Council and allies within government to influence changes in HIV/AIDS policy.

TAC in alliance with other social movements carried out demonstrations and approached the courts to force the government to provide free PMTCT programmes in order to reduce MTCT of HIV. TAC argued that government had a constitutional obligation to do so. In its 2002 ruling, the constitutional court observed that government’s failure to provide a comprehensive programme to prevent MTCT of HIV was unreasonable and unconstitutional. The constitutional court ordered the government to supply nevirapine to prevent transmission of the virus by mothers to newly born children. By 2003, thousands of TAC members had embarked on numerous demonstrations including a march on the South African Parliament protesting against low scale roll-out of Navirapine to pregnant mothers despite the order by the High Court. Subsequently government scaled up this programme.

Pursuant to this victory TAC campaigned for a full rollout of ARVs to all people who needed them. Due to government sluggishness TAC turned to civil disobedience to pressure the government to adopt the comprehensive programme. TAC campaigns in this regard included “demonstrations, invasions of police stations and government buildings, disruptions of speeches by politicians and laying charges against the Ministers of Health and Trade and Industry respectively.” TAC’s international allies also ensured international pressure against government policy on ARVs. Many cam-


paigned at SA embassies and conducted workshops and conferences\(^{61}\). After months of protests, the South African Cabinet gave in to the distribution of ARVs to people living with HIV/AIDS rather than purely to expecting mothers\(^{62}\). At the beginning of 2005, at least one service point for AIDS-related care and treatment in each of the country’s districts had been established. Subsequently, this campaign by TAC helped secure a universal government-provided AIDS treatment programme, which is possibly the world’s largest at the moment\(^{63}\).

TAC popularised the salience of the HIV/AIDS issue to the extent that government was prompted into adopting a National Strategic Plan on HIV, STIs and Tuberculosis by 2007 (2007-2011). For this and other achievements, TAC was identified as one of the world’s most effective Aids groups and the smartest activist group world-wide\(^{64}\).

In the last three years, the TAC has been fighting for the amendment of South Africa’s Patent Laws rooted in the need to give the poor access to vital medicines including lifesaving HIV drugs and it hopes that this campaign can help remove unnecessary and superfluous barriers to generic competition\(^{65}\). Among other activities, TAC mobilised over 130 organisations and experts globally to demand Patent Law reforms in South Africa\(^{66}\). It also fought an alleged $450,000 campaign by the international pharmaceutical industry to block the Patent Law reforms\(^{67}\).

TAC sees fair patent laws as striking a balance between the profit making interests of pharmaceuticals and a constitutionally guaranteed right to health for South Africans. TAC notes that “The reforms we are campaigning for are all fully in line with World Trade Organisation rules and have already been implemented in other developing countries like India, Argentina and Brazil”\(^{68}\). TAC calls in this regard are also consistent with South Africa’s international obligations under the TRIPS agreement read with the 2001 Doha Declaration on Public Health.

Pursuant to TAC advocacy around the issue of the Patent Laws, SA’s Department of Trade and Industry published a Draft National Intellectual Property policy in September 2013. The draft policy incorporated many of the changes that TAC envisages in ideal Patent Laws that can improve access to drugs. TAC hopes to pressure the

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\(^{64}\) Ibid


\(^{67}\) Phillip De Wet, ‘Motsoaledi: Big pharma’s ‘satanic’ plot is genocide’ Mail and Guardian, 17 January 2014.

\(^{68}\) Ibid
Department to finalise the policy as well as the attendant new bills that would be signed into law.

Therefore, today the TAC continues to represent HIV/AIDS users of the public healthcare system in South Africa by calling for elaborate and clear HIV/AIDS and drug policies, and to campaign and litigate on critical issues related to the quality of and access to healthcare. As a result of its efforts, South Africa now has one of the world’s largest AIDS treatment programmes. As of 2014, approximately 2.4 million people were on antiretroviral therapy.

Through fighting for an elaborate HIV/AIDS policy, TAC has not only helped HIV/AIDS patients to have access to life saving drugs in South Africa but has also helped to reduce the stigma around HIV/AIDS. It has also helped South Africans to claim their inalienable constitutional rights to public health. TAC has also been making efforts to adopt a Pan-African network of AIDS treatment activists that not only engages their respective countries but the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the African Union. This means that gains made around HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa can be replicated around the continent.

However, the effectiveness of the TAC has sometimes been questioned. Available statistics show that the majority (sometimes up to 70%) of TAC membership have been women and its reach towards men has been limited. There is a need for TAC to develop more innovative means of attracting more men to participate in HIV and AIDS programming. Another argument often posed is that TAC is mainly a single issue based movement while the challenges facing people infected or affected by HIV and AIDS are multifaceted in the South African society and closely related to the rapid spread of HIV and AIDS. TAC would therefore be more effective if it starts focusing on broader issues of governance. TAC has of late been bedevilled by financial changes due to reduced support from donors such as the Global Fund to Fight Aids which is likely to scamper further progress in its activities. For the 2015/2016 financial year TAC has a budget of R35 million (approximately US$3.5 million) but only a fraction of that has been secured.

Conclusion

This study contributed to an understanding of the influence of social movements on public policy using the case of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa. Though Social movements are often viewed as strangers in the policy arena, they can contribute towards public policy outcomes in a variety of ways. The TAC carried out a series of campaigns to force the government to adopt an elaborate HIV/AIDS policy.

71. Ibid
These campaigns included demonstrations, education and litigation. Among its victories towards securing a comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa, TAC forced the government to adopt the MTCT programme, an expansive ARV programme for all HIV/AIDS positive individuals and the re-interpretation of constitutional health rights and drug Patent Laws. TAC gains are however likely to be affected by reduced donor support and its failure to raise sufficient funds for its 2015/16 financial period. TAC also needs to consider integrating other governance issues into its programming in order to have more impact as HIV and AIDS issues are intertwined with other challenges in the broad South African Society.
Foot Soldiers and Diamond Mining: Securitisation, Conflict and Negotiation with Artisanal Miners in Chiadzwa Diamond Field in Eastern Zimbabwe

Godfrey Maringira

Abstract

Dominant discourses present the deployment of Zimbabwean soldiers in the Chiadzwa diamond fields as evidence of absolute control of state natural resources by state security. This paper argues instead that both soldiers and artisanal miners-illegal miners, popularly known as Makorokoza or Magweja, employed their tactics’ to negotiate and co-opt each other into illegal mining and selling of diamond in a context of economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe between 2006 and 2009. Findings reveal that, even though soldiers and Makorokoza engaged in relationship involving illegal mining, both groups continue to view themselves as distinct from each other. The paper draws from 16 stories of former soldiers and 13 Makorokoza in Zimbabwe. The former soldiers interviewed for this study had been deployed to protect Chiadzwa diamond fields from Makorokoza between 2006 and 2009.

Key words: Soldiers, diamond, mining, artisanal Zimbabwe

The discovery of diamonds in Chiadzwa, in the eastern part of Zimbabwe in 2006, led to arush to artisanal mining and increased extraction of alluvial diamond. The ‘scramble’ for diamond mining involved a wide range of actors including the state, private sector and artisanal miners, known as Magweja or Makorokoza, who operate in syndicates. The state labelled Magweja as an illegal group in the mining of diamond. As a result of illegal mining operations by Magweja the state deployed soldiers to protect diamond fields. The government deployed more than a battalion of soldiers to ensure that diamond mining was under the state’s control, auspices and accountability. However, little attention has been paid to the different ways in which both the soldiers and Magweja developed social and economic relations in illegal diamond mining.

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In this paper I will reveal that at a time of deployment, soldiers of the Zimbabwe National Army, like the Makorokoza were struggling to feed and clothe due to low salaries and poor working conditions. Thus operating under such conditions necessitated the forging of soldier-Makorokoza relationship in a diamond mining field. In this paper I argue that, while more than a battalion of soldiers were deployed to securitise the diamond fields, their presence actually, and contrastingly, contributed to and strengthened Magweja illegal mining activities in Chiadzwa diamond field. However, the social and economic relationship established between soldiers and Makorokoza were temporal and unstable as both continued to view each other as ‘living a different way of life’. The paper draws from stories of 16 former soldiers who were once deployed in the diamond field. In order to triangulate these stories, the paper also draws from 13 stories of Magweja in Zimbabwe. Below I reveal the background to the Zimbabwean political crisis between 2000 and 2009. I will then present overview information on artisanal miners and this will be followed by the ways in which I accessed my participants. Finally I present the findings from the interviews selected for this paper.

Zimbabwe in Crisis: 2000-2009

Following a politicised land reform process in post-independence Zimbabwe in 2000, the political and economic situation in the country deteriorated for a decade. Scholars have described the Zimbabwean situation (at the time) as a ‘multiple crisis’ exacerbated by internal state-sponsored political violence. This violence became known as jambanja to refer to chaos, disorder and a general loss of political morality, as brutality grew against opposition party supporters. Muzondidya notes that the ZANU (PF) party, led by President Robert Mugabe, deployed its militant youth to shore up...
support during elections and marshaled state resources and institutions such as the army and the police to ensure electoral obedience and success. My study participants became perpetrators and victims of jambanja. Soldiers were politically deployed to threaten and commit violence against civilians (defined as members of the opposition political party) and against perceived enemies of the State, including white farmers. This created acrimony and a social distance between soldiers and a large part of the civilian population. All soldiers were viewed as oppressors, like the ZANU PF, especially as a result of the violence committed by soldiers during these operations.

The Zimbabwean army remained politicized in the post-2000 crisis and continued to publicly support Mugabe. This phenomenon, which began in 1980, has been described as the ‘ politicisation of the military’ in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Politics centered on Mugabe and every political action was undertaken in support of his regime. This is what Ranger called ‘Mugabe-ism’. Thus, in Zimbabwe, soldiers were, and still are, perceived as anti-democratic beneficiaries of Robert Mugabe’s patron-client relationship, a perception reinforced by the involvement of the army in political violence.

Soldiers were internally deployed in rural and urban areas, for instance during the land reform programme and during election periods, as well as during Operation Murambatsvina (‘Clean the filth in all cities’) in 2005. At the time, amidst the political and economic crisis from 2000 onwards, a large number of soldiers were deployed around the country to ensure the implementation and success of different government political actions, forcing people to chant and celebrate President Robert Mugabe’s slogans and songs, harassing and flogging civilians. This was done to en-

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10. In June 2011, Brigadier General Nyikayaramba said; “Daydreamers who want to reverse the gains of our liberation struggle will continue daydreaming. They can go to hell . . . they will never rule this country.” He declared that he would not serve under the leadership of anyone who did not have liberation war credentials and that security forces would do anything to make sure President Mugabe remained in power until they felt the “threat” was over. He was referring to Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, the president of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition political party http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/news/tsvangirai-warns-brigadier-general-douglas-nyikayaramba/Accessed on 10 February 2015.
12. J, Alexander, ibid; A, Hammar, ibid
sure a solid bloc of votes for President Mugabe against his opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai.

According to Raftopoulos\textsuperscript{13} most of the political violence against civilians was directed by the Joint Operation Command (JOC) of the armed forces. Ndlovu-Gatsheni\textsuperscript{14} argues that, since Zimbabwean independence in 1980, Mugabe has never been tolerant and Ranger\textsuperscript{15} furthermore emphasis that Mugabe shifted from ‘nationalist historiography’, which advocated a welfare agenda and reconstruction, to ‘patriotic history’, which divided the nation into black and white ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’. Elections were approached by ZANU-PF as ‘battles’ and political opponents were viewed as enemies to be annihilated rather than as political competitors.\textsuperscript{16}

In the post-2000 crisis, the continuing political violence and economic decline of the country also profoundly affected soldiers in the barracks.\textsuperscript{17} Many became frustrated and, with rampant inflation, their salaries could not meet their basic needs. In some cases their monthly salaries were insufficient to enable them to subsist. The return of Zimbabwean soldiers from the DRC-war\textsuperscript{18} in 2002 coincided with the political and economic meltdown of Zimbabwe. The market was considered to be kупенга (mad: ChiShona).\textsuperscript{19}

Subsequently, the economic crisis deepened, with unprecedented levels of hyper-inflation. Jones\textsuperscript{20} described the Zimbabwe’s economy at the time as kukiya-kiya, which points to an indescribable scenario where normal strategies of life were rendered useless. People resorted to illegal activities to survive. According to Hanke\textsuperscript{21}, by November 2008, the annual hyper-inflation index rate in Zimbabwe was close to ninety sextillion percent (sextillion: 1 followed by 21 zeros). There were virtually no cash transactions taking place and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange had stopped trading. President Robert Mugabe tried to control inflation by using what Tendai Biti, the former Minister of Finance\textsuperscript{22}, called ginyanomics - the controlling of inflation by arresting industry and

\textsuperscript{13} B, Raftopoulos, 2009, ibid
\textsuperscript{14} S, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, ibid
\textsuperscript{15} T, Ranger, 2004, ibid
\textsuperscript{16} J, Muzondidya, 2009, ibid
\textsuperscript{17} Soldiers played and occupied double roles, as unquestioning tools of oppression, and also silent victims who had to be whipped into line so they would not undermine ZANU PF.
\textsuperscript{18} The Democratic Republic of Congo war started in 1998. The war was a result of the rebel forces who wanted to overthrow the legitimate government of Laurent Kabila. The rebels were supported by Rwanda and Uganda while the DRC government was supported by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia.
\textsuperscript{19} J, Jones (2010b) Freeze! movement, narrative and the disciplining of price in hyperinflationary Zimbabwe, Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies, 36, 2: 338-351.
\textsuperscript{22} Tendai Biti became the Minister of Finance at the inception of the Zimbabwe Unity government in 2009. In late 2014 he led a factional group from the mainstream MDC-T to form what he called MDC Renewal Team advocating for leadership renewal and in particular to the dismissal of Morgan Tsvangirai. However, he was recently dismissed from parliament with his 21 Members of Parliament.
commerce leaders and imposing price-control monitors on shops. When presenting the 2013 national budget, Biti emphasised that the economy had become *feja-feja* (a game of dice). In his view the Zimbabwe economy had become a ‘vendor’s economy’, in which almost every citizen is informally selling something in order to survive. The actors in the Zimbabwean economy were using random and at times criminal strategies, most of which fell outside what was ‘normal’, in a collapsing economy.

Jones observed that by February 2009, immediately before the Zimbabwean dollar was replaced by the US dollar, an egg cost two trillion Zimbabwean dollars. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe had printed a hundred trillion (Zim-dollar) note and, along with ordinary civilian Zimbabweans, the soldiers faced financial disaster when the Zimbabwean dollar collapsed. The continuing economic crisis destroyed the livelihoods of soldiers and other civil servants; their monthly salary was at the time equivalent to US$10.00. Faced with such economic difficulties, soldiers were deployed in the newly discovered diamond areas such as Chidzwa. They were supposed to secure the diamonds and to prevent illegal mining. Interestingly, soldiers were co-opted by Makorokoza into illegal mining who were the very people whom they seek to eliminate from the diamond field.

### Accessing the Field

Stories in this paper were collected in Zimbabwe over a period of three years during my visits between 2009 and 2012. My interest was driven by informal conversations with my compatriots in the Zimbabwean National Army, who had been deployed in diamond fields to provide the much needed security against Magweja operating in Chidzwa area. Over time I became more aware of and interested in exploring the different ways in they were co-opted into illegal mining and dealings in a diamond field of Chidzwa district. I therefore interviewed 16 former soldiers and 13 Magweja. While it was somehow doable to interview former soldiers because of the past soldierly life which we shared, it was difficult to access the stories of Magweja considering their illegal practices in Chidzwa diamond area. The difficulties of doing research among Magweja was compounded by the fact that, generally in Zimbabwe people who try to do research are perceived as ‘spies’ because of the kind of questions they ask participants. I however, assured them that, despite the nature of the questions which I asked them, this was an academic study which had nothing to do with ‘spying’ work. Thus through snowballing, I hanged-out and interviewed Magweja in their home spaces. While I took notes immediately after our conversations, I recorded some of the stories upon consent from the participants. Throughout this paper I use pseudonyms in presenting both Makorokoza and former soldiers’ stories. In order to give a broader view of issues explored in this paper, I first conceptualise ‘artisanal miners’ in order to place my discussion in a broader context. I then narrow down my presentation by

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24. http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-9571. ‘We are running a ‘feja-feja’ economy’We%E2%80%99re+running+a+%E2%80%98feja+economy%27+Biti/news.aspx

25. Jeremy Jones, 2010a, ibid
conceptualising Magweja or Makorokoza, a concept used in the Zimbabwean context to refer to the practices of ‘artisinal miners’.

**Artisanal Miners: A broader View**

The concept of artisanal miners is very difficult to grasp partly because of the context of operations which helps to define it. Artisanal mining is highly associated with marginalisation and illegality.\(^{26}\) In some situations artisanal miners are defined on the basis of their production, i.e. ‘small-scale-miners or the type of minerals exploited’. In Brazil, artisanal miners are known as *garimpeiros*.\(^{27}\) The term originated from gold panners who survived from working on river gravel and gold ores. *Garimpo* is the worksite, *garimpagem* is the mining activity conducted by *garimpeiros*. Even though the terms are still used in Brazil, they are derogatory.

In Ghana, artisanal miners are known as *galamsey*.\(^{28}\) In some countries artisanal miners operations are regulated by law while in others they are considered as illegal. In northern Benin the government criminalised artisanal miners’ operations by deploying soldiers to force, expel and confiscate their mining equipment’s.\(^{29}\) In Ghana the government also deployed the army to evict sprouting *galamsey* from illegal mining sites, forcing them to register their mining claims.\(^{30}\) Veiga et al.\(^{31}\) notes that ‘artisanal miner’ is a concept applied to individuals who pan for gold and or other minerals alongside riverbanks. Artisanal mining may also involve a one-man operation or may involve different people working together organised under the sharing contract.\(^{32}\) Muwowa\(^{33}\) reveals that artisanal miners work in syndicates which are either temporary or permanent. The latter arise in situations where there is need to help each other in navigating the diamond terrain, hiding and informing each other about police and soldiers movements within the mining field. For Gunson and Jian\(^{34}\) artisanal mining includes legal and illegal miners who use rudimentary processes to extract...
minerals from river banks. But how do artisanal miners identify mineral deposits along river banks? In their finding in Amazon, Brazil, Veiga and Hinton note that artisanal miners employ instinct and intuition to identify and extract mineral deposits. While the definition of artisanal mining provides a framework to understand it in theory, it is very narrow in giving a vivid picture of the practice of artisanal miners. This paper captures the world view of both ‘artisanal miners’ and soldiers situated in precarious conditions.

While the statistics of artisanal miners are by far not reliable, existing reports indicates that there are 10 to 15 million artisanal miners around the world. Gunson and Jian reveal that China alone has up to six million artisanal miners, half of the world’s artisanal miners. In Tanzania and Zimbabwe there are an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 artisanal miners. The statistic is similar to other West African countries such Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mali. However, official statistics have already been surpassed by the current economic conditions in Africa, and other developing countries. Below I conceptualise Magweja, a local term instituted on artisanal miners in Zimbabwe.

**Conceptualising Magweja: Contextual Practices**

In the context of economic crisis (2000-2009), in Zimbabwe, when the unemployment rate was very high, the general populace employed ‘unruly’ practices, actions and behaviour in order to make ends meet: one was to engage in illegal artisanal mining which can be translated as Kukorokoza. It was within this context that young men and women entered restricted diamond areas. In the Zimbabwean context, artisanal miners have been popularly and locally referred to as Magweja or Makorokoza which refers to illegal miners’ practices. It is a derogatory term, which depicts arrogance, filthy and uneducated. Gweja simply means someone who uses force when seeking ways to survive. It also means a person who has the ability to con others in order to pave way for him/her. Thus what Makorokoza do (in and outside the mining field), how they manoeuvre the landscapes of mining, and the ways in which they mine, defines them as Makorokoza. In practice, Makorokoza can be applied and enacted even outside the field/practices of illegal mining activities. The ways in which Makorokoza live: what they use their money drawn from gold sales is absolutely wayward in the sense that their money buys consumptive goods and services such as alcohol, smoking cigarettes, and prostitution. The word Makorokoza therefore means a lot of practices including an inability to plan a good future based on assets such as houses, cars etc. Scholars such

37. Veiga et al., Ibid
as Werthmann\textsuperscript{40}, found that in Burkina Faso such money drawn from gold digging was defined as 'bitter money', i.e. money not buying any meaningful asserts. This is closely related to Korokoza (singular) and Makorokoza (plural) which refer to practices and actions employed by a person seeking pathways to survive, in particular in a situation of economic crisis. In illegal mining, Makorokoza, are the very people who work along rivers as well as mountain slopes using elementary tools, such as chisel, sluices, shovels, picks, sledge hammers, pans and domestic dishes to extract alluvial diamond deposits.\textsuperscript{41} Makorokoza develop systems of labour organisations in which small groups of between six and eight illegal miners organise themselves into hierarchies of power. Some groups had leaders, usually connected with big/influential politicians in the country. Members of such groups would then pay 'membership fee' to their leader who connives with politicians and later on with soldiers to illegally mine. Such small groups are known as 'syndicates'. They have their social networks built around Kukorokoza (illegal mining). Makorokoza devise their own modes of disputes settlement without necessarily appealing to official institutions. The syndicates have leaders, who determine when and how to manoeuvre diamond terrains manned by soldiers, police and central intelligence officers. In such syndicates, leaders are responsible to their members' actions and practises and members are accountable to their leaders. The practice of 'syndicates' in illegal mining situations is also very common in Burkina Faso, West Africa gold mining areas, where Werthmann\textsuperscript{42} found that there were 'Big Man' who led such networks. The 'Big Man' as observed by Werthmann\textsuperscript{43}, amasses wealth and privileges from followers.

Below I reveal the narratives of both soldiers and Makorokoza, presenting and analysing how and why they had to negotiate and co-opt each other in securitized area of Chiadzwa diamond area.

**Soldiers as Illegal Miners**

The discovery of diamond in Chiadzwa in 2006 coincided with a political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe. Richard Saunders\textsuperscript{44} emphasised that the discovery of easily accessible surface diamonds that could be extracted through non-mechanised mining (including hand-digging and panning) presented opportunities for individual illegal miners. This scenario created a rush for diamonds with media reports presenting that Makorokoza had literally taken control of Chiadzwa diamond field. The government

\begin{footnotes}
\item[41] This involves illegal miners in gold panning working both individually and collectively.
\item[43] Katja Werthmann, ibid
\end{footnotes}
responded by deploying a battalion of soldiers under Operation ChikorokozaChapera (End to illegal mining) and Operation Hakudzokwi (No return) and Operation DzokeraKumusha (Go Back Home).

Saunders notes that more than 22,000 Makorokoza were arrested countrywide in gold panning areas with 9000 or more in Chiadzwa diamond field. The police who were deployed were allegedly working with illegal miners in the securitised zones: by enabling Makorokoza access through bribes and even digging for themselves.

Makorokoza ’syndicates’ made of Makorokoza with soldiers leading were very prominent and popular in Chiadzwa diamond field which Saunders refers to as ‘criminalised networks of accumulation’.

When soldiers are deployed, what is expected of them is to maintain order in a disciplined manner, but the ways in which Zimbabwean soldiers were co-opted and transformed into illegal miners, can be summed by what Saunders called ‘corruption and concealment’. This means that soldiers’ involvement in diamond extraction and illicit dealings were made possible by their presence as ‘guards’ to securitize the diamond area. Their military uniforms became a resource to be involved in Makorokoza practices without being caught in such dealings. One of the former soldiers, named Amon Harurwa revealed how the government itself made him engage in illegal mining:

Initially we were deployed with enough food. The Zimbabwe National Army was taking care of us but as time goes on, we were made to survive on our own. This was difficult for us, so the military itself pushed us to fend for our self, to connive with Magweja.

The de-professionalization of the Zimbabwe National Army “pushing soldiers to fend for themselves” in a context of crisis contributed to the ways in which soldiers acted: “conniving” with Magweja to make ends meet in situations where soldiers were neglected by their State employer. However, ‘conniving’ with Magweja did not happen overnight. Initially soldiers harassed Makorokoza - even beating them with their rifle butts. This was emphasised by Adrian Nduna:

When I was deployed I had no friendship with a Gweja because they are POVO, they are civilians who must be beaten to align themselves with the law. But as we remained in deployment, we were made to be friends.

The language of being ‘made’ was very central in the narratives of the majority of former soldiers deployed in the diamond field and interviewed for this paper. For these former soldiers, while they were determined to be professional, the economic crisis, being neglected in terms of care for food and inadequate salaries ‘made’ them

46. See Richard Saunders, ibid, pp.6
47. Saunders, ibid
48. TinasheNyamunda& Patience Mukwambo, ibid
49. Richard Saunders, ibid
50. POVO simply means the general masses, civilians, those with no military background (who have not been trained as soldiers).
to realise that they could survive through illegal means alongside *Makorokoza*. This view is revealed by Lungile Boza, a former soldier who notes that,

> I had no choice, I had to survive and the only way to live, me and my family was for me to make money though *Makorokoza*. In fact I myself became a *Korokoza*. I had to allow *Makorokoza* to extract diamond and then we would share, or they would go and sell it and we share the money. It was a complete deal for survival.

The excerpt reveals how soldiers engaged in what they called “deals for survival”, in a diamond field. They justified their criminal practices by revealing reasons why as soldiers were involved in diamond ‘deals’. Soldiers blamed the Zimbabwe National Army for lack of a ‘good living’ which they expected as professional military men. Apart from that, part of the justification was the very fact that senior officers: Generals, Brigadiers, Colonels and Commanding Officers were also involved in diamond deals in Chiadzwa. Hence junior foot soldiers saw it fit to follow suit. As Tindo Mabwe, a former soldier states,

> When we were deployed in Chiadzwa diamond area, we could be ordered that: ‘don’t search those trucks because they are for senior officers’. Not only that, but in many situation there could be a syndicate of *Makorokoza* coming, and our commanders on the ground will tell us these *Magweja* are coming from senior officer so and so. So it was from that idea where I learnt that I can have my own syndicate of *Makorokoza* to mine.

The narrative reveals how senior officers were deeply involved in diamond mining, but interestingly how junior foot soldiers learnt illicit diamond dealings from their superiors. Saunders notes that Chiadzwa diamonds nurtured the foundations of parallel axes of power especially in situations where soldiers, the police and central intelligence organisation all engaged in illegal diamond extraction. Thus from the excerpt above, while soldiers took orders from their senior officers, they themselves engaged in their own activities to illegally extract diamond for personal gain.

What the narratives are telling us is that, soldiers expanded structures already existing in Chiadzwa. Thus the production of syndicates of *Makorokoza*, testifies how the illegal mining practices were fractured but somehow coordinated in illegal manner. One of the former soldiers reveals that working with *Magweja* was normal for their survival.

> I did not invent this relationship of dealing with *Makorokoza* in syndicates, but I just followed what was there because politicians themselves had syndicates when we got deployed.

However, Jeremy Bantu, a former soldier emphasises that, the relationship with *Makorokoza* was one characterised by power relations which manifested in soldiers

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flogging, harassing and punishing Magwejas who had been caught illegally mining diamonds.

In the military, for you to work together as soldiers, one has to be punished, harassed and beaten during military training. This is what we did to these civilians (Makorokoza). We beat them so that they can understand us, so that they can work with us. We instil fear in them and this helped us and them at last.

The use of violence was twofold: to punish Makorokoza and to create a relationship in a mining field. Soldiers employed military tactics of systematic soldiering in the context of illegal mining, i.e co-opting Makorokoza through violence. Violence was meant to build mutual understanding about illegal mining and trade in diamond ‘deals’. For Makorokoza to understand soldiers’ way of operation, i.e. through discipline and punishment as envisaged in military training, they had to succumb to solderly ways of ‘knowing soldiers ways of operating. So in some ways this was a ‘militarisation of social relations’ configured through military practices in a diamond field. So what happened was that, while soldiers ’made’ Makorokoza to work with them, in a way Makorokoza also ‘made’ soldiers into illegal miners. This was explored by one of the Makorokoz as, Nobert Munda who states that:

When I was caught by soldiers with 1kg of diamond, they beat me up. They made me to roll and craw on the ground. I did not understand why they were harassing me, instead of taking me to the police.

Another Korokoza, Methias Mhandu, reveals this form of violence by soldiers,

When I tried to sneak into the diamond field, I heard a strong voice: Hands, up, who goes there? I did not understand what this soldier was saying. I kept quiet, but he came close to me and pushed me using the butt of his gun. I was forced to lie down, and he ordered me to sleep on the ground, and he stepped on my buttocks.

Similarly, James Mazenga, a Korokoza mentioned this violence perpetrated to them by soldiers in Chiadzwa said,

I came face to face with soldiers. They were six. They took me to their military base. I was ordered to walk like a duck. Another soldiers told me to move and hiss like a snake. They asked me to sing the national anthem in both Ndebele and Shona. I was later released.

Anthony Ndemera, a Gweja notes that, ‘were there are too many soldiers and police officers, there is money, so we had to find ways to work with them. Such an assertion was shared by the majority of Makorokoza interviewed for this study. But the question was, in what ways and in what capacity would Magweja work with men in combat uniform. Responding to this, Foxes Mbandaka reveals that,

It’s easy to work with soldiers. We would just propose to them that, ‘let’s share rather than confiscating and take it to the state. Both of us will lose.
The language of ‘sharing’ the proceeds of diamond, mediated the relationship forged in Chiadzwa diamond area between soldiers and Makorokoza. In addition, Kelvin Mambure, a Korokoza asserts that, “soldiers only beat you up at first but once they beat you, they will not arrest you. They (soldiers) will work with you”. The question is whether such relationship between soldiers and Makorokoza is possible to maintain beyond diamond ‘deals’. A social analysis of such relations is that such relations were temporal. They were ‘diamond’ relations characterised by ‘fictitious’ and material issues and practices which were timely and contextual.

Friendship is not Comradeship

In emphasising the idea of ‘fictitious’ and temporary relations which existed between soldiers and Magweja, one former soldier, Victor Ndiweni maintains that soldiers will not be friends with civilians. He said,

We don’t have friends in the military, but comrades. So I might work with civilians but they are not my comrades.

The excerpt reveals the difficulties of maintaining a soldier-civilian relationship beyond “diamond deals” or Kukorokoza. Unlike friendship, comradeship is characterised by the soldiers’ military past in war and in the barracks and is continued in their present lives. According to Hynes,


54. Hynes, L.S., ibid, p.9
The excerpt indicates that comradeship does not come about as friendship does; it is rather ‘instilled’ through military practices. This is contrary to civilian life which does not force its members to work together for a collective goal. The need to be able to completely rely on each other becomes a potential life-saving reality during armed combat and is continuously sustained and reinforced in later life. Thus under strenuous circumstances soldiers have no choice but to depend on one another in order to survive as part of soldiering in combat and in later life. In this regard the military, in sharp contrast to civilian life, places great emphasis on the active establishment of a high degree of social solidarity. The resultant camaraderie constitutes ‘team work’ and tends to be preserved in post-combat life. Harris, notes that in many circumstances long-term allegiances develop, networks and forms of comradeship are established, where ex-combatants work together to support each other in navigating civilian worlds. For my participants, adrift in post-combat life, comradeship ‘becomes the focus of their love and loyalty.’

Makororokoza shared similar views with these former soldiers who were deployed in Chiadzwa diamond area. Marxwell Chomupande reiterates that,

I only liked to get into diamond deals with soldiers in Chiadzwa but not to make them my friends for my entire life. No! A soldier is a soldier and I have my own way of living.

The distinction between soldiers and civilians/Magweja (in this case) is drawn from ‘the way of living.’ This includes the ways in which soldiers think, talk and perceive others. Following this, I argue that, the relationship between soldiers and Makorokoza was one based and mediated by fear and violence. While for soldiers, enacting violence (beating, hazing, and punishment) on Makorokoza was viewed as a social and economic resource, making Magweja to understand soldiers, such relations remained temporal.

Conclusion

The paper highlighted how and why soldiers and Makorokoza were able to engage in illegal diamond mining in Chiadzwa. The ability of Makorokoza to work together with soldiers was partly because of the State’s inability to fulfil its obligations concerning soldiers’ salaries, clothing and food. However, on the other hand, soldiers’ own capacities to act, and employ a configuration of military practices (beating, hazing, punishing and disciplining) to intimidate Makorokoza contributed in forging these illegal mining relations. In addition, the fragmentation of state actors in legal diamond mining opened gaps for soldiers to form their own syndicates in illegal diamond mining.

57. Hynes, L.S., ibid, p.9
The focus on former soldiers’ ways of negotiating in the diamond field with Magweja, and how Makorokoza respond is illuminating at both academic and policy level debates. It follows that, policy has to understand the dynamics of Magweja world view, how they negotiate with state security actors. Thus negotiations through violence are worrisome in public discourse. It is therefore imperative for policy to regulate the activities of Magweja, and importantly to legalise their skills and help them hold mining claims which are accountable to the state.
Environmental Resource Governance and Conflict in Western Zambia

Jacob Mwitwa¹, Lumbiwe Mwana and Ignatius Mukunto

Abstract

The backdrop of this article is the conflict in western Zambia (formerly known as Barotseland) over issues of economic development and self-governance. This document analysis and subsequent inferences are based on the violence that occurred in western Zambia as well as the contents of the pre-independence Barotseland Agreement of 16 April 1964 signed between the then local political leaders, traditional leaders and the British Colonial Office, which has partly been blamed for the violent conflict that resulted in the loss of human life in 2011 in western Zambia. The conflict between the state and “agitated” of Barotseland has been overshadowed by national party politics and systemic structural problems inherent in not only western Zambia but the country’s social system which is both enabling and constraining.

Introduction

Conflicts have been an inherent aspect of human existence as a conflict per se cannot be negative unless it is violent. In fact, Lederach postulates that conflict actually drives social change hence it has a vital role to play in society as long as it is driven towards a constructive position as opposed to the destructive aspect of a violent and futile conflict.² In the simplest of terms, conflict can be described as differences in opinions, expectations, or expressions of dissatisfaction or disagreement. The differences in wants or needs and expressions of dissatisfaction in turn affect human behaviour which can lead to poor or termination of collaboration, particularly from a political context. Therefore, conflicts are about issues that involve deep-rooted human needs.³

This paper argues that conflicts over the pre-independence Barotseland Agreement which helped to establish the unitary state of Zambia should be viewed from the aspect of a decline in the Western Province’s livelihoods arising from the failure by the

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Environmental Resource Governance and Conflict in Western Zambia

system of state to fairly distribute benefits from socio-ecological systems. National policies regulating resource management and benefit distribution favour the state as a management agency. Policy development and implementation are determined by government agencies with local communities as “invited” stakeholders and not as partners in resource management. This perception entrenches feelings of alienation and exclusion from the fair distribution of benefits. In the case of poor communities, perhaps members of such communities that are not aware of the extent of fairness in existing policies may not focus on procedural justice but may be concerned with the fact that benefits are not being distributed in a just manner. In such cases, conflicts do arise out of a local sense that resource management agencies or groups that are controlling resources are withholding the benefits from them or keeping access difficult. These “groups” are state agencies whose role, as perceived by the citizenry, is anchored in the political dynamics of property and the “recursive constitution of property rights and authority” embedded in the socio-political psychic of the modern state and its evolutionary dynamics.

The Barotseland Agreement was an outline of a procedural aspect (justice), the abrogation of which can be assumed to have violated the trust between the locals and the national government, which then calls into question the whole legitimacy of the relationship. The interaction between independent causal variables (loss of livelihood due to unfair decision making resulting in a failure to distribute benefits in a just way from socio-ecological systems) and dependent variables (the people of “Barotseland”) is the basis of the analytical approach adopted. Is the failure to justly distribute benefits from socio-ecological systems caused by distributive injustice or both procedural and distributive justice? It is also hypothesised (in linking structural conflicts with poor distribution of benefits from socio-ecological systems) that the conflict is structural due to poor political organisation and a lack of devolved power and social assets. Conflict assumes structural violence dimensions if there is some underlying pattern in the governance system that prohibits people from receiving a fair benefit or participating in decisions in a just way. Such conflicts occur when patterns of economic exclusion and domination establish deprivation and social tension thus paving the way for violence. Domination may be perceived from the governance context in which local ethnicity is unrepresented in the governance of the state, thus exercise no participative decisions in both formulation and actualisation of resource distribution systems. The question then is how can procedural and distributive justice, and thus trust be restored, if at all, or at least what processes might be useful to consider when restoring the aforementioned?

5. Steve McCool, (Personal communication, 15th April, 2014).
Western Zambia's population increased from 638,756 in 1990 to 765,088 in 2000 and to 881,524 in 2010. The annual growth rate between 2000 and 2010 was 1.4%. An estimated 47% are males and 53% females. The region's population and growth rate are some of the lowest compared to its size. This is partly due to the migration to Lusaka and the Copperbelt Provinces for employment. The major tourist attraction in the region is the annual Kuomboka ceremony and nature based tourism. Statistics of the region’s contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are not reported. The region, together with Luapula and North-western Provinces, remains one of the least developed in Zambia compared to other parts of Zambia. The major export crop from the region, particularly Mongu, is rice produced in the Zambezi Plain.

Environmental resources of Western Zambia include the second largest wildlife sanctuary in the world, the Kafue National Park (KNP; size: 22,480 Km²), SiomaNgwezi National Park (SNP; size: 5,000 Km²), Luwu Plains National Park (LPNP; size: 3,660 Km²) and associated Game Management Areas (GMAs). Zambezi Plains declared a Ramsa site in 2007 is one of Zambia’s richest fishing grounds even though statistics of fish production and generated revenues in the plains are not available. The range of habitats and large number of plant and animal species that are secure within them in such a large more or less pristine ecosystem is a measure of the value of KNP as a protected area (PA) and the other two national parks.

The greatest diversity of animal species found in any national park in Zambia is only found in the KNP. With the exception of giraffe, tsessebe and black rhinoceros; the latter was once widely distributed but has been exterminated; large mammals naturally occurring in Zambia have been recorded in the KNP. The three national parks are habitats of small and large mammals including elephants, hippos, leopards, lions and endemic red Lechwe (Kobuslecheleche). In 2009, communities within the GMAs of the KNP received a total of US$490,393 in revenue from the Zambia Wildlife Authority. This is projected to increase to more than US$ 1 million in the event of the

10. www.ramsa.org
restructuring and investments taking place in the KNP. Western and Southern Zambia have been the key suppliers of railway sleepers for Zambia’s rail system for more than 60 years. An example of the wealth contained in the national parks of the Western Province is illustrated by the rich biodiversity contained in the Kafue National Park as a proportion of the national biodiversity (Table 1).

The three national parks are habitats of small and large mammals: elephants (KNP resident population of up to 3,400); buffalo (KNP resident population of more than 6,000); red Lechwe (Kobus lechesleche) (KNP resident population of 5,494); carnivores (Lion—Panthera leo, leopard—Panthera pardus, cheetah—Acinonyx jubatus, spotted hyena—Crocuta crocuta, wild dog—Lycaon pictus and side striped jackal Canis adustus) population distributions and densities are not known; Primates (Yellow baboon—Papio cynocephalus, Chacma baboon—Papio hamadryas, Vervet monkey—Cercopithecus pygerythrus, bush baby—Galago crassicaudatus, night ape Galagomoholi) population distribution and densities are not known. Sioma Ngwezi National Park is home to more than 1,100 elephants whilst Liuwa Plains National Park has been known to harbour unknown numbers of elephants, carnivores and small mammals. Liuwa PNP is known to harbour cheetah, lions, wild dogs and hyenas. Matthew notes that in 2011, increases in animals were noted for wildebeest from 15,000 to 40,000, Zebra from 2000 to 4,900 and Tsessebe from 400 to 1,450. Whilst eland, lions and buffalos were reintroduced, wild dog and roan antelope returned of their own accord. Wild dogs have been recorded in Sioma Ngwezi NP as reported by International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)/Species Survival Commission (SSC).

In 2008, Zambia had an estimated elephant population of over 26,350 in approximately 166,713Km$^2$ in national parks and Game Management Areas. The revenue

<table>
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<th><strong>Table 1</strong> Mammals, Birds, Fishes, Reptiles and Amphibians in Kafue National Park as a proportion of the national total</th>
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<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
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<td>Mammals</td>
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<td>Fishes</td>
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*Source: KNP Management Plan (1976) as reported by ZAWA (2010)*
potential of the KNP, which is still below full potential is classified in Table 2 according to activity.

In 2009, communities within the GMAs of the KNP received a total of US$490,393 in revenue from the Zambia Wildlife Authority. This is projected to increase to more than US$ 1 million in the event of the restructuring and investments taking place in the KNP particularly under the Millennium Challenge Account. All National Parks (NPs), Game Management Areas (GMAs), Bird and Wildlife Sanctuaries in Zambia are under the jurisdiction of the state under the Policy on National Parks and Wildlife of 1998 and the Wildlife Act of 1998. It can also be inferred that trade in wildlife products are legislated by the state. One of the strategies of the legislation is to promote and develop an integrated approach to the management of human and natural resources. Under the wildlife sector this includes negotiation of agreements with tour operators, managing wildlife and recruiting scouts. The government can acquire or establish a protected area (PA) on any land except that under mining concession. In GMAs and customary lands of relevance to wildlife, local communities can register a Community Resource Board (CRB) to administer Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) with the participation of the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). The CRBs receive funding from ZAWA in the following proportions:19

- Hunting fees: CRBs (45%); Traditional leaders (5%); ZAWA (40%); Government (10%).
- Concession fees: CRBs (15%); Traditional leaders (5%), ZAWA (80%).

This arrangement has resulted in US$1.7 million being passed over to local communities from 2001 to 2005. Impediments may arise from the Environmental Management Act of 2012 through which the government may declare any environ-

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mentally sensitive or fragile area as an Environmentally Protected Area managed by the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA). The Water Resources Management Act of 2011 can also render any forested wetlands or marshlands to be under the protection of the Water Resources Management Authority.

Governance of Capture Fisheries resources

There are 11 major fisheries in Zambia, four within the Congo Basin (Bangweulu, Mweru-Luapula, Mweru-Wantipa and Tanganyika) and seven in the Zambezi Basin (Kafue, Kariba, Lukanga, Upper Zambezi, Lower Zambezi, Iteszhi-Tezhi and Lusiwashi). The Upper Zambezi fishery is located within the North-western and Western Provinces. The fisheries sector contributes around US$109 million in 2007 which was a percent on average to Zambia’s GDP. In the same year the annual government allocations averaged US$2.3 m, or 0.12 percent of the national budget. The sector provides incomes to 300,000 individuals with a total production from capture fisheries of approximately 65,000 to 80,000 tonnes per annum. An additional production of 5,000 mt is estimated from the emerging aquaculture sector. There has been a decline in average per capita fish supply from over 11 kg in the 1970s to approximately 6.5 kg in the 2000s due to over fishing and declining fish stocks. Zambezi Plains declared a Ramsa site in 2007 is one of Zambia’s richest fishing grounds even though statistics of fish production and generated revenues in the plains are not available. The plain is estimated to be 200Km long and 70Km at its widest point with approximately water and swamp area of 7,500 Km² at higher inundation (Flint, -). Government revenue collections from artisanal fishing resources is poor. No commercial fishing companies have been reported in the Western Province.

The fisheries sector is governed by the Fisheries (Amendment) Act of 2007. The legislation’s objectives are to improve the involvement of riparian communities in fisheries management, promote development of the aquaculture sector, and establish a Fisheries Development Fund. Each fishery is designated a Fisheries Management Area managed by a Fisheries Management Committee. The role of the Committee is to oversee the development and implementation of a local Fisheries Management Plan and administer a fund to improve local riparian livelihoods. However, the government appoints members of the Committee constituted by key stakeholder groups and regulates the payment of local fisheries revenues into this fund.

Governance of Timber and Other Plant Resources

Timber and the only natural sources of Devils Claw. The Zambezi Teak Forest is home to *Baikiaeaplurijuga*, *Schynziophytonrautannenii*, *Pterocarpuslucens* and *Pterocarpus–santunesii*, *Colophospermumumnopane* and the widely exploited Mzauli. The Kafue National Park is assumed to be the home of *Brachystegiabakeriana* which according to

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the 2010 Red List of Threatened Species Version 3.1, is a vulnerable plant species\textsuperscript{22} Western and Southern Zambia have been the key suppliers of railway sleepers for Zambia's rail system before the 1960s. The mining industry depended on mining timber from \textit{Baikiaeaplurijuga}. Therefore, Western Province has been supplying timber for Zambia's industrial development for more than 60 years. The post-1995 privatisation of Zambia’s industrial base has seen an increase in the exploitation of timber from western Zambia, the bulk of it unquantified and probably illegally obtained. The species most exploited are \textit{Baikiaeaplurijuga}, Mzauli and \textit{Pterocarpus} species.

Forest resources are governed by the Forest Policy of 1998 and the Forests Act No. 39 of 1973. Western Zambia, like any other region has both Local Forest reserves and National Forest reserves which are under government jurisdiction. The exploitation of timber and non-timber forest product is strictly prohibited and punishable. Timber exploited in customary forests cannot be transported for sale without a permit neither can one legally sale the same within the customary area without a permit. However, Joint Forest Management introduced under Statutory Instrument No. 52 of 1999 and Statutory Instrument No. 47 of 2006, provided prescribed community participation in forest management with no clear benefit distribution provisions. Forest legislation provides limited access rights to some forest products which provides the recognition of access rights related to forest produce for local communities. However, regardless of the status of surface rights to land and related surface resources, such rights do preclude rights to subsurface resources which remain under the jurisdiction of the state.

**BAROTSELAND AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN ZAMBIA**

The Barotseland Agreement and Zambia's Development Strategies

Modern day Western Zambia (Figure 1), called Barotseland, was previously a large tract of land that the British assigned the title of Barotseland North-western Rhodesia around 1953. This was in effect a country within a country (protectorate within a protectorate) bordering the territory then called Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Rhodesia and Nyasaland constituted Northern Rhodesia (modern day Zambia), Nyasaland (modern day Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia (modern day Zimbabwe). Prior to the political independence of Northern Rhodesia on 24th October 1964, the prospective leaders of Northern Rhodesia entered into a permanent agreement (called the "Barotseland Agreement of 1964) at the Commonwealth Relations Office in the United Kingdom on 18th May 1964. The agreement (extracts from the Barotseland Agreement are in Box 1) was signed by then Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Prime Minister of Barotseland, King of Barotseland and Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies, to signify the approval of the British government of the arrangements entered into between the parties to the Barotseland Agreement. The principle tenets of the agreement are

1. Create a unitary sovereign state of Zambia as captured in the agreement .......
   *Barotseland Agreement 1964....shall come into force on the day on which Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, becomes the independent sovereign Republic of Zambia.*

2. Protection of the rights and freedom of the people of Barotseland applied equitably as obtaining in the whole Republic...........*the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual; the judiciary; and the public service and those provisions shall have full force and effect in Barotseland.*

3. Equitable distribution of the wealth of the state with Barotseland equitably treated in a similar manner as other parts of Zambia...................*shall have the same general responsibility for providing financial support for the administration and economic development of Barotseland as it has for other parts of the Republic and shall ensure that, in discharge of this responsibility, Barotseland is treated fairly and equitably in relation to other parts of the Republic.*

Constitutional reviews in 1969 through the Constitution Amendment Act and the Land and Miscellaneous Provision Act derogated the agreement including the rights, obligations and liabilities associated with the Barotseland Agreement.

The Barotseland Agreement primarily advocates for the fairness, equity and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Barotseland just as these would apply to the people in other regions of Zambia. Secondly, the Barotseland Agreement recognised the significant role of local institutions in the management of land and environmental resources within the areas that are designated as customary or traditional areas. The Zambian government publicised, in the government owned press and the private press, the “Agreement” (parts of which are in Box 1) as a way of informing the Zambian public concerning the contents of the Barotseland Agreement. The Barotseland Agreement that was published in the government owned *Times of*
### Selected sections from the Barotseland Agreement with relevance to governance of environmental resources

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<th>Paragraph</th>
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<th>Subsection Stipulation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Citation and Commencement</td>
<td>Cited as the Barotseland Agreement; come into force on the day Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, becomes the independent sovereign Republic of Zambia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 2         | Constitution of Zambia | Shall include:  
(a). protection of human rights & fundamental freedoms of the individual;  
(b). the judiciary;  
(c). and the public service & those provisions shall have full force & effect in Barotseland |
| 3         | Administration of Justice | (a). People of Barotseland accorded same rights of access to the High Court of Zambia;  
(b). accorded same rights of appeal from decisions of the courts of Zambia |
| 4         | The Litunga and His Council | (1). Accorded recognition to person who is the Litunga of Western Province.  
(2). The Litunga shall be the principle local authority for the government & administration of Barotseland.  
(3). Shall be authorised & empowered to make laws for Barotseland in relation to the following:  
(b). Barotse Government  
(e). The Courts  
(f). Matters relating to local government  
(g). Land  
(h). Forests  
(i). Traditional & customary matters relating to Barotseland Alone  
(j). Fishing  
(k). Control of hunting  
(l). Game preservation  
(m). Control of bush fires  
(p). Reservation of trees for canoes  
(r). Barotse local festivals |
| 5         | Land | (2). Litunga& Council continue to have powers hitherto enjoyed by them in respect of land matters under customary land |
| 6         | Civil Servants | All public officers who may, from time to time, be situated in Barotseland shall be officers serving on permanent & pensionable terms |
| 7         | Financial Responsibility | Provide financial support for administration & economic development of Barotseland; Barotseland is treated fairly and equitably in relation to other parts of the Republic |
| 8         | Implementation | Laws for time being in force are not inconsistent with provisions of the Barotseland Agreement |
| 9         | Interpretation | Any question concerning interpretation of this Agreement may be referred by the Government of Zambia to the High Court for consideration |
| Annex     | Annex, Para 3 | [2] The provision of public services and the possibility of economic development in Barotseland are not hampered by special formalities |

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Zambia newspaper (page 11, 18 January 2012) and the Zambia Daily Mail (page 18, 25 January 2012) is the focus of this article.

The publication of the Barotseland Agreement followed violent protests in Western Province related to the restoration or implementation of the Barotseland Agreement. On 13 January 2011, two people died and 130 were arrested in Mongu and Lusaka following violent clashes between police and groups of people agitating for the secession of Western Province. A group of people went on rampage in Mongu, attempting to burn petrol stations, smashing cars and deflating tyres, throwing stones at the public, the police and houses.

Zambia’s constitution, the Constitution of Zambia Act of 1996, and sector legislation on environment (Environmental Management Act of 2011), fisheries [Fisheries (Amendment) Act of 2007], forestry (Forest Act of 1973), land (Lands Act of 1995), water (Water Supply and Sanitation Act of 1997; Water Resources Management Act of 2011) and wildlife (Wildlife Act of 1998) enumerate legal provisions that are not region specific. With the exception of conventions such as Ramsa, none of the policies and legislation on the management of environmental resources discriminate against a region, ethnic group or an individual. However, the agreement’s Paragraph 4 (3) stipulating that the Litunga will be authorised and empowered to make laws for Barotseland in relation to the governance and management of environmental resources is not provided for under Zambia’s constitution. This is because the governance and management of Zambia’s resources is entrusted in the state on behalf of its citizens. Traditional authority, which remain unwritten, in all Zambia’s ethnic groupings is still respected by the local people and recognised by the state. Even though the environmental resources of Western Province are subject to national policies and legislation like resources in other parts of the country, the actual implementation of policies and legislation may not be effective. The ineffectiveness of these governance infrastructure may create a local perception of bias or social exclusion especially in a region with a history of the Barotseland Agreement. The non-regional or ethnic inclination of policies and legislation can also be found in two key development policy and strategy documents: the Vision 2030 and the revised Sixth National Development Plan (R-SNDP), treat the country as a unit in the context of development. For example, the Vision 2030 stipulates that “By 2030, Zambians, aspire to live in a strong and dynamic middle-income industrial nation that provides opportunities for improving the wellbeing of all, embodying values of socioeconomic justice, underpinned by the principles of: (i) gender responsive sustainable development; (ii) democracy; (iii) respect for human rights; (iv) good traditional and family values; (v) positive attitude towards work; (vi) peaceful coexistence and; (vii) private-public partnerships” Similarly, the R-SNDP envisions that “………..the strategic focus of this Plan is to primarily focus on job creation, rural development and promote inclusive growth while investing in human development to take care of macro-economic fundamentals……….The ultimate goal of the

24. Litunga is the customary title of the monarch of Western Province (“Barotseland”) that means the guardian of the earth. All Lozi Kings are known as the Litunga.
Vision 2030 and the R-SNDP is to improve the quality of life for all Zambians\(^{27}\). In terms of key growth sectors that resonate with Western Province’s environmental resources, the R-SNDP specific mentions water and fisheries which are more abundant in Western Province than many of Zambia’s regions excluding the Copperbelt, Luapula, North-western and Northern Provinces.

**Relationship of the Barotseland Agreement to Socio-economic Deprivations and Conflict**

Environmental resources are critical to the survival of people\(^{28}\) of western Zambia, both for subsistence and for economic development. The Zambian government generates revenue from the same resources on which communities depend for their livelihood. Thus, creating unfair competition for resources and markets from a vantage point of being the policy formulation and implementing agency. In some circumstances, access to or control of the resources has been a contentious issue often generating latent conflicts between the state agencies and local communities. Besides the violent conflicts which have ensued as a result of these resources, there are also governance infrastructure conditions necessitating structural conflicts which have been inadvertently created in the process of managing these resources.

The correlation between violent conflicts and these infrastructural conditions is suggestive of relative deprivation.\(^{29}\) The call for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement is driven by people’s perceptions of a discrepancy between what they think they deserve in terms of public services and what they are actually getting. They feel fraternally relatively deprived against other regions of Zambia. As such, the propensity for collective violent engagement against state agencies is great. In other words, a community’s drive for collective violence is driven by the perceived gap between what they have and what they think they should have.\(^{30}\) Although, while some members of the local community may advance and legitimise their cause genuinely, others can easily feed on the deprivation and advance selfish interests and agenda.\(^{31}\) However, the situation is manifest in what others describe as evident poverty and underdevelopment rendering the Barotseland as the poorest and least developed province in Zambia.\(^{32}\)

\(^{27}\) Ibid.


Attesting to this impoverishment, a study by Masumbu and Mahrt\textsuperscript{33} revealed that western province of all the ten provinces of Zambia has the highest number of households deprived in five dimensions—sanitation, housing, energy, education and employment creation. These five indicators are enthused by Zambia’s national developmental goals as spelled out in the 2011 to 2015, Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP).

There is a probable mismatch between the provisions on financial responsibility as outlined in box 1 and the employment creation especially in relation to other regions of Zambia. For example, between the year 2000 and 2010, while the national average growth rate of labour force was 3.0 percent, Western province was at 0.5 percent\textsuperscript{34}. Similarly, the province’s literacy levels for both young people aged between 15 and 24 and all adults above 15 years were second lowest at 82% and 72.5% in 2010, while Eastern province carries 75.2% and 66.5 for the two categories respectively.\textsuperscript{35} While both Eastern and Western provinces have the lowest literacy levels, the latter’s case accentuated by claims of purposeful (intentional) marginalization and exclusion. Exclusion from access to resources and failures in fair benefit distribution mechanisms have the potential to threaten livelihoods as in the case of western Zambia. This can lead, and has led to the manifestation of a structural conflict mechanisms. These mechanisms have the potential to catalyse the strengthening of ethnicism, nationalism and regionalism with the potential to create definable social boundaries. Poorly designed and targeted policies, legislation and management systems and coupled with population increases and environmental factors such climate change can negatively affect local resource rights, declined resource quality and availability and thus affecting local livelihoods. Opportunities then may arise in this context such conflicts over or related to resources, a social perception of social exclusion from governance and benefits, and a collapse in local resource governance systems that may exacerbate illegal resource appropriations.\textsuperscript{36}

Degraded environments, thus declined environmental resource quality and quantity, accelerate the process of impoverishment thereby affecting livelihoods.\textsuperscript{37} The nexus between poverty, environment and livelihood is undoubtedly interconnected and inter-reliant, in the sense that the impact of one on the other can exacerbate vulnerability and loss of livelihoods. As a result of this interaction, the loss of livelihood increases household and community conflicts as individuals compete over declining resources and it also induces mobility or migration and promotes ethnic tensions as well as distrust.\textsuperscript{38} Undoubtedly it is not only resource degradation and scarcity that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid
\item Ibid.
\item Rafael Reuveny, ‘Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict’, Political Geography, 26:6 (2007), 656-673.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
affects livelihoods but whether there is fairness in the way benefits are distributed and the process that inherently determine how and to whom benefits will be distributed. Homer-Dixon supports this view in reference to his environmental scarcity theory.\textsuperscript{39} In circumstances in which resources are not “equitably shared”, some groups may become increasingly frustrated and aggrieved by the widening gap between their actual level of economic achievement and the level that is deserved. Hence, this may result in rebellion and eventually conflict.

The failure of policies prescribing procedural and distributive justice as in the case of Zambia is most likely due to greed by management agencies. Greed in management agencies elicit grievances in society which lead to conflict manifestations.\textsuperscript{40} The manifestation of structural violence in western Zambia is a case in point and may be explained by severe grievances in the form of high economic inequality and not necessarily a lack of political rights or ethnic and religious divisions. The recent social unrest and interest in the Barotseland Agreement may also be partly driven by a perception of social exclusion. Social exclusion can be driven and manifested in several ways. A sense of being part of a community, prosocial behaviour, was found to be affected by a sense of being excluded driving people to be less motivated to behave pro-socially.\textsuperscript{41} Additionally, social exclusion can also be caused by a lack of access to resources and the opportunity to derive a benefit from such resources.\textsuperscript{42} The denial of rights and opportunities can also result in increased poverty and the inability of people to participate the political and economic activities of the society in which they are.\textsuperscript{43}

Arguments in terms of the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement and formation of the Barotse state have found favour due to the foregoing as the Barotseland Agreement is more about fairness in economic and political aspects than statehood nor cessation of the region from the rest of Zambia. Whether the creation of the Barotse state will lead to acceptable levels of procedural and distributive justice by the new Barotse state regime is doubtful especially in a state that is so ethnically stable and interconnected. The evolution of the Barotse state will also follow the long known path of nation-state evolution of being recursive in terms of property rights and control as has been manifested in many post-independence African states.

Peacebuilding practitioners contend, humans have material needs and rights and society is obligated to protect economic rights through distributive justice or equitable distribution of wealth, education and employment opportunities\textsuperscript{44}. Thus, distributive justice is more of a moral issue for western Zambia than a technical one. Less enlightened individuals at local community level are more concerned with fairness in distributing benefits from socio-ecological systems than with the mechanisms of how the benefits are distributed. Assuming the Barotseland Agreement has not been ful-

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Lisa Schirch, ‘The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding’ (Good Books, 2004).
filled in the context of fairness in benefit distribution, one would be inclined to question the original position, context and justification for the parties in the agreement. Based on Rawls, one would question whether signatories to the agreement made a rational decision without knowing the long-term dynamics in beliefs and interests of the parties, their relationship, and the alternatives available to them. Secondly, how can fairness be achieved when the parties are negotiating from different power positions and epistemology states? One party negotiates on the basis of political expediency whilst the other party negotiates from an aspiration of a better livelihood for those with no political power. An argument may be advanced for the application of the principle of rectification of injustices, the recourse is a court of law managed by an arm of government. However, the state can justify its position by indicating its own definition of what is fair or not fair.

Conclusion

Natural resource management policies and legislation that place control and ownership of resources under the government can lead to securitization of resources. The perception is that threats to resources indirectly entail threats at the economic security of government. Under certain circumstances, securitisation of natural resources can exclude ownership, access and alienation rights for communities. There is need for increased stake through consultation in the implementation for example of the Environmental Management Act of 2012 which currently mandates government to declare any environmentally sensitive or fragile area as an environmentally protected area. Consistent with the Barotseland Agreement there should be due recognition of the Litunga and his council in decision making pertaining to the governance of wildlife resources in western province. Although the act does provide for public participation, no particular reference is made to the Litunga and his council.

Similarly, government’s active involvement in the appointment of Fisheries Management Committee for Western Province as stipulated by the Fisheries (Amendment) Act of 2007. Despite the governance of capture fisheries resources being under the jurisdiction of the state, local communities throughout Zambia have ‘owned’ natural resources including fisheries. For Western Province, in light of the Barotse Agreement provisions (Para. 4, 3), full jurisdiction, it can be argued should be under the Litunga and his council. This would, in more ways than one dissipate local perceptions of bias and social exclusion. Conversely, ownership and oversight of public service provision and economic development in Barotseland would be enhanced. Undoubtedly, the change in ownership is still an opportunity cost to the local communities part of which should be considered in issues of determining the cost of managing environmental resources and benefits that are derived thereof.

The governance of timber and other plant resources equally merit reconsideration in view of the Barotseland Agreement. The Statutory Instruments Nos. 52 of 1999 and No. 47 of 2006 should be implemented with due recognition of the Litunga and his council as major stakeholder in the governance and administration of Barotseland.

The implementation of Statutory Instruments should be clear on benefit distributions; access rights to forest products and review rights to all surfaces and subsurface resources. And the Litunga for example, should, as provided for in Barotse Agreement have full stake in the formulation and/or implementation of policies and legislation vis-à-vis natural resources management.
Asymmetric Warfare: Reflections on the Responses of Security Forces to Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria

Osumah Oarhe

Abstract

This article examined the operations of security forces in response to the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency in northern Nigeria. Methodologically, it relied on data derived from extant literature. It acknowledged that the operations of the security forces have yielded gains such as recovery of captured communities, rescue of some women held captive, arrest and killing of a number of suspected BH militants. These gains have been undermined, as demonstrated by continued attacks and reprisals with lethal effects by the Boko Haram. The limited impact of the operations of the security forces is ascribed to a number of factors such as poor financing and equipment, ill-motivation, and poor coordination across various units and services of the security forces as well as popular and external support for the insurgents. The paper recommended the need to address these limiting factors for more effective counterinsurgency warfare.

Keywords: Asymmetric warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, security forces, Boko Haram

Introduction

Nigerian security forces have been part of many successful peacekeeping operations across the world. In particular, they have spearheaded peacekeeping operations in crisis-ridden West African countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, which de-escalated the conflicts. Indeed, they have earned the admiration of the international community including the USA and Britain in its successful restoration of peace in the sub-region in the 1990s.

In the home front, Nigerian security forces have successfully crushed acts of insurrection against the state since the attainment of independence in 1960. In the early
1960s, the Nigerian security forces successfully quelled the Tiv riots between 1960 and 1964. They also crushed the self-determination and declaration of the Independent Republic of Niger Delta by the Adaka Boro-led Niger Delta Vigilante Service (NDVS) in 1966. The rebellion lasted for only 12 days. Furthermore, the Nigerian security forces subjugated the Major Odumegwu Ojukwu-led Igbo-succession bid to have a Republic of Biafra. The war lasted for 30 months. After the civil war, the security forces effectively quelled the Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s in northern Nigeria. In addition, they have successfully tamed violent activities of ethnic militias such as Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in southwestern Nigeria, Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in southeastern Nigeria, and many ethno-religious violence in Northern Nigeria. However, the glowing international reputation and virility of the Nigerian security forces appear diminishing in face of Boko Haram-induced insurgency, which became most active since 2009. Since 2009, the BH insurgents ran ring round the security forces deployed to fight them. Notably, from the mid-February 2015 with the assistance of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) drawn up from Nigeria and four contiguous neighboring countries, Chad, Cameroun and Niger (which together constitute members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission), and Republic of Benin, the counterinsurgency warfare appears winnable. The MJTF has recovered some captured towns and villages, rescued women held hostage and arrested or killed many suspected BH militants. However, these successes have often been for short-term, as the ebb often quickly flows into reprisal attacks with lethal effects. This situation has resulted in so much fear and anxiety, which prompt many prominent Nigerians to contend that Nigeria is cascading to another civil war.

The ontological contradiction of the Nigerian security forces in counterinsurgency warfare against BH insurgency with their glowing reputation in international peacekeeping operations and containment of earlier insurgent activities stirs need for research. This article outlines the operational tactics of the Nigerian security forces against BH insurgency and their marginal impact. It also seeks to identify the limiting factors on the performance of the security forces and to recommend plausible practical measures to shape their performance. Before proceeding with the issues raised, attempt is made to unpack the conceptual and analytical notes on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as provide an overview of BH construction and insurgency. Methodologically, this article relies on data derived from extant literature.

Conceptual and Analytical Notes on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Scholars and theorists have differently defined insurgency. In this discourse, the Kilcullen’s definition is adopted. According to Kilcullen, “an insurgency denotes a struggle for control over a contested political space between a sovereign state and one

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or more non-state challengers”\textsuperscript{5}. Insurgency is characterized by guerrilla warfare, terrorism, asymmetric violence, the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, political mobilization such as propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization and international activity aimed at weakening government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy\textsuperscript{6}.

Insurgencies emerge from and are conducted through pre-existing social networks. Insurgents in recognition of their weakness or unequal power force with the conventional security adopt asymmetric warfare. According to Robert Shaw

asymmetric warfare is a warfare in which the two or more of the belligerents are mismatched in their military capabilities or accustomed methods of engagements such that the militarily disadvantaged power must press its special advantages or its enemy’s particular weaknesses if they are to prevail\textsuperscript{7}.

Beyond the tactic of operations, there are other conditions identified as key to a successful insurgency. Most common conditions are good and tactically strategic cause that can attract large supporters on the basis of persuasion, capacity of the insurgent group to access external supports in terms of finance, training, arms, intelligent information and freedom to use foreign territory as safe haven\textsuperscript{8}. Other auspicious conditions include poor quality of governance and weakness of the indigenous security forces especially the police\textsuperscript{9}.

A combination of these factors apart from being crucial in understanding the vulnerability of a country to insurgency would also help in assessing a counterinsurgent’s point of view. Counterinsurgency is a combination of actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. The 2009 Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operation defined “counterinsurgency as comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances”\textsuperscript{10}.

Broadly, there are two approaches to counterinsurgency; the enemy-centric approach and the population-centric approach\textsuperscript{11}. The enemy-centric approach emphasizes annihilation of enemy or insurgent group while other mechanisms are considered as secondary. In this approach, the emphasis is on the complete elimination of the insurgents, or their guerrilla network and cadres while downplaying the imperative of nation building and measures to gain popular support.

The population-centric approach on the other hand while acknowledging the possibility of military offensive of crushing insurgents, contends that such tactic is not sufficient without popular support. This presupposes that the population-centric ap-

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\textsuperscript{6} Federation of American Scientists, ‘Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency’, January 2009, 6-9
\textsuperscript{7} David L Bufalloe, ‘Defining Asymmetric Warfare’, Land Warfare Papers, No.58, September 2006
\end{flushleft}
proach regardless of its emphasis on popular support allows for offensive, defensive and stability operations with varying degrees depending on the local circumstances. Under this approach, in the initial phase, offensive could be conducted in order to ride off insurgents in possible areas. In the subsequent phases, according to this approach, the counterinsurgent agenda encapsulates military training or reconstruction plan in stability operation.

The Nigerian security forces, which in this discourse refer to the armed forces comprising the Army, Air Force and Navy and para-military institutions such as the Police, and State Security Service (SSS) adopt the counterinsurgent approach that is enemy-centric. These institutions, which date back to colonial period, were established essentially for the maintenance of colonial order, territorial quest, and suppression of rebellions among the natives. As Fawole noted, “in the course of performing their duties of pacification on behalf of the ruler of the state, Nigerian soldiers are generally contemptuous of people’s rights and freedom”.

Generally, sovereign states rely on military and para-military forces such as the Police to combat or defeat well-armed insurgents. The police is the arm of government statutory charged with the responsibility of maintaining internal security and public order, thus a key factor in the early stage of insurgency and the first counterinsurgent organizations that insurgent confront, infiltrate and neutralize. The effectiveness of the police depends on its numerical strength, competence and loyalty of its personnel and complimentary role from other government institutions such as the judiciary. The police duty is to identify and arrest suspected insurgent and prosecute the insurgents in court. But there is little the police can do if the insurgents take advantage of the safeguard in the judicial system to secure freedom. Thus, an effective judicial system sensitive to the extraordinary condition of insurgency is a necessity for successful counterinsurgency warfare. Also, central to police effectiveness in counterinsurgency warfare is its numerical strength. For example, in Algeria in 1954, the limited numerical power of the police personnel made insurgents to overrun them.

Like the police, the effectiveness of the armed forces in asymmetric warfare and counterinsurgency depends on its numerical strength in relation to the size and population of the country. A standard ratio of the force of 10 or 20 between the counterinsurgent and insurgent is common when insurgency develops into guerrilla warfare. Also, the feeling of the individual soldiers towards the cause of the insurgents and towards the counterinsurgent is considered as key to success.

Other critical factors identified as central to the effectiveness of security forces in counterinsurgency warfare include professionalism, effective training, proper financing and equipment, good intelligence and integration across units and services, prin-

15. Ibid
cipated leadership, adequate motivation as well as ability to learn and adapt during combat\textsuperscript{17}. In contrast, relatively weak security forces, which are ill-financed and ill-equipped, organizationally inept, corrupt, lacking in intelligence gathering, politically factionalized and not well-informed about events cannot effectively conduct counter-insurgency warfare\textsuperscript{18}.

Also, the success of the security organizations in asymmetric warfare and counter-insurgency operation depends on factors such as resoluteness of the political leadership and their understanding of the tactic and strategy required to fighting insurgents, national consensus in reaction to any attempt against the government in power\textsuperscript{19}. Also, in asymmetric warfare, geography is a critical factor. Difficult terrain limits the counterinsurgents and emboldens the insurgents\textsuperscript{20}. These factors are critical to the understanding of the marginal impact of the counterinsurgency by the Nigerian security forces.

**Boko Haram Construction and Insurgency**

BH is an extremist Islamic sect founded in 2002 by an Islamic cleric, Ustaz Muhammad Yusuf. BH initially went with the moniker Nigerian Taliban because of its ideology and methods. Under Yusuf, BH attempted several attacks against the Nigerian state without recording so much success as it has today. The wave of violent attacks against the Nigerian state, which has continued today started after Yusuf died in police custody in 2009\textsuperscript{21}.

BH, which is formally designated Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation of Jihad) means “unlawful”, “ungodly”, “forbidden” or “sinful”. BH is not only the sect’s moniker. It also figuratively means that Western education is unlawful and sacrilegious\textsuperscript{22}.

The sect particularly repudiates aspects of western education such as geology, Darwinian evolution, genetic engineering, sociology and philosophy, which are not in tandem with the Islamic doctrine. Also, BH sect detests democratic system and attempts to struggle for social justice and corruption. Furthermore, the sect rejects legitimacy of Nigeria’s secularity and seeks to achieve an Islamized Nigerian state and recommends a government based on Sharia laws\textsuperscript{23}. Despite these ideological concerns, BH has been largely engaged in violence than nonviolent political activity. Although BH leaders and the Nigerian government officials have communicated with regards to cease-fire and concession, so much progress towards a brokered peace has not been

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{17} Ibid
\bibitem{18} Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, (Arlington: RAND Corporation 2008)
\bibitem{20} Ibid
\bibitem{21} START Background Report, ‘Boko Haram Recent Attacks’, University of Maryland, May 2014
\bibitem{22} Shannon Connell, ‘To Be Or Not To Be: Is Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist Organization’, *Global Security Studies*, 3:3 (2012), 87-93
\bibitem{23} Oarhe Osumah, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Vicious Cycle of Internal Insecurity’, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 24:3(2013),536-560
\end{thebibliography}
made. For example, in October 2014, there was a botched ceasefire between both sides, which President Idriss Deby of Chad facilitated. BH militants are enlisted from the ranks of frustrated, poor, idle and marginalized Islamic extremist youth within Nigeria and adjacent African countries including Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Sudan, Somali and Mauritania. The exact numerical strength of BH members is not known although its estimates range considerably. In 2013, the United States Department of State Country Report on Terrorism held that BH had several hundreds to a few thousand members.

BH is hierarchically organized with one overall leader. After the death of Yusuf in 2009, Abubakar Shekau emerged as the leader of BH. Under Shekau, BH became one of the deadliest terror groups in the world.

In January 2012, a splinter faction called Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (JAMBS), which interpret as Vanguards for the Aids of Muslims in Black Africa emerged from BH. JAMBS, was believed to have been formed following disenchantment with the leadership approach of BH’s commander and spiritual leader, Mohammad Shekau, particularly the penchant for executing Muslims. The sect, JAMBS, which is an affiliate of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), like BH, is against the Nigerian government and western agenda. JAMBS has claimed responsibility for various acts of terrorism targeted mostly on police, military, and foreigners.

The splinter group claimed responsibility for the kidnap of a French engineer in Katsina in January 2013, advancing France’s press on for military intervention in Mali as reason. Also, JAMBS averred to be responsible for the ambush of Nigerian soldiers in Kogi State on January 19, 2013. The soldiers were reportedly on their way to Mali as part of African peacekeeping mission. The ambush led to the death of two of the soldiers.

While JAMBS concentrates largely on foreign targets, BH focuses essentially on targets in Nigeria and neighbouring African countries such as Chad, Cameroun, and Mali. In Nigeria, at various times, BH launched attacks on churches, media establishments, educational institutions, and important government agencies such as police stations including Force Headquarters in Abuja, Army Defense College in Jaji, Kaduna and other strategic establishments such as the United Nations Office in Abuja.

Although there are conflicting figures over the exact number of casualties so far recorded since the BH onslaught emerged, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) in its background report in May 2014 noted that over 80 percent of the terrorist offensives in Nigeria between 1970 and 2013 for which masterminds were identified, BH was responsible. Although there is no

26. START Background Report, ‘Boko Haram Recent Attacks University of Maryland, May 2014’
27. Ibid.
29. Ibid
30. START Background Report, ‘Boko Haram Recent Attacks’ University of Maryland, May 2014
exact number of fatalities caused by BH, estimates put the death toll at 12,000 as at
2009. Between January and March 2014, the death toll was over 1,500.31
BH attacks spectacularly increase insecurity and displacement in north-eastern
Nigeria and neighbouring countries. According to United Nation High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) 2015 Report nine million people have been affected by BH
violence in the north-eastern Nigeria, with three million acutely needing humanitar-
ian assistance. An estimated 35,000 refugees are in northern Cameroun, 10,000 in
Chad and 90,000 displaced persons (refugees, returnees and third-country nationals)
have been in Diffa region in Niger.33
Furthermore, BH insurgency has greatly exacerbated regional, ethnic and religious
suspicions in Nigeria. A number of Christian-non-indigenes resident in the northern
part of the country have been on mass exodus to their states of origin in the South
because of BH’s offensives and its insistence that southerners should leave northern
Nigeria. This situation is reminiscent of the pogroms and mass migrations that pre-
ceded the Nigerian civil war.34
The Boko Haram menace has spread to Chad, Cameroun and Mali. The terror
group has abducted foreign nationals from China and France in Cameroun.35 Also, on
account of BH insurgency a number of countries such as the United States and the
United Kingdom have warned their nationals of the security risk of visiting Nigeria
because of the insecurity of life and property engendered by BH insurgency.36
BH insurgency inflicts deep psychological trauma on the society. By the day, hor-
ror, apprehension, despair, and dissatisfaction cripple genuine feeling and lamenta-
tions about the ambience of increasing insecurity amongst numerous Nigerians.37 The
frequency of BH attacks with deleterious consequences prompted former President,
Goodluck Jonathan to note thus:

the situation we have in our hands is even worse than the civil war we fought. During
the civil war, we knew and we could predict where the enemy was coming from, you
even knew the route they were coming from, you could even know the caliber of
weapon they would use and so on. The challenge we have today is more complicated
...this is a particular time when the country has major security challenges. There is
explosions everyday, people are dying, people are killed daily without any reason.38

33. Ibid
34. Oarhe Osumah, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Vicious Cycle of Internal
Insecurity’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 24:3(2013),536-560
35. Jide Ajani, Ben Agande, Tony Nwankwo, and Abiodun Alade, ‘Paris Conference on Terrorism:
12,000 lives lost to Boko Haram-Jonathan’, Sunday Vanguard, 18 May, 2014, 1&7
Insecurity’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 24:3(2013),536-560
Drawing similar concern, former Governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, against the backdrop of BH offensive with lethal effects held that Nigeria is in a state of war. In his words,

Well, in a nutshell what we are being confronted with is that we are in a state of war. … the sooner we stop playing the ostrich and rise up to the challenges of the day, and marshal all resources towards visualizing the antics of Boko Haram, the better for all of us39.

Prior to the emergence of BH, there have been earlier radical movements in Nigeria driven by religious sentiments and anti-government posture. For example, there was the Maitatsine movement in the early 1980s. Mohammed Marwa, a radical Islamic cleric who migrated from Northern Cameroun to Kano in 1945 led the Maitatsine movement. Maitatsine in Hausa means “he who curses”. The movement moved against the prevailing Muslim practice and materialistic disposition of people especially the representatives in government40. Like BH, the Maitatsine militants were largely youth unemployed migrants and other persons who felt that the official Islamic hierarchy was uncaring and insensitive to their needs41. The Maitatsine uprisings between 1980 and 1984 in some northern states such as Kano, Borno, Gongola and Kaduna led to the death of over 10,000 persons including Marwa himself, the leader of the Islamic sect42. Also, like BH, Maitatsine movement had foreign sponsors such as Maummar Gadhafi of Libya and Aiyatollah Khomemi of Iran43. Foreign actors allegedly provides BH strong supports in the areas of financing and training44. Meanwhile, in contrast to earlier insurgent groups in other parts of Nigeria such as OPC in the Western region, MASSOB in the Eastern region, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in oil-rich Niger Delta region, BH appears to embody an exceptional problem. BH is distinct from the earlier militia groups such as the Maitatsine sect by its use suicide bombers in executing attacks on targets in northern Nigeria. Also, BH is distinct from earlier insurgent groups on account of it controversial goals, demands and grievances. There is yet no known document wherein BH’s goals are clearly articulated. BH’s much publicized Islamization agenda in the country at earlier stage attracted positive sentiments across the northern Nigeria. This sympathy seems to have been lost since 2010, following the group’s indiscriminate bombings, abductions, attacks and killings of both Muslims and Christians. In fact,

41. Ibid
43. Austin.Thomas Aghemelo and Oarhe Osumah, Nigerian Government and Politics: An Introductory Perspective (Benin City: Mara Mon Bros & Ventures Limited, 2009)
many prominent Muslim clerics in Northern Nigeria have public condemned BH as terrorists.45

Operational Tactics of Nigerian Security Forces in Countering Boko Haram Insurgency

As afore-stated, before the emergence of BH insurgency, the Nigerian security forces had been deployed in the suppression of internal insurrection and insurgency. Like the earlier insurgent movements, a coalition of security forces known as Joint Task Force (JTF) has been ordered to counter BH insurgents and to restore order in the north-eastern Nigeria, where BH has been most active. In the attempt to fight BH insurgency, particularly after the imposition of emergency rule in 2013 in the BH stronghold in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states by then President Jonathan, the JTF has initiated several operational tactics. The tactics include mounting of roadblocks, regular patrols, surveillance over high profile areas, house-to-house search, and stop and search operations as well as raids of suspected hide-outs of the militants.46

Mounting of roadblocks: BH members move on roads in convoy of vehicles and motorcyles to carry out their attacks on targets. In the presumption that BH militants move on roads to launch attacks on target, the JTF mount roadblocks or checkpoints on roads in both cities and hinterlands in the north eastern Nigeria. This operational tactic is intended to cripple the movement of BH members. At the various checkpoints, the security forces conduct random search and screening on commuters on motorcyles and in vehicles to detect bomb couriers. This tactic has yielded only marginal positive result due to inadequate manpower, required screening gadgets, and corrupt practices on the part of the security operatives. For example, BH militias declared that they bribed their way through the several checkpoints erected by various security agencies to attack the UN building in Abuja.47

Cordon off and search operation: Through this tactics, the security forces have captured some BH militants, recovered arms, ammunitions and explosives. However, due to lack of proper communication or poor intelligence report, this tactic has resulted in arbitrary arrest, collective punishment, illegal detention and sometimes extra-judicial murder.48

Surveillance over high profile areas: BH members have paralyzed the operation of many businesses and institutions.49 This led the security forces to permanently deploy heavy personnel presence around vital facilities in order to forestall further attack from

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47. Ibid
49.
BH insurgents. From 2009, when the Federal Government set up the JTF in BH heartland, the task force has sustained heavy presence in major cities in Northern Nigeria. However, the heavy presence of the JTF has not sufficiently guarantee protection of civilians and investments as BH insurgents continued to launch attacks with devastating impact.  

**Regular Patrol:** The security forces embark on regular patrols to deter BH attacks and reassure the populace of their safety. This tactic is to prevent BH insurgents from operating with brazen impunity. It is also to avail the security authority with good knowledge information. However, the regular patrol of security personnel in uniform and vehicle has exposed security personnel. There are incidents where security personnel on patrol come under ambush resulting in huge carnage.  

**Raids:** The security forces raid suspected locations and hideouts of BH militants based on intelligence report with the aim to arrest or kill. The security forces have raided a number of locations, and settlements of BH. Such raids have resulted in the arrest or killing of several BH militants, recovery of captured communities and rescue of hostages. For example, on April 28, and May 1, 2015, the security forces rescued 293 and 234 women and girl hostages. Also, on March 9, 2015, over 300 suspected BH militants were reported killed by Chadian soldiers. On September 24, 2012, it was disclosed that 156 suspected BH militants were arrested and 35 other members were killed during a raid on the sect’s enclave in Yobe and Adamawa States. Also, it was reported in October 2012 that 35 BH militants were killed a gun battle with the JTF. In March 2013, about 72 suspected BH militants were reportedly killed.  

Despite these gains, the security forces have not been able to rescue the missing Chibok school girls abducted in April 2014 after over a year. Also, the raids by security forces have also resulted in collateral damage and gross human rights violations. The Human Rights Watch, and Borno Elders Forum, an assembly of statesmen in Borno State and some traditional rulers and Senators have respectively accused the JTF of high-handedness bordering on extra-judicial killings, physical abuse, rape, arbitrary, secret and unlawful detentions, extortion, burning of houses, and stealing of money during raids.  

These allegations of widespread highhandedness and abuses by the security operatives have often been justified on the ground that BH had committed crimes against humanity. As the JTF through its spokesman Lt. Col. Sagir Musa noted “we should not forget that several security operatives have been killed or maimed by the terrorists, a
lot of police stations and military installations have been destroyed”56. The resort to reprisal attacks reinforces the enemy-centric counterinsurgency approach. This mentality of the JTF has roots in past counterinsurgency warfare. Benefit of hindsight reveals that the Nigerian security operatives carried out reprisal attacks in Umuenchen in 1990 in Delta State, Odi in Bayelsa State in 1999, Zaki Biam in Benue State in 2001, and Ijaw communities such as Gbaramatu, Oporoza, Kunukunuma, and Okorokokoko in Delta State in May 2006 to smoke out suspected militants’ hideouts57.

De-radicalization strategies: The SSS has introduced the Perception Management Program (PMP) with rehabilitation, de-radicalization and welfare dimensions. The SSS through contracts with some clerics teach, preach and propagate moderate Islamic beliefs on electronic media such as radio and television. Some of the Islamic clerics have been used also to engage Islamic extremists in debates over interpretations of Islamic injunction, and praxis. In addition, the SSS has been investigating the familial background of BH radicals with the intent to understanding their economic status and assisting them financially. More so, the SSS is offering assistance in ensuring re-admission of school drop-outs into schools and securing admission for eligible candidates among them58. It is pertinent to note that there is yet no data to show any significance difference the PMP has made on the counterinsurgency warfare.

Limiting Factors on the Nigerian Security Forces in Confronting Boko Haram

A number of factors limit the effectiveness of the Nigerian security forces to combat the BH insurgency. A major challenge of security forces in the counterinsurgency warfare is that their personnel are overstretched. The Chief of Army Staff, Ihejirika acknowledged this in relations to the Army, when he noted that “practically every Nigerian Army unit is engaged and there is no redundancy or reserves to cater for rest and recuperation of troops”59.

Apart from being overstretched, the security forces are contending with inadequate ammunition and ill-motivation. According to Governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, with the arrangement on currently ground, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat Boko Haram…I made it emphatically clear to Mr. President that the Boko Haram are better armed and better motivated, anybody who is following events in this country can attest to the fact that they have a very smooth sail overrunning communities, killing people60.

Although the Nigerian defence authority had faulted the governor’s claim, the level of demotivation in the security forces reached a point that compelled some soldiers in the 7th division to engage in mutinous actions such as opening fire on their commanding officers after 12 of their comrades were killed in an ambush\(^{61}\).

It is true that Nigeria in the wake of BH insurgency has become a bigger spender on defence and security as reflected in its annual national budgetary allocation to security. In 2014, out of a total budget of N4.962 trillion, the defence sector was allocated N968.127 billion. This represents 20 per cent of the total budget.\(^{62}\) Instructively, the heavy budgetary allocation has not translated into the motivation of and purchase of equipment for the security forces possibly due to corruption.

In addition, in the wake of BH insurgency, the Nigerian government ensured that operatives of the security forces receive training on combating terrorism both in and outside the country. In 2012, some 300 Nigerian soldiers were reportedly sent to the USA to receive counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and bomb-disposal training specifically aimed at fighting BH. However, authority of the Nigerian Army was reported to have denied sending soldiers on counter-terrorism training in the USA\(^{63}\). This denial could be a ploy to keep BH members out of the strategic plans of the security forces. But, even if the training was real, there are yet no data as at the time of this writing to show the significant impact such training has on the counterinsurgency warfare.

Another factor limiting the effectiveness of the security forces in combating BH insurgency is undue rivalry and suspicion among the sister organizations and quest for personal glory at the topmost level of the agencies. For instance, it was reported that lack of teamwork was responsible for the failure of the security agencies to prevent the attack on the UN building. Although information about the plan was reportedly received about nine days before it was executed, this allegation was denied by the then National Security Adviser\(^{64}\).

Also, the impact of the security forces in combating BH insurgency may have been undermined by the clandestine interactions between some unscrupulous security personnel and BH insurgents. In May 2013, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt.-Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika was quoted to have said that some soldiers were arrested for conversing with BH insurgents\(^{65}\). Similarly, in 2012 Colonel Sagir Musa, the spokesman of JTF was reported to have disclosed in an interview with British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that the JTF arrested a number of security operatives who had confessed to being BH members and carrying out attacks for BH\(^{66}\). In what seems to be lending credence to this claim, Goodluck Jonathan, then president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria reportedly held that the activities of BH have become difficult to combat be-

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64. Oluokon Ayorinde, ‘Why the Terrorists are Winning in Nigeria’, The News, 18 September 2011
66. JTF arrest Nigerian security operatives working for Boko Haram, Premium Times, 30 September 2012
cause the sect has infiltrated sensitive government institutions (the legislature, the presidency, executive, and judiciary) and even the security apparatuses such as the police and armed forces.

Although some prominent political, religious and military figures have been alleged to be fraternizing with suspected members of BH, many of whom have denied while some others have threatened court action in order to clear their names. A few of them are being prosecuted in the court. This situation, which creates an impression of popular support and legitimacy for the insurgents, is capable of demoralizing and demobilizing the security forces in the counterinsurgency warfare.

In addition, the clandestine support by some residents in the local communities for BH limits the counterinsurgency operation of the security forces. Although the Civilian Joint Task Force has been supportive of the security operatives in the counterinsurgency warfare especially in terms of information gathering, the authorities of the security forces have alleged that residents of some communities of accommodate, shield and allow members of BH to use their houses as escape routes after attacks. This may be for fear of retribution from the sect or the inability of the security agencies to provide them security. Moreover, the alleged indiscriminate deployment of force by and the associated abuses could have compelled or encouraged significant section of the people of the affected local communities hitherto critical of BH violence and extremism to support the militants. Suggestively, the JTF’s indiscriminate deployment of force alienates the local people who are supposed to be the victims of BH insurgency from the security operatives.

Also, a significant challenge to the counterinsurgency warfare of the security forces is the external supports for BH. It has been contended by the authority of the Nigerian Defence and Security that the sect has links with international terrorist organizations such as AQIM, which operates principally in the Sahel region. The sect reportedly derived financial support from sympathetic groups in the Middle East and North Africa. This support perhaps helps the sect grow more complex and acquire sophisticated weapons. These external supports help the asymmetric operations of BH and frustrate the efforts of the security forces.

A further central challenge to the security forces in effectively responding to the BH insurgency is the porous nature of the Nigerian borders. Nigeria shares borders with the Niger Republic and Chad to the north, the Benin Republic in the west, Cameroon to the northeast and south–south, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe in the south. The Nigerian Immigration Service disclosed it has discovered along the borders about 1,487 illegal routes into Nigeria and 84 regular routes. The share breadth of these numerous entry points arguably constitutes challenge to security plans while it provides BH militants with leverage for escaping from the security agencies in the wake of attacks and for bringing arms and illegal immigrants into the country. Due to the porous nature of the Nigerian borders, the BH operational zone is believed to host

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70. Ibid
71. ‘Nigeria’s porous border’, Vanguard, 7 February 2013
sophisticated arms such as AK-47, G3 magazines, rocket aircraft missiles, some of which have been intercepted by security operatives. This free flow of arms in the north emboldens BH militants in confronting the security operatives.

The objective socio-economic condition in the North-eastern part of Nigeria where BH has been most active has potential implications for limiting the effectiveness of the security forces in the counterinsurgency warfare. Compared to other parts of Nigeria, the objective socio-economic conditions in terms of poverty and illiteracy in the northeast region of the country are more profound. This objective condition creates a rich reservoir for the supply of recruits for the insurgent group. The Almajiri population (less privileged children isolated from western education who survive on alms) in northern Nigeria is put at about 9.5 million. As the spokesman of BH noted “there is a large number of our brothers, all eager to carry out suicide missions because of the abundant reward that awaits the person. So, we decided to introduce balloting to avoid disharmony among us”.

Also, a major limiting factor on the counterinsurgency warfare by the security forces is the seeming lack of luster of Nigerian Federal Government under Goodluck Jonathan. Although, in May 2014, at a summit hosted in Paris, President Jonathan with his counterparts from Benin Republic, Chad, Cameroun and Niger approved an action plan designed to counter BH activities, President Idriss Deby of Chad in an interview with French magazine accused the Nigerian government of attempting to doom the action plan for failing to cooperate with the regional collation offensive.

Indeed, until the mid-February 2015 when the Jonathan government tactically postponed the general election to avoid an embarrassing defeat, there was no strategic action to galvanize the security forces in combating BH. It was after the postponement of the election that the Federal government procured military hardwares, adopted a regional military approach courtesy the African Union strategic plan that have given the security forces upper hand over BH insurgents. However, these eleventh-hour strategic measures were not sufficient for Nigerian electorate to renew the electoral mandate of the Jonathan government.

Conclusion

This article examined the operations of counterinsurgency warfare by the Nigerian security forces against BH insurgency in the northern part of the country. It acknowledged that the security forces have recorded some gains in its counterinsurgency operations. The security forces have helped in the recovery of some captured towns and villages, rescuing of a number of women hitherto held hostage and killed many BH militants. However, these gains remain marginal, as demonstrated by the growing

73. Ibid
76. Chad president accuses Nigeria of failing to help fight Boko Haram, Daily Mail, 27 March 2015
audacity in violent attacks with lethal effects by BH insurgents. The paper identifies a number of factors limiting the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency warfare by the security forces. Among others, the limiting factors are overstretched personnel, ill-motivation and poor equipment, poor professional ethics, corruption, and lack of proper integration among the security forces, as well as insufficient popular and external supports.

Thus, to shape the capacity of the security forces in the counterinsurgency warfare, there is the need for better financing and supply of superior modern equipment, greater incentives and regular training and re-training for the security personnel as well as effective collaboration and cooperation across the various units and services of the security forces.

Furthermore, there is the need for the various levels of government to improve the governance capacity in the country through provision of essential services to its citizens in order to limit any form of sympathy for the insurgent group and limit its source of supply for recruits. In addition, there is the need to limit the capacity of BH to external supports: training, operational tactics, money, arms, logistics, diplomatic backing, supply of recruits and freedom to use foreign territories as sanctuary.
Drones in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: A New Direction in United Nations Peace

Philip Attuquaye\textsuperscript{1} & Michael Yekple\textsuperscript{2}

Abstract

Contemporary narratives surrounding the use of drones have been overwhelmingly influenced by fallouts from their application in the United States-led War on Terror. These have included collateral damage from targeted killings, the psychological effects on target communities living in fear of drone attacks as well as denunciations of legal justifications for the use of drones to arbitrarily execute people. The implication of the confluence of these challenges is a heavy cloud of controversy surrounding the use of drones. This notwithstanding, the United Nations (UN) has approved the use of drones by its mission in Congo (MONUSCO). Within the context of controversies surrounding drone use, this paper examines UN operations in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and assesses the implication of the use of drones within that mission. It is argued that notwithstanding challenges relating to storage and dissemination of surveillance data, the strategic utility of drones is critical to the execution of the mandate of MONUSCO.

Introduction

Over the years, the nature of conflict has evolved, where conflicts have become largely intra-state. This has necessitated the modification of the strategic context of UN peace operations, making peace operations more robust and multi-dimensional.\textsuperscript{3} In the DRC, where conflict has been raging since 1996 between rebel groups supported by Rwanda and Uganda and government forces supported by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, much of the changing context of internal conflict has been at play. The origin of the conflict is found in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its Hutu-Tutsi ethnic rivalry. Following the genocide, forces supported by Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC in 1996, in retaliation for DRC’s hosting of Hutu militias, thought to be re-

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sponsible for the genocide. Aided by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, the DRC pushed back the invading forces. Consequent to this, the Lusaka Agreement was brokered and signed in 1999 by the parties to the conflict. The ceasefire however broke down leading to another outbreak of conflict that continued until 2003. Since 1996, the conflict has been defined by varying levels of rebel activities, resulting in gross human right abuses, massive civilian casualties and a sovereign territory balkanized and denied government authority.

The UN got involved in the conflict in 1999 when it created the United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) to implement the Lusaka Agreement. In 2010, the UN Security Council (UNSC), on the basis of resolution 1925 (2010), transformed the MONUC into the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) with an enhanced mandate to include state building responsibilities: protection of civilians, promoting rule of law and reclaiming territory for sovereign control. To fulfill the tenets of resolution 1925, the UNSC has authorized two new measures to be adopted: the authorization of offensive action, to be carried out by a newly constituted military unit of MONUSCO known as the Intervention Brigade, against armed groups that pose security challenges to state integrity and the safety of civilians. The second relates to the use of Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs), popularly known as drones. UAVs, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, are “powered, aerial vehicles that do not carry a human operator, use aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload”.

The deployment of drones by MONUSCO appears consistent with the evolving approach to peacekeeping in response to changing context of war; yet, it also appears to generate huge interests because of the controversies associated with the application of drones in the War on Terror. This paper addresses the implications of the use of drones on UN operations in Eastern DRC. This is geared towards a forecast of the possibility of enhanced drone use in future UN missions particularly in Africa. The context for this paper is set with an overview of the conflict in the DRC and the UN’s involvement followed by a review of the use of drones as a new approach to the changing context of UN peace operations. The paper then discusses the relevance of drone capability for MONUSCO’s mandate and its implications for future UN peace operations.

4. The Lusaka Agreement was signed between states who were the major stakeholders in the conflict in the DRC. These include Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Key points covered by the Agreement towards resolving the conflict in the DRC were the establishment of Joint Military Commission (JMC) which is representative of all the belligerent factions, the withdrawal of all foreign groups engaging in hostilities in the DRC; and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants in the DRC. Perhaps most significantly, the Lusaka Agreement required the creation of a UN Peacekeeping Mission to help monitor and enforce crucial aspects of the agreement such as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups.


The Conflict in the DRC and the UN’s Involvement: An Overview

In 2010 the United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) was transformed into the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) by UNSC Resolution 1925, to on the role of ensuring that all armed stopped violence against civilians. MONUSCO’s mandate was later renewed to include the state-building doctrine of the UN, including helping the DRC with public sector reform, Security Sector Reform (SSR), and reclaiming state control over the rebel held areas of the eastern provinces. However, with multiple armed groups operating in the region, it was essential to also stabilize security within the DRC and the great lakes region as a whole. The mechanism for addressing this was an Intervention Brigade. An arrangement sanctioned by the African Union (AU) and the UN and backed by UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013).

The establishment of the Intervention Brigade is considered a milestone in the UN’s use of force as it provides legal backing to the deployment of UN troops, for the first time, in active combat against armed groups. The specific objectives of the Brigade is to “neutralize” and “disarm” armed groups and eradicate the threat they pose to state authority and the security of civilians. Resolution 2098 is also peculiar because it set a precedent for the authorization of the use of drones to aid MONUSCO’s surveillance capabilities. Both the Intervention Brigade and the use of drones are commensurate with the open-ended measures (indicated as “all necessary means” in resolution 2098) MONUSCO could adopt to ensure the protection of civilians and prevent human rights violations.

The UN’s resort to the use of drones in its MONUSCO mission falls within the continuum of a larger non-military application of drone technology; most of which is in mainstream civilian, commercial and humanitarian spheres. The legitimacy of the civilian use of drones is utility-driven. The rise of drones in the humanitarian industry can however be understood within the framework that Sandvik and Lohne described as ‘war dividend’. This suggests that while ‘peace dividends’ reflects developments accruing from the absence of war, the rise of drones in the humanitarian sector derives from developments accruing due to the presence of war dividends emerging from the military spending on the War on Terror. Thus, the creeping of
Drones in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

Drones into the humanitarian sector may be due to the contiguity of warfare and humanitarian action over the past decade in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.14

**The Use of Drones as New Approach to the Changing Context of UN Peacekeeping**

Since the end of the Cold War, UN peace operations have taken a new turn, from the old model of monitoring ceasefire and armistice agreements, to one that is robust, multidimensional, and increasingly characterized by enforcement action. This is in line with the state-building doctrine of the UN whose basic tenets by virtue of the 2008 Capstone Doctrine, include, the protection of civilians, promotion of democratic reforms, and the restoration of state control over territories, among others.15

The MONUSCO mission typifies the contemporary state-building enterprise of UN peace operations. The UN’s resolve to advance this approach to peacekeeping took a new turn in January 2013, when UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013) approved the use of drones by MONUSCO. While this is the first time the UN is deploying its own drones in a peace operation, western countries have used drones in peace operations over the years. As early as 1994, the U.S. deployed Gnat 750 drones, which are earlier versions of the predator, and the reaper drones, over Bosnia. Other non-UN peace operation missions, such as those of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) have since deployed drones in various peace support operations.16 Besides, in 2006, Belgian troops who were part of the EU Force (EUFOR) contingent providing technical assistance to MONUC came along with drones to enhance the work of MONUC.17 Again, in 2008, EUFORas well as some affiliates of the civilian UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) used drones for many purposes including the protection of refugees and the tracking of internally displaced persons both in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).18 While successes recorded in such peacekeeping theatres could have inspired the recourse to drones in the DRC, the MONUSCO mission also offers peculiar challenges that maybe effectively addressed with the aid of drones.

**Relevance of Drone Capability for MONUSCO’s Mandate**

A fundamental component of the mandate of MONUSCO is the protection of civilians, UN personnel, and generally, to put an end to long years of human rights violations that have come to characterize the conflict labeled one of the most dangerous on the planet since the World Wars. While the UNSC has passed elaborate resolutions

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14. Ibid.
15. Piiparinen, ‘UN State Building at A Turning Point’
18. Ibid.
with respect to the protection of civilians in the DRC,\textsuperscript{19} the UN has not succeeded in this regard. Therefore, it ranks high on the current mandate of MONUSCO, as indicated by paragraph 4 (2) of resolution 2147 (2014). In this regard, MONUSCO is mandated to protect civilians from physical violence, “through active patrolling, paying particular attention to civilians gathered in displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, from aggression and violence originating in parties to the conflict.”\textsuperscript{20} Further, MONUSCO is tasked with the protection of lives of UN personnel as well as property, and guaranteeing their freedom in order to perform their tasks. They are to monitor and prevent human right violations and all forms of violence perpetrated against populations in hostile areas around the eastern border.\textsuperscript{21}

Unfortunately, MONUSCO is contending with armed groups not given to conventional military stratagem, but like irregular armies and groups, resort to guerrilla tactics to perpetrate violence against civilians.\textsuperscript{22} Such activities by irregular armed groups in the DRC are generally consistent with the nature of intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War period. The conflict in the DRC has festered, among others, because forces in the eastern DRC derive ‘unwholesome urge’ from the use of unconventional approach, through guerrilla tactics. In their contention, they have the ‘right’ to disregard international humanitarian law in a manner their peacekeeper counterparts cannot; they are able to abduct and hold hostage civilians as bait. In short, they are able to exploit civilian vulnerability. In this regard, obtaining timely and regular intelligence on the condition of civilians, largely situated in the remote regions, and the activities of armed groups is important to prevent the regular attacks on civilians.

More importantly, the ability of drones to provide MONUSCO troops with reasonable qualitative and quantitative intelligence on the armed groups is a great leveler. It is reasonable to suggest that such intelligence can alleviate the deficits peacekeeping troops incur due to armed groups’ exploitation of guerrilla tactics. Thus the use of guerrilla tactics by armed groups put them at an advantage regarding military strategy, as armed groups are able to equal peacekeeping troops in all respects; in terms of financial support UN troops leverage budgets from the mission while armed groups in the DRC engage in resource theft and are supported by foreign backers, sometimes states.\textsuperscript{23} In terms of arms, the trans-border arms smuggle into the DRC feeds the arms demand of the armed groups. However, armed groups’ exploitation of guerrilla tactics has always given them some edge over peacekeepers. The use of drones by peacekeeping troops to leverage intelligence on armed groups will likely tilt the balance of mili-


\textsuperscript{20} United Nations Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014)

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Nadira Lalji, ‘The resource curse revised: Conflict and Coltan in the Congo,’ Harvard International Review 29, no. 3 (2007): 34.

tary superiority in favour of MONUSCO. Thus, drones capability is not only a new addition to the repertoire of peacekeeping equipment for the UN, but it appears to offer the opportunity for peacekeepers to be one step ahead of armed groups, therefore bringing balance in strategy between the two sides.

Another mandate of MONUSCO, relating to the security of the DRC, and whose fulfillment the use of drones would be helpful has to do with monitoring the movement of armed groups, arms and related materiel. This is in all respects a difficult task, especially in the context of the challenges imposed by Africa’s notorious porous borders. The DRC is the heart of central Africa, sharing borders with nine countries, most of them post-conflict countries. This makes the region a melting pot of armed groups who exploit the porous borders to smuggle arms and mineral resources across the region. For instance, a group like the LRA, led by Joseph Kony, since it was pushed out of Uganda, has been shuttling between the CAR, DRC and South Sudan. The ability of MONUSCO to monitor and control arms smuggle and the movement of armed groups would naturally depend on the commitment of and collaboration with all neighbouring countries of the DRC. At best, relations between the concerned countries in the Great Lakes region are murky, characterized by mistrust, emanating from accusations and counter-accusations of long years of war. Therefore, the collaboration of security and intelligence sectors of the countries of the Great Lakes Region needed for generating and sharing of trans-border intelligence on the activities of armed group into the eastern DRC cannot be guaranteed. The implications are that MONUSCO must shoulder the generation of intelligence to aid its peacekeeping efforts. The use of drones would, in important ways, relieve the burden of securing the commitment of neighbouring countries in the Great Lakes region regarding the generation of intelligence. With a base in Goma, and reaching a distance of up to 200 km, remaining airborne for up to 14 hours, the drones are directed to monitor activities in the hinterland and collect intelligence along the borders in the east, even without the political commitment of neighbouring countries.

Furthermore, drone capability is relevant for the MONUSCO mission because of geography of the DRC. In many respects, the context of the DRC is representative of challenges faced imposed by geography faced by peacekeepers. The DRC is a huge expanse of land, occupying a total area of approximately 2.3 million km², majority of which constitutes rural areas, inhabiting over 60% of the country’s 68 million people. Civilian dwellings therefore follow dispersed settlement patterns dotted across the large expanse of land. Besides, the eastern corridor, the base of the peacekeeping troops, is ruggedly mountainous, covered with thick forest, exploited by armed groups for safe havens. Access to those regions has been challenging for peacekeepers. The difficult context of the peacekeeping in the DRC is further complicated by its chronic infrastructural deficit; a challenge that had been longstanding, even predating the war, often attributed to the long years of neglect of infrastructural development during decades of Mobutu rule. The long years of war further depleted the limited infrastructure. Infrastructural deficit in the case of MONUSCO means lack or poor road networks linking the hinterlands for easy movement to and access of those areas.

Thus, the eastern DRC, the catchment area of MONUSCO’s operation lack the necessary access roads linking the remote civilian communities, which are also concentrations of mineral wealth, and hence key areas of contention for armed groups.

The challenges of geography and poor infrastructure undoubtedly inhibit MONUSCO in two of its core mandates; first, the mandate to protect civilians and second, the mandate to monitor the movement and activities of armed groups. However, the use of drones enable MONUSCO to navigate the limitations of geography and infrastructure it encounters in the pursuance of these functions. This is made possible by a unique feature of drone capability: precision, which enables the identification of specific targets,25 which in this case are the civilians MONUSCO is mandated to protect. The quality of precision of drones is brought to fore on MONUSCO’s mandate of protection of civilians as it allows peacekeepers to concentrate on remote communities vulnerable to crisis situations, emanating not only from activities of armed groups, but also from natural disasters such as floods. Thus the ability of drones to focus on remote communities, and to target civilians who are in distress, and providing them with the needed help enables MONUSCO to sidestep the geography and infrastructural challenge of the DRC. Without drone technology, the status quo with respect to MONUSCO’s modus operandi is “short-sighted ‘peacekeeping through remote-controlling’ tactics, occupying and policing areas for a limited time and protecting civilians in those areas, and removing troops to new hotspots where they are needed more urgently”;26 MONUSCO is not the first peacekeeping mission to use drone capability to protect civilians. During the EUFOR support operation with MONUC in 2006, drones enabled the peacekeeping troops to focus on hostile areas, while at the same time monitoring developments in other areas. This curbed the intermittent and unexpected attacks on remote communities in the dangerous eastern area.27 MONUSCO’s resort to drones will enable it respond quickly in cases of armed attacks against civilians in remote parts of the eastern DRC.

The difficult terrain of the DRC coupled with poor infrastructure does not only prevent peacekeepers’ access to remote civilian communities but also prevent access to safe havens of armed groups. With drones, MONUSCO troops have invincible access to remote areas where alternative platforms like helicopters and patrol vehicles cannot. The relevance of drone capability in this regard is in many ways similar to the United States’ use in the War on Terror, in which it has appropriated drone capability in its unconventional wars in places such as the tribal regions of Pakistan, Somalia and the Sahel where, due to want of geography, boots could not be put on the ground.28 The targets, in the case of MONUSCO, are not members of terrorist organizations, but armed groups whose movement and activities are to be monitored. The access of MONUSCO troops to surmount the difficult terrains of the eastern DRC through the use of surveillance drones makes the work of the mission easier.

26. Piiparinen, ‘UN State Building at A Turning Point’
27. Interview with an Austrian military officer who was part of the EUFOR who provided support, including drone capability, to the MONUC mission in the DRC in 2006, 10th July, 2014
While the use of drones are relevant to help the MONUSCO troops navigate the challenges stated above regarding the context of peacekeeping in the DRC, there are some other dynamics of drone capability that can be appropriated to advance the course of MONUSCO in the areas of cost of peacekeeping, storage of data and the quality of deterrence emanating from the presence of peacekeepers. Regarding cost, drones are cheaper compared to mainstream instruments of peacekeeping such as jets and helicopters. Over the years, UN missions have experienced acute budget constraints. For instance, between 2012 and 2013, all ongoing UN missions, including MONUSCO, received 10 per cent budget cut.29 This had severe implications for some of their most reliable peacekeeping assets such as helicopters. As a result, MONUSCO’s helicopter inventory has not been progressive: 2008, it had 46 helicopters; 2009, it had 47; in 2010 it had 47, in 2011 it had 52; in 2011, it had 37 helicopters.30 Drones can be good alternatives for the more expensive surveillance platforms, in order to address the budget constraints of MONUSCO. The acute shortage of helicopter facility facing MONUSCO meant that peacekeepers had to choose between conducting surveillance and attending to emergency situations of remote dwellers in the eastern DRC. Drone capability would allow for a more efficient allocation of the already overstretched helicopters, by freeing them to be redeployed to more pressing tasks such as responding to crisis and emergency situations of civilians in remote parts of the eastern DRC.31

One of the reasons drone technology is highly sought after is its ability to accumulate considerable amount of data that can be used for various purposes. For this reason, drones are largely deployed in the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Peacekeeping operations thrive on collection and accumulation of intelligence. Manned platforms have been the main instrument of intelligence gathering for UN peacekeeping operations. Manned helicopters have had to depend on eye-view of troops for surveillance. This puts limit on the amount of intelligence that can be collected. Then, there is the challenge of accumulation of data as manned platforms do not have the capability to accumulate data.

Drone technology makes much difference for the MONUSCO peacekeepers. Unlike helicopters, data collected, especially on armed groups, is stored and analysed and used to enhance the early warning system of MONUSCO. This position was aptly made by the UN Secretary General Ban to the effect that drones provide “information capabilities needed for advanced information collation, analysis and dissemination to enhance situational awareness and to permit timely decision-making.”32 Such vital information provided by drones enables the UN to “track movement of armed militias, assist patrol heading into hostile territory, and document atrocities.”33

30. Ibid.
31. Interview with an Austrian military officer, 10th July, 2014
Accumulation of intelligence is also crucial for MONUSCO to meet one of its most sensitive mandates: monitoring and implementation of the arm embargo established by UNSC resolution 1807 (2008) and further reiterated by resolution 2078 (2012). The arms embargo was intended to curb the inflow of arms to the DRC, and to deny arms to rebel groups. Over the years, the UN and the DRC have accused the eastern neighbours of supplying these groups with arms for their activities in the mineral rich eastern DRC. According to the UN Secretary Ban Ki-Moon, MONUSCO drones are useful to “monitor and report on flows of arms and related materiel across the borders of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.” Drones are able to accumulate data on clandestine movement of arms in order to curb illegal arms flow into eastern DRC.

In peacekeeping environments, the presence of peacekeepers is expected to impose certain deterrence, serving as disincentive to armed groups. But deterrence of peacekeepers can be ineffective when armed groups know locations are inaccessible to peacekeeping troops. The ability of drones to hover over large areas reach remote, inaccessible parts of the eastern DRC where armed groups hide, restores the deterrence of the presence of peacekeepers. The UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Herve Ladsous puts it aptly when he indicated that the presence of surveillance drones in the skies of the eastern regions of the DRC serves as deterrence to armed groups. If armed groups realize that their moves are being monitored by the UN troops, they would not be motivated to move around terrorizing civilians.

The UN’s decision to use drones in its mission in the eastern DRC while it may have been motivated by its use in other peacekeeping missions is in tandem with specific realities of the peacekeeping context in the DRC. Those realities feed into the generally challenging contexts of contemporary peacekeeping bemoaned by UN officials. The DRC epitomizes those challenges in many respects: the use of guerrilla tactics by various groups; the reality of Africa’s infamous borders, lack of capacity of the government of the DRC to organize unimpeachable intelligence to guide the work of MONUSCO and the huge infrastructural deficit within the DRC. It is herein argued that arming MONUSCO with drone capability is appropriate to meet the mandate of the mission.

Challenges Facing the UN’s Deployment of Drones

Since the UN disclosed its intentions to arm MONUSCO with drone capability, some thorny issues have emerged concerning general operating procedures, dissemination

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35. Letter dated 27 December 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2012/43)

of information and many more.\textsuperscript{37} This is because drones generate huge surveillance data, and the UN would have to contend with the management of that data. In a conflict situation like the DRC, an array of information is gathered: information on armed groups, human rights violations and commission of war crimes, movement of arms, resource theft, among others.\textsuperscript{38} Those are valuable information for the UN's purpose. However, the controversial part is the unintended consequence of drone surveillance; thus, the chunk of surveillance data not related to the mission of the UN, but is collected anyway. It could be data on private individuals, organizations or even sensitive information bordering on the national security of neighbouring states. The UN has to develop a robust operational procedure that addresses any blowback arising from these issues in the future.

Management of ‘targeted data’ is an area of concern. The current operational procedure requires that data is classified and kept in exclusive custody of the UN. Access thereby entails laborious legal and bureaucratic tussle with the world organization.\textsuperscript{39} The UN is yet to address controversies that will soon arise with respect to whether host countries, for instance, have the right to surveillance data, or the implication for international justice. That is, whether data in UN’s custody could, for instance, be used for the prosecution of war criminals in the International Criminal Court (ICC).

While surveillance data is presumably safe in UN custody, concerns remain, largely among developing countries, of the ability of powerful countries to surreptitiously access such a data in UN custody. It is one of the concerns that motivated developing countries’ resistance to the request for MONUSCO to use drones. These countries are not so enthused with drafting drone capability into UN peacekeeping operations, because they consider their use as an opportunity for western powers to infiltrate into the intelligence systems of developing countries. The basis of the apprehension among countries of the Global South with respect to security of surveillance data, perhaps, lies in the 1990s, when U.S. intelligence operatives sneaked into the weapons system of the UN, and extracted information on the then Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{40}

Outside the UN fold, peace operations are increasingly adopting drone technology. In Mali, Dutch troops are using drones to collect intelligence on the activities of Islamist insurgents in the Sahel. The UN has been given approval by host governments in Mali and CAR to deploy drones in their territories. Others like South Sudan have refused. What is clear is that all terrains for which drones are being sought, or are already being used in Africa are terrains that troops have challenges to access. For instance, when French troops pushed Al-Qaeda militants from Northern Mali in 2013, the insurgent later sought refuge in mountains and desert regions of Northern Mali, where began to launch guerrilla attacks. French troops relied on drones to continue the fight against these Islamist insurgents in those mountainous and desert regions.

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\textsuperscript{37} Karlsrud and Rosen, ‘In the Eye of the Beholder? The UN and the Use of Drones to Protect Civilians’


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Lynch, ‘UN Wants Drones for Peacekeeping’
that would otherwise not be accessible. Navigating such challenges using drones makes drone technology attractive to ensuing peace related operations. The utility dimension of drones thus drives international partners’ current requests to national governments, particularly on the African continent, to use drones on their territories. However, receiving approval from a host government and acquiring acceptance from the civilian population are mutually exclusive. Events so far, with exception of the South Sudan case, suggest that the UN is not likely to face challenges securing host governments’ approval to deploy drones in their territories. The challenge, however, will be addressing the implications of their deployment for populations of the host countries.

The deployment of drones in the skies of civilian populations is bound to create some problems if civilian populations are not adequately educated about why and how they operate. In 2006, during the EUFOR experience with drones in the DRC, elaborate public education campaigns were conducted to inform the general public about the purpose and nature of operation of the drones. This was done through radio and TV campaigns. This alleviated the concerns of populations and their ability to manage the presence of the drones. There are indications that current deployment of drones by MONUSCO is somewhat lacking in the area of citizens’ education regarding the drone programme run by MONUSCO. A major humanitarian group operating in Congo, the World Vision, indicates that citizens are unaware “about when and why these surveillance vehicles are being used.” Civilians cannot distinguish between the military use of drones and their use for aid delivery. This is the case because UN humanitarian agencies are using the drones for their activities alongside their use by the military component of MONUSCO. It has been suggested that this development negatively affects the work of aid agencies whose principles of neutrality, impartiality and operational independence is on the line (World Vision, 2014). This is blurring the line between the humanitarian action and military activity, not only in the minds of the populations of the local communities, but rebel forces, thereby exposing humanitarian actors to enormous risks.

**Implications for UN Future Peace Operations**

MONUSCO’s experiment with drones in the DRC has carved a precedent for future use of drones in other UN missions. Such calls have already been made. For instance, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon alluded the fact that the UN “will continue to consult the legislative bodies on the deployment of unmanned unarmed aerial vehicles based on the experience we have gained with their deployment to MONUSCO’” Besides,

42. Sengupta, ‘Unarmed Drones Aids UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa’
43. Interview with an Austrian Military officer
45. Ibid.
46. Secretary General’s Remarks at the United Nations Open Debate on Trends in United Nations Peacekeeping
the UN peacekeeping chief Herve Ladsous has called for drones to be incorporated into the peacekeeping setup in the UN’s missions in Mali, CAR and South Sudan. Ladsous has requested for the UNSC to deploy them in Mali. According to him, drones will “enhance the situational awareness of MINUSMA as well as its ability to protect civilians and its own personnel”. Such calls to deploy drones in other UN missions are based on the experiment of drones with MONUSCO.

The use of drones by MONUSCO, and the subsequent calls for its use to be extended to other UN peacekeeping missions, is indicative of the crucial role they will play in UN peacekeeping in the near future. This is consistent with the public declarations of some high-ranking UN officials in recent times. For instance, Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon asserts that technology must be employed to make peacekeeping more effective and less costly, considering the increasingly difficult contexts peacekeepers now operate in.

Greater integration of drone technology into UN peacekeeping operations holds vexing implications for both topics: drones and peacekeeping. In the build up to the UNSC approval of the MONUSCO drones, UN public relations had been characterized by efforts to explain that the drones would be unarmed. This was to dispel the unenviable reputation of drones due to America’s campaign of targeted killing. However, the prospects of ‘weaponization’ of peacekeeping drones cannot be completely discarded, especially when analyzed in the context of the evolution of the UN use of force.

The UN has been more receptive to the use of force in the post-Cold War period, as violent intra state conflicts have been rampant in most countries, particularly in Africa. The reason the UN gives for its increasing enforcement action in recent times is that the context of peacekeeping has evolved, where peacekeepers encounter “asymmetric and unconventional threats”. This sentiment accounts for the austere and landmark enforcement action that characterized the mission of the Intervention Brigade in the eastern DRC. This suggests that the UN has evolved, and the peacekeeping environments of recent times have forced it to soften its stance on strict adherence to its core principle of neutrality, by fighting alongside national armies against rebel groups.

It is within the context of the increasingly difficult environment that the UN peacekeeping forces operate and the new threats peacekeepers encounter, marching it against the trajectory of UN’s use of force that people’s apprehension about the possible weaponization of peacekeeping drones is, perhaps, not out of place. This is because the context of the DRC could change, demanding that the UN changes strategy. The wording of portions of two crucial UNSC resolutions guiding MONUSCO’s operations in the DRC points to this direction. UNSC resolution 1925, now amended to become resolution 2147, in effect “authorizes MONUSCO to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry

49. Secretary General’s Remarks at the United Nations Open Debate on Trends in United Nations Peacekeeping
out its protection mandate...” Again paragraph 11 of UNSC resolution 2098 (2013) states that:

Future reconfigurations of MONUSCO and its mandate should be determined on the basis of the evolution of the situation on the ground and, in the context of implementation by the Government of the DRC and all other signatories of the PSC Framework, progress towards the following objectives...

Two conclusions can be gleaned from these two. First, the authorization of the use of all means necessary could be suggested to mean the use of armed drones to achieve the mission mandate; and second, evolution of the situation on the ground could demand MONUSCO’S mandate be reconfigured to include the use of armed drones to target members of armed groups who pose severe threats to civilians humanitarian workers and peacekeeping troops.

The usually quick turn to discount any possibility of the use of armed drones in UN peacekeeping operations raises the question of whether optimum benefits could not be appropriated from drone capability if they were armed in peacekeeping contexts. Most UN officials tend to allude to reasons, including the improvement of the situational awareness of troops for the use of surveillance drones. That includes, for instance, observing the violations of human rights abuses against civilians in remote regions. The best help surveillance drones offer is reducing reaction time because surveillance drones direct troops to specific areas where civilians face imminent threat from armed groups. Surveillance drones therefore cannot address all the challenges when it must still take some time to dispatch troops to locations upon the lead of the drones; in most cases when raid on villages might have occurred before the troops arrive. In other words, surveillance drones could reveal human right violations instantaneously but cannot guarantee instantaneous physical presence of troops on the ground. This situation makes a strong case for the use of armed drones to target and kill armed groups before they attack civilians. The political sentiments that surround the drones discussions in international settings appears to get in the way of the maximum benefits the UN could leverage if the drones were armed. Armed drones could change the current configurations of peacekeeping operations that depend on responding to threats posed to civilians by armed groups, to actually preventing the threats, by targeting armed groups before they attack civilian concentrations.

The UN’s use of drones in its peacekeeping operations also has implications for the political economy of drones. The drone industry, for some time now, has been on a campaign to reconstruct the image of drones to ensure their acceptance into humanitarian industry, or the civilian domain in general. It is an attempt to co-opt civilian and humanitarian market for the drone industry; analysts consider this development necessary because of the projected and actual cuts in the defense budgets of major market players such as the United States. UN’s resort to drones in peacekeeping operations, therefore, accords some credibility to the industry’s efforts to garner legitimacy among the humanitarian community for drones. As drones gain acceptance in UN peacekeeping operations, and the larger humanitarian and civilian spheres, it represents remarkable improvements in the fortunes of the drone industry that has engaged in intense lobbying for the mainstreaming of drones.
Conclusion

The conflict in the DRC has been characterized by gross human rights violations and threatens the security of the entire Great Lakes region, a situation the UN has been trying to avert for over a decade. The mandate of the current mission, MONUSCO, just like its predecessor, MONUC, has been toward that end. MONUSCO’s resort to drones is crucial for meeting its mandates, largely because of the unique advantages offered by drone technology, usually laced in its guiding principles of precision, targeting logic and distance; the same principles that foster their preference in the battlefield. The qualities of drones make it possible for the MONUSCO peacekeepers to better protect civilians, aid workers, UN personnel and alleviate the dangers that the peacekeepers themselves are exposed to.

The UN’s use of drones generated much debate not only because it was the first of its kind in the history of the organization, but also the implications for future UN peace operations as well as for discussions surrounding drones. Other considerations, such as the commercial interests of a powerful drone lobby, have been influential in efforts to reconstruct an image for drones that is acceptable outside military use. The UN has touted the benefits of drones as necessary for surmounting the difficult geographical contexts of its peacekeeping operations. As a result, one can expect more drones in other peacekeeping missions in the future.